Sujetos del Derecho de Autor

In this section I explore the crisis tendencies undermining the established structure of the gender relations of emotion and its trajectory to crisis. I examine the development of these crisis tendencies. I then scrutinise the implications of the maturation of the crisis tendencies on bapakism during the period under study. I argue that the bolder political

movements in support of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) in the first 15 years of the twenty-first century has deepened the gender- order crisis. It has considerably undermined the heteronormative structure of the gender relations of emotion. On one hand, the struggle has exposed more clearly the

marginalisation of non-heteronormative individuals and their expressions of gender and sexual identities. On the other hand, the intensifying struggle has also triggered

backlash, mostly led by conservative religious groups. Indirectly, the backlash against the growing support for LGBTIQ reinforces heteronormativity and the idealisation of heteronormative gender ideals, including the bapakism hegemonic masculinity.

The dominant patterning of relations of emotion in Indonesia is heteronormative. It emphasises an assumed coherence between sex, gender and sexuality. An individual born male is culturally expected to assume a masculine gender identity and to desire a heteronormative sexual relation with a heterosexual feminine woman. Since the colonial period, the state has formally recognised only heterosexual unions and families.

Compulsory heterosexuality increasingly became ‘the norm’ of the gender relations of emotion since the intervention of colonialism. Deviation from heteronormativity outside the culturally recognised niches, such as rituals, entertainment and the informal

economy, have generally resulted in discrimination and/or marginalisation (Blackwood 2005). Heteronormativity is significant to the hegemony of bapakism. A man can be an

ideal authoritative patron leader only in the social units organised within the heterosexual family order. Consequently, masculinities not supporting

Chapter 2. A Gender-Order Crisis

heteronormativity are subordinated or in many cases marginalised. To date in Indonesia, there has not been any openly gay man who is publicly idealised as a representation of ideal masculinity.

Under the authoritarian regime (1966–1998), the heteronormative patterning of sexual relations became increasingly dominant as the state formally supported a

patriarchal gender order. Although the New Order state did not criminalise homosexual unions, it did not take a clear stance to support them either. Given that the state’s

Marriage Law of 1974 recognises only heterosexual marital unions, the New Order state barely took any legal precautions to criminalise non-heterosexual unions. Yet, the New Order’s policies and programs, especially concerning families, were clearly designed with heteronormative assumptions. This is despite the long history and cultural

significance of non-heteronormative individuals in many Indonesian societies since the pre-colonial era (see Blackwood 2005; Davies 2010), and despite the prevalent presence of transgender individuals, including those in popular culture (see Murtagh 2017) and the informal economy (Boellstorff 2004b) at that time. It might indeed sound

contradictory that the then President Soeharto invited a transwoman entertainer, Dorce Gamalama, to several events at his presidential palace.20

This internal contradiction between officially recognised heteronormativity and the reality of everyday LGBTIQ identities overtime developed into a crisis tendency within the structure of the gender relations of emotion. Indeed, theoretically the impending legitimacy of homosexuality is a fundamental crisis tendency within any heteronormative structure of the gender relations of emotion. According to Sara Ahmed (2014: 144), non-heteronormative arrangements of gender relations of emotion threaten

20 _{Dorce Gamalama completed her transition to becoming a woman in 1980s and has since been}

reportedly engaged in romantic relationships with men (Noviandi 2013). Dorce, in her biography, claims that she had performed live in front of five presidents of the Republic of Indonesia (Gamalama and Gunawan, 2005: 80–86). She had performed for Soeharto, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono by the time her biography was released in 2005.

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the only legitimate way of reproducing life—in the form of future generations—as well as reproducing culture as they destabilise the specific arrangements for living, in this case ‘family’ (ibid.). Since the 1980s, activism for the support of non-heteronormative relations of emotion has been visible. The establishment of Lambda Indonesia in 1982 marks the increasing prominence of activism in support of this marginalised group. After being disbanded in 1986, Lambda Indonesia metamorphosed into GAYa Nusantara in 1986, whose operations focused mostly on publication and advocacy against AIDS (Oetomo in Ikawati 2015: n.p.).

The crisis tendency imposed by the increasing visibility of non-heteronormative individuals and communities was discursively counterbalanced by the state. In addition to naturalising heteronormativity through the Marriage Law and other regulations and policies, the New Order state discursively constructed homosexuals and transgender people as belonging to the primary risk groups for developing HIV/AIDS (Oetomo 2000). In doing so, the state discursively constructed homosexuality as bearing substantial health risks, as opposed to the legally sanctioned heteronormative gender relations of emotion. In addition, the consistent naturalisation of gender roles through promotion of heteronormative nuclear families and ideal femininity contributed

significantly in controlling gender and sexuality (Blackwood 2005). The state regulation on child adoption favoured heterosexual couples; in fact, since colonial times, as

prescribed in Staatsblad (129/1917), adoption has been the sole privilege of

heteronormative couples. In short, the New Order state was aware of the growing crisis tendency lurking beneath the heteronormative structure of the gender relations of emotion, yet it did not take direct legal precautions to outlaw this gender practice.

The post-authoritarian moment in Indonesia engendered high hopes for changes to the overall patterning of gender relations, including that of emotion. The euphoria regarding possible changes also triggered bolder political movements in support of non-

Chapter 2. A Gender-Order Crisis

heteronormative groups. Activism for transgender rights, which started around 1960, and gay and lesbian activism, beginning in the early 1980s, became more noticeable publicly and gained more substantial traction post-1998. One of the major milestones was the daring move to host the International Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transexual and Intersex Association (ILGA) in Surabaya in 2010. Yet, the event was eventually cancelled on the day of the conference due to a violent protest led by conservative Islamists. According to Hartoyo, the founder of Suara Kita (Our Voice), a not-for-profit organisation focusing on advocating LGBTIQ rights:

In post-1998, LGBT organisations began to show their identities more publicly. Discussions on discourses of sexualities and genders started to be more seriously fostered by several social organisations. Even LGBT groups started to build intensive dialogues and communication with religious groups (2015: 81).

The movements for LGBTIQ rights also attracted support from public figures. In fact, some religious figures and organisations openly declared their support for

LGBTIQ rights. Among them were Ulil Absar Abdala, the founder of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL, Liberal Muslim Network) (Hadiansyah 2016) and Musdah Mulia, a notable Muslim feminist activist. Although their controversial views subjected them to harsh criticism and multiple threats of violence, they continued to provide support for the recognition of non-heteronormative individuals and communities.

In addition, the post-authoritarian moment opened up new political avenues for the struggle for LGBTIQ rights. Dede Oetomo, an openly gay man and the founder of GAYa Nusantara, was nominated by a minor leftist political party, Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD, People’s Democratic Party), as a legislator in the 1999 General Election (Oetomo 2006).21 In 2012, Oetomo passed the first selection process in an effort to become a commissioner of the Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM),

21

The party itself while standing in the 1999 general election, only won 0.07 per cent of the vote. It has not stood in any subsequent elections.

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although he eventually failed in the ‘fit and proper’ test conducted by the legislative members. This information was reported in ‘Inilah tujuan aktivis gay ingin jadi komisioner komnas HAM’ (This is the goal of a gay activist’s bid for a seat at the National Commission for Human Rights) in Liputan 6(11 October 2012).22 Although he did not make it to the parliament or to KOMNAS HAM, his nomination proves the increasingly visible activism supporting the rights of non-heteronormative individuals and communities. The involvement of openly gay men in state politics was unthinkable in the previous era.

In a much later development, responding to the heightened public debate on LGBTIQ and the intensified global pressure to legalise same-sex unions since 2014, the views of cabinet ministries were no longer in unison towards marginalised groups and individuals. Although none of them asserted their support for the legalisation of non- heteronormative union, the ministers’ views ranged from the need for the state to ensure their safety and rights, all the way through to the need to raise awareness of the apparent dangers of LGBTIQ and the need to criminalise LGBTIQ individuals (Ikawati 2015).

The abovementioned daring movements exposed more clearly the internal contradictions in the established structure of the gender relations of emotion. They revealed more clearly the social and cultural marginalisation and discrimination, which so far had been largely tolerated. In addition, they exposed more plainly the ambivalent position, as well as absence, of the state in terms of legal recognition and protection, discrimination, threats of violence towards these marginalised groups and individuals (Khanis 2013). They also highlighted the involvement of the state and its apparatus in the ensuing criminalisation of LGBTIQ individuals since 2004. For instance, the persecution of Hartoyo in Aceh in 2007 (as a result of the enforcement of the anti-

22 _{A part of the selection process is commonly called the ‘fit and proper’ test, in which the candidate has} to face a panel of legislators. The candidate has to answer the questions given by the legislators. The legislators will then determine whether the candidate is suitable for the position.

Chapter 2. A Gender-Order Crisis

LGBTIQ bylaw) spread virally through global social media networks. It spurred controversy and gained attention from international human rights organisations (Hartoyo 2015).

The movements in support of LGBTIQ rights and the changes they inspired further implicated the relations of masculinities in the gender order. They exposed more clearly that the hegemony of bapakism was at the expense of the marginalisation of

masculinities and of non-heteronormative men and women. The movements revealed that the cultural exaltation of bapakism had inspired the tolerance of bullying and

prevalent discrimination against other masculinities which were considered unfit in the patriarchal gender order. The idealisation of culturally exalted heteronormative

masculinity was no longer taken for granted. Its hegemony was further eroded.

As the movements in support of LGBTIQ rights further eroded the legitimacy of the dominant patterning of the gender relation of emotion, as well as the deeply

entrenched culturally exalted masculinity, they eventually triggered a backlash. Islamisation provided a platform for the struggle to restore the hegemony of

heteronormativity and bapakism masculinity. Tom Boellstorff (2005a: 575) asserts that

many Muslim public figures, mostly men, continued to discriminate against

homosexuality in their public sermons. Some of them increased their vitriol. A series of violent protests, led and populated by mostly men, had taken place against LGBTIQ individuals (Boellstorff 2004a; Liang 2010), and against the activism and social media campaigns of the LGBTIQ rights movements since 1999 (Lestari 2015). In 2010, the Indonesian Islamic Clerics Council (MUI), the official fatwa-issuing organisation in Indonesia, and the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) protested against the Q!Film Festival because homosexuality was considered against the religion and social norms (Gus/Ken

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2010).23 In January 2015, MUI formally issued a fatwa condemning especially gays, lesbians and transgenders and suggesting the state rehabilitate individuals contacting the ‘disease’ and capitally punish those caught performing homosexual activities (Hidayana 2015).

The force to restore the heteronormative gender patterning of emotion, as well as its heteronormative masculinity ideal—bapakism—eventually culminated in the

criminalisation of homosexuality since 2004, albeit in a few regions. While the national law continued to be silent in regard to the legal status and citizenship rights of LGBTIQ people, the decentralisation policy provided opportunities for local governments in several sharia-compliant regions, such as Aceh, Padang Panjang and Tasikmalaya, to criminalise homosexuality (Arivia and Gina 2016; Ichwan 2013). In Aceh, the punishment for committing homosexuality is 100 lashes (Arivia and Gina 2016: 8). Other legal mechanisms, which discriminate against homosexuality, include, among others, Law No. 44/2008 on Pornography,24and Government Regulation No 4/2007 on adoption25 (Muthmainnah 2016).

The increasing visibility of movements in support of LGBTIQ rights and the mounting pressure to formally criminalise non-heteronormative relations were strong indicators of a deepening crisis in the patriarchal gender order. The support for LGBTIQ rights indicated an increasing distrust of the established patterning of the gender

relations of emotions. However, the mounting pressure to restore ‘order’ was a very strong indicator of the growing awareness of the eroded legitimacy of the

heteronormative patterning of the gender relations of emotion and more specifically of

23 _{Greg Fealy (2004) categorises the FPI as part of the burgeoning Islamist movement seeking to} dramatically change Indonesian society and politics through the implementation of a comprehensive sharia law. FPI is best known as a vigilante group for its violent approach to enforcing Islamic law. 24 _{Article 4 criminalises the production, procurement, distribution of pornographic materials, including} those on ‘deviant sexual intercourse’, which further partly specifies as lesbian and homosexual sex (see Muthmainnah 2016).

25 _{Article 13 clearly states that homosexual couples cannot adopt children.}

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hegemonic masculinity. What was considered as something that it was not necessary to regulate in formal legal terms began increasingly to be seen as a threat requiring special attention from, not only religious and community leaders, but also lawmakers. The struggle for hegemony was thus more intensified at this moment in history.