La Suprema Junta Nacional Americana, los elementos constitucionales y Rayón

The complex chain of steps intervening in the setting of railway infrastructure charges - i.e. the overall regulation of the infrastructure manager, the price regulation mechanisms, the definition of the objectives and principles that should drive the pricing tool or the design of the structure – finds its final form in a set of components and variables (the charging structure) and levels. They are the only elements published in the network statement and thus directly perceived by the railway operators.

Moreover, they are the driving force of the charging scheme, and the major leverage on the operation segment. This fact was clearly exemplified in a position paper of the Community of European Railways and Infrastructure Managers (CER, 2005, pp.5-6) that referred the complaints of the international freight operators as “Is structure the problem? [...]It’s the level of charges”.

The characterization of the charging levels may adopt different forms. It is possible to examine the average level of a charging scheme (e.g. in terms of average charge or in terms of cost recovery), the level applied to some standard services (e.g. a standard freight

train or a standard high speed train), the overall range of variation of the levels within the scheme (e.g. minimum and maximum unitary levels) or their specific variability with respect to the parameters included in the charge (e.g. relative variation of the unitary level with the type of service).

3.7.1 Definition of charging levels

The definition of the charging levels applied in the infrastructure network basically depends on the existence of price regulation mechanisms and the pricing principles adopted. Furthermore the allocation of prices to the different services requires an adequate coordination with the components and variables selected for the charge.

As mentioned in section 3.4, the application of indirect price regulation mechanisms on the infrastructure manager may set strict boundaries to the average level of track access charges, in the direct form of price caps or through limitations in the rate of return or the revenues allowed to it.

Fig. 28: Cost elasticity with respect to traffic for various road and rail case studies

Note: Blue columns refer to rail case studies, purple columns to road case studies; O-Operation costs;

M-Maintenance costs; R- Renewal costs; RM-Renewal and Maintenance costs.

Source: GRACE Consortium, 2006, p.20

The selection of a given pricing principle establishes the fundamental relation of the charging levels to costs or demand, influencing both, the methodologies to define the price and the level itself. If the selected principle is based on marginal costs, the levels will be limited by the cost basis selected (maintenance cost only, maintenance and renewal costs, external costs, etc.) and they will be expected to achieve a low cost recovery. According to the more recent case studies performed by the GRACE Consortium, they will generally be below the 30% of the total operation, maintenance or renewal costs considered (Fig. 28). If the selected principle is based on average costs,

the level of the charge will be defined by the level of total costs born by the infrastructure manager. If the selected approach is a full cost minus State subsidies, then the level will depend on both, total costs and the availability of public funding.

The procedures to define the charging levels may be less clear in those cases where the willingness to pay of the demand is involved, mainly because of information asymmetry and the deferred nature in time of the economic decisions of the operating company (e.g.

buying new rolling stock).

Finally, the coordination between the level and the structure of the charging scheme is particularly relevant in order to reflect variations in the underlying demand and costs, but also to ensure the effectiveness of the incentives embedded in it (i.e. the intensity of the signals transmitted to the operators). Several considerations may be taken into account at this stage, particularly the achievement of an average level or the avoidance of cross subsidization between services, geographical zones, types of infrastructure, etc.

3.7.2 Charging levels in the EU

To complete this overview on the track access charges in the EU, something should be said on their economic influence in the railway transport production system. Few quantitative references exist in the literature about the weight that track access charges have on the competitiveness of railway undertakings. According to Scherp (2002, p.2) track access charges can represent up to 30 or 35% of the total production cost of rail freight services and therefore they are an important item in the competitiveness of railway undertakings. The final report of the Task Force on Track Access Charges set up by the European Commission (2005b, p.2) stated that infrastructure charges account for a significant part of the cost of a railway operator, and pointed out that rail freight operators pass on 5% to 25% of their revenues to the infrastructure managers.

When charging levels are observed for every Member State, it is possible to identify relevant differences among them. Some countries had set up relatively high infrastructure charges, while others had deliberately set them at a low level. These differences in charging levels in the EU have been analyzed by several studies in the recent years, though with different finalities in mind.

The ECMT studied the charges levied on average freight and passenger trains in order to assess the differences arising between Member States’ charging levels (Fig. 29). They highlighted the dispersion of current charging levels across the Member States, and pointed out that in some regions, like in parts of Western Europe and in the Baltic States there is little sign that the current level of charges has a significant negative effect on market development.

Fig. 29: Average access charges in selected European countries. 2004

Note: Figures in €/train-km, excluding cost of electric traction; CEE- Central Eastern Europe; S-Sweden;

N-Norway; NL-Netherlands; F-France; B-Belgium; P-Portugal; CH-Switzerland; I-Italy; SI-Slovenia; D-Germany; SF-Finland; DK-Denmark; A-Austria; UK-United Kingdom; CZ-Czech Republic;

BG-Bulgaria; RO-Romania; H-Hungary; EE-Estonia; LT-Lithuania; LV-Latvia; PL-Poland; SK-Slovakia.

Source: ECMT, 2005, p.40

The UIC promoted a study, aimed at determining the effect that track access charges could have in the development of high speed services at European level. Within it, a number of national and international high speed relations (or with the potential to become such) were identified and the average value of track access charges calculated for each of them. The results obtained for the national relations showed again a great dispersion in the levels applied throughout the EU (Fig. 30).

Fig. 30: Average access charges levied on selected European high speed relations. 2006

Péages en !/train-km (OD nationales)

0,0 2,0 4,0 6,0 8,0 10,0 12,0 14,0 16,0

Athinai-Thessaloniki Belfast-Dublin Oslo-Trondheim Helsinki-Turku Göteborg-Stockholm Praha-Brno Lisboa-Porto Bratislava-Zilina Amsterdam-Breda Genève-Zurich Warszawa-Katowice Wien-Salzburg København-Esbjerg Ljubljana-Maribor Budapest-Debrecen Vilnius-Klaipeda Riga-Rezecne Tallinn-Narva Rome-Florence Luxembourg-Bettembourg London-Newcastle Madrid-Séville Bruxelles-Liège Frankfurt-Köln Paris-Lyon

!/train-km

Source: CENIT, 2006, p.61

The study found out that track access charges range from 25% to 40% of the revenues for links using new high speed infrastructures and concluded that, with such a weight in the operating expenses, the infrastructure charges play a key role in the high speed rail

economy (CENIT, 2006, p.7). The same study was updated one year later with the aim of observing the variations in the levels of the charges. The authors concluded that the level of track access charges presented a general trend to increase within the EU-27 (CENIT, 2007, p.14).