TÉCNICA DE MICROABRASIÓN CON ACIDO CLORHÍDRICO

At Node I, R decides not to investigate T even though R has in- formation that T is engaged in wrongdoing. There are legitimate rea- sons why R might make such a decision. R may determine, for exam- ple, that it cannot afford to allocate its scarce investigative resources to investigate a business without more concrete information. This leads to the first benefit R reaps with its decision not to investigate T: R will save investigative resources that can be directed to other investigations. There is another possible benefit. If T learns of R’s de- cision not to open an investigation, T could be deterred in continuing its wrongdoing since T doesn’t want R to investigate it. If T knows that T is on R’s radar screen, T may decide to cease wrongdoing and

157. Similar events preceded HealthSouth’s $1.4 billion scandal, HealthSouth Faked $1.4 Billion Profits, The SEC Alleges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2002, at A1, and the bank- ruptcy of Enron. See also Matt Krantz, Peeling Back the Layers of Enron’s Breakdown, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at 1B; Jim Yardley, Critic Who Quit Top Enron Post is Found Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at B1, B6. The seventh-largest commercial bankruptcy in United States history, Enron’s downfall apparently was brought on by the company’s prac- tice of hiding, from public scrutiny, millions of dollars of Enron debt on the books of off- shore partnerships. The Enron Scandal, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at 3B.

not further pique R’s interest. Because both T’s awareness and T’s response are speculative, this possible benefit is deemed to be mini- mal.

R’s decision not to investigate creates possible costs for R: (1) T may be encouraged, if not emboldened, to continue its wrongdoing, especially if T is aware of R’s decision not to investigate T; (2) R’s de- cision may give T time to revise and improve its fraud methodology, allowing T to become even more sophisticated in committing and concealing its wrongdoing; (3) If T is allowed to continue its wrongdo- ing and possibly expand it, more persons may become victims of T’s fraud; and (4) If other businesses become aware of R’s decision not to investigate T’s wrongdoing, they too will be encouraged to continue, or commence, similar wrongdoing.

For these reasons, the costs of R’s decision not to investigate T once R receives information that T is engaging in wrongdoing out- weigh R’s benefit.159

At Node II, R opts for the opposite strategy: R decides to investi- gate T. By adopting this strategy, R obtains the converse of many of the benefits and costs noted at Node I. Thus, R achieves the following possible benefits: (1) R discourages T from engaging in at least some of its wrongdoing. (2) R discourages other observant business from engaging in wrongdoing. Businesses not already subject to investiga- tion have reason to be concerned when another business in the same industry comes under investigation,160 since often R expands its in- vestigation of one business to include other similar businesses on the assumption that they too are engaging in the same wrongdoing.161 Additional possible benefits accruing to R include: (3) Opening an in- vestigation of T makes it difficult for T to continue refining its wrongdoing methodology, and (4) makes it less likely T will expand its wrongdoing to include more victims. (5) During its investigation of T, R develops some institutional knowledge and expertise about T, T’s industry, and the type of behavior T is engaging in. This knowl-

159. Seeinfra app. A chart 1, at 677.

160. The “national initiative” undertaken by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (OIG), demonstrates this. For example, in 1996 the OIG sent a letter to the 125 teaching hospitals associated with all 125 academic medical centers in the United States informing these hospitals that they were subject to an audit of their teaching physicians’ Medicare Part B billings. This national initiative arose after Medicare Part B irregularities were found at one such medical center, the University of Pennsylvania. Pamela H. Bucy, The PATH from Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching Hospitals, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 3,3-14 (2000).

161. Russell Hayman, Dissecting a Health Care Fraud Investigation, in HEALTH CARE

FRAUD & ABUSE: HOW TO NAVIGATE THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS 223, 238-44 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1129, 1999) (reviewing regional and national initiatives by federal regulators aimed at multiple health care providers), available at WL 1129 PLI/Corp 223.

edge may be generic—how to more effectively investigate a general type of wrongdoing—or specific to T or T’s industry. While such insti- tutional knowledge could benefit R in future investigations, its value is highly speculative since turnover at R could dissipate it. Thus, this last benefit is minimal.

R also incurs costs with its decision to investigate T: (1) Be- cause R has little information about T’s possible wrongdoing and no inside information about it, R’s investigation will consume con- siderable resources. R’s investigation is also likely to be relatively unfocused and inefficient with unlikely chance of uncovering the full extent of T’s wrongdoing and all individuals who are involved. (2) Because R’s resources are limited, R incurs an opportunity cost when it directs its resources toward T. By spending scarce inves- tigative resources on T, R will be unable to investigate other de- serving targets.162 _{For these reasons, R’s benefits at Node II,}

where R opts to investigate T, slightly outweigh R’s costs.163

2. Nodes III and IV: Whether R Initiates Action at the Conclusion