Sustitúyese el artículo 3° de la Ley Nº 10.295 y sus modificatorias, por el siguiente:

Source: (Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank 1999, 39)

By 1999, Area A constituted 17.2 percent, Area B constituted 23.8 percent, and Area C constituted 59 percent of the West Bank, though estimates of Area C during the reform years were at 62 percent of the West Bank.180 Through the 1995 Interim Agreement, both sides agreed to carry out their security responsibilities “with due regard to internationally-accepted norms of human rights and the rule of law” and would “be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human dignity and avoid harassment.” Further, security obligations were not to interfere with the “normal and smooth movement of people, vehicles, and goods within the West Bank, and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” Both sides agreed to take “all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and against their property and shall take legal measures against offenders.”181

In the case of security-related disputes between Israel and the PA, the Accords stipulated that Israel and the PA should address security issues together, through bilateral dispute resolution,

without involving international institutions or processes. Annex I of the Interim Agreement, The

179 _{(Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement 1995)}

180 _{UN OCHA. Area C Humanitarian Response Plan Fact Sheet. United Nations, 2010.} 181 _{(Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement 1995)}

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Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements, called for the creation of a Joint Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee (JSC) made up of five to seven members of each side to “deal with all security matters of mutual concern regarding this Agreement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” that would “deal with alleged violations, as well as differences relating to the application or implementation of the security arrangements set out in this Agreement.”182

Indeed, a JSC was created along with a bilateral dispute resolution system but proved to be largely ineffective. University of the Pacific professor Omar Dajani argues, “The Palestinians’ capacity to advance effective challenges to Israeli violations of individual or collective rights through the bilateral dispute resolution structures defined in the Accords was limited [however], by their narrow latitude for self- help or retaliatory action.” If Palestinians felt Israelis violated the Agreement or made unrealistic security demands, Palestinians could cease cooperating with Israeli security demands, but Israel held significant leverage in this regard. If Israel felt the PA violated the Agreement, it could withhold the transfer of clearance revenues and taxes to the PA, which it has, or refrain from the next stage of military redeployment.183

Initially, it seemed that the stipulations in the Accords had the potential to create an environment conducive to safety for Palestinians within the WBGS, protect their ability to move freely within the WBGS, and provide recourse for disputes. However, the security agreements relating to Palestinian welfare and movement were overridden by critical caveats in the Accords giving priority to Israeli security interests, and effectively overriding security guarantees to

Palestinians. One such provision gave Israel “overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.” Another caveat indicated "Nothing in this Article shall derogate from Israel's security powers and responsibilities in accordance with this

182 _{(Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement 1995)} 183 _{(Dajani 2011, 187)}

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Agreement.”184

These critical caveats in the Agreements provided a scenario in which Palestinian security and movement within the WBGS were constantly subject to change, based on Israel’s perceived security needs. The Accords established that Israeli security was tantamount, thereby making agreements safeguarding Palestinian security uncertain.

The PA aimed to achieve security for Israel and the rule of law within its own jurisdiction— in part by denying Palestinians a sense of security. Those suspected of being affiliated with violence against Israelis and paradoxically those suspected of cooperating with Israel secretly faced illegal detention and treatment, and in the best case scenario, a trial.

The PA elevated Israeli security needs above the rights of Palestinians through the establishment of the Palestinian State Security Court. By a presidential decree, President Yasser Arafat established the State Security Court in 1995 to try cases involving security issues in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The court lacked almost all due process rights and many of those detained and tried in the courts were deprived of fundamental human rights. Inmates were often held without charges, tortured, denied the right to defend themselves in court, denied the opportunity of appeal if convicted of a crime, and some faced death by a firing squad.185 The Israeli newspaper Haaretz published an article in 2003 discussing the creation of the court. The article stated, “When the State Security Court was established, Palestinian jurists immediately recognized that one of Arafat’s main tools was to bypass the rule of law and deliberately weaken judicial authority. Individuals tried in the court had no right to appeal their sentence.186

The Accords provided motivation and impetus for the PA to take measures to provide security, namely to Israelis, while the PA considered that security for Palestinians could only be

(Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement 1995)

185 _{(Arab Political Systems: Palestine n.d.)}

(Freedom House 2012)

186

Hass, Amira. “PA says the Palestinian State Security Court has been abolished.” Haaretz. April 8, 2003. http://www.haaretz.com/news/pa-says-palestinian-state-security-court-has-been-abolished-1.13550 (accessed December 3, 2012).

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secured through final-status negotiations. The Interim Agreements regulate Palestinian and Israeli security relations to this day, and continue to reflect the preeminence of Israeli security concerns. It is within this framework that the PSF operate.

Building on the Palestinian Security Sector

The long-delayed ratification of the Palestinian Basic Law in 2002 provided legal clarification regarding the roles of the PSF and police, potentially bringing enhanced security to Palestinians and Israelis. The Basic Law stipulated that the security forces and police would be responsible for defending the WBGS within its jurisdiction, serving the people, protecting society, and maintaining public order, security, and public morals.The security forces and police would be obliged to adhere to the limits prescribed by law, and would respect the rights and freedoms

established by it. The PSF were mandated to operate in parts of the WBGS.187 The Basic Law placed the security services under the control of the cabinet (council of ministers), while acknowledging the president’s role as “commander in chief.” The Palestinian Basic Law led to improved security for Palestinians, in part due to its role in leading the PA to abolish the unconstitutional Palestinian Security Court, along with abolishing the practice of trying Palestinian civilians in military tribunals.188

While the Interim Agreement and the Palestinian Basic Law provide some basic legal framework for the PSF, further legislation needs to be created to regulate their work, which cannot happen until the PLC reconvenes. In 2005, two laws were developed that provided some clarification of duties within the PSF. The International Crisis Group explains: "The Law of Services in the Palestinian Security Forces (No. 8 of 2005) stipulated the merger of the forces into three branches and, for the first time, regulated the rights and obligations of security personnel and enshrined a promotion system based on professional performance. The PA also enacted the General Intelligence

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Law No. 17 to better regulate a particularly anarchic agency [the Palestinian Intelligence agency].”189

The latter law defined the branch’s overall responsibilities, but lacked clarity on how its work was different from that of Preventive Security and Military Intelligence.190

Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State Security Objectives

The security reforms in the PA’s Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan were a continuation of the extensive security objectives laid out in the PA’s 2008-2010 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP). Annex E includes a list of reform goals laid out in the PRDP, a few of which include increasing the execution of court decisions, improving the quality and quantity of intelligence information, and improving the civil defense response rate to incidents.

From 2008 to 2010, the PA allocated US$257 million to Security Sector Reform and Transformation, much of which was funded by U.S. external assistance.191 Table 11 displays the allocation of the PA development budget resources during 2008-2010, and the high priority given to Security Sector Reform and Transformation, within spending on government reforms.

Table 11: Allocation of PA Development Budget Resources