91Técnicas administrativas aplicadas a enfermería

From the liberal perspective in IR theory, the leaders’ ideas can work as a proxy to assess the priority of policy or guidelines of foreign behaviors. When introducing domestic factors into the analysis of international politics, an efficient way to synthesize all factors coming from both the international and domestic levels is critical to deal with the “too many variable” problem. In Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993: 11-24) work, there are three causal pathways to explain the role of belief and idea in foreign policy-making. Ideas can serve as road maps which can limit policy- makers’ choices. Ideas can serve as focal points when a unique equilibrium is not available. Ideas embedded in institutions can serve as innovations for new policies. In short, since ideas and beliefs help decision-makers identify an option among alternatives, it is reasonable to take ideas or beliefs as factors that cause shifts of foreign behavior. On the other hand, the outcomes of policymaking is also a function of perceptions or misperceptions based on Jervis’ (1976: 117- 203) theory, because policy-makers have to maintain their cognitive consistency between beliefs and reality. Perception is related to a process of reasoning in which actors formulate their beliefs, images about other actors, and other actors’ intentions. In this light, the preexisting belief works as a gate-keeper to filter and process information for decision-makers. In both works, ideas and beliefs can work as proxies to understand decision-makers’ priority and reasoning.53 _Therefore,

when policy-makers face challenges and factors coming from both international and domestic

levels, they may have different priorities because of their different ideas. In this case, when analyzing cross-strait relations, it is reasonable to take Taiwan’s leadership change into account because the shift of leadership may denote a shift of policy preference or priority which leads to the change of negative-or-positive patterns of foreign behavior or the possibility of increasing uncertainty.

On the other hand, leadership change in Taiwan also implies the possibility for Taiwan to deviate from the “one China” position. Since 1949, the legacy of Chinese Civil War makes “one China” issue become the essential characteristic of cross-strait relations, and the “one China” position is further moved to favor the P.R.C. because of the normalization of the U.S.-China relations in 1979. However, the democratization process creates a momentum for Taiwan to deviate from the “one China” position because it provides an opportunity for the pro-

independence actors, like the DPP, to influence cross-strait relations. In general, Taiwan’s democratization has two political consequences which need a further analysis. First, in the last chapter, the statistical analysis has shown that the approach of Taiwan’s presidential election creates uncertainty for both Taiwan and China and then makes cross-strait relations less stable.54 Second, after democratization, the change of Taiwan’s leadership also becomes a noteworthy variable in cross-strait relations because Taiwanese leaders may hold different positions on the “one China” issue, and this chapter aims to investigate its consequence. However, it is also worth noting that the difference about the “one China” position among the top leaders cannot be totally explained by partisanship. For example, both Lee Teng-hui and Ma Ying-jeou are the KMT presidents, but their “one China” positions are quite different. This is the main reason for this chapter to take leadership change rather than partisan alternation as a proxy to access the

preference deviating from the “one China” position. In sum, the goal of this chapter is to explore what the impact of leadership change is on cross-strait relations.55

As to the hypotheses in this chapter, like the previous chapters, leadership change may influence negative-or-positive patterns and the stability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors. Regarding negative-or-positive patterns, any leader attempting to deviate from the “one China” position may lead to a negative development of Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each other, while any leader maintaining the “one China” position may lead to a positive development of Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each other. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that when the DPP leaders are in office, the actors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle tend to expect Taiwan to deviate from the “one China” position recognized by the framework of 1979. As to the KMT leaders after 1990, it is obvious that Lee Teng-hui is defined as a supporter of Taiwan independence in China’s rhetoric, but Ma Ying-jeou is never criticized for any attempt to deviate from the “one China” position. Since the DPP leaders generally hold a pro-independence

position, it is reasonable to hypothesize a more conflictive development of cross-strait relations when the DPP leaders are in office. As to the KMT leaders, considering China’s criticism on Lee Teng-hui, it is also reasonable to hypothesize that Lee Teng-hui has the same effect like the DPP leaders on cross-strait relations. In this case, two hypotheses about negative-or-positive patterns go as follows:

H1 Conflict Brought by the Independence Preference Hypothesis

When the DPP leaders (Chen Shui-bian) or Lee Teng-hui are in office, a negative development of cross-strait relations can be expected.

H2 Cooperation Brought by the Unification Preference Hypothesis

55 _{Since there is no evidence of China’s deviation from the “one China” position, this chapter does not includes} leadership change of China into analysis.

When Ma Ying-Jeou is in office, a positive development of cross-strait relations can be expected.

As to the hypotheses about the stability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors, any leader attempting to deviate from the “one China” position creates uncertainty for all decision-makers, and then causes the instability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors. On the other hand, any leader maintaining the “one China” position makes Taiwan and China’s behaviors more stable. Thus, two hypotheses about the stability of cross-strait relations go as follows:

H3 Instability Brought by the Independence Preference Hypothesis

When the DPP leaders (Chen Shui-bian) or Lee Teng-hui are in office, China and Taiwan’s behaviors toward each other are less stable.

H4 Stability Brought by the Unification Preference Hypothesis

When Ma Ying-jeou is in office, China and Taiwan’s behaviors toward each other are more stable.

To sum up, the change of leadership may represent a shift of policy preference, and it can work as a proxy to indicate Taiwan’s preference to hold or deviate from the “one China” position in the US.-China-Taiwan triangle because of the independence-or-unification nature of Taiwan’s domestic politics. In general, this chapter hypothesizes that any deviation from the “one China” position creates a conflictive development of cross-strait relations or produces uncertainty that causes instability for both Taiwan and China’s behaviors. In the following sections, a set of statistical analyses will be conducted to test the validity of the hypotheses.

6.2 Method and Variables

This chapter applies an ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH (1,1) model to control the bias caused by the serial correlation, non-stationary and heteroscedasticity problems.56 The GARCH model is designed to model both the mean and variance of time series data, so there are two equations in the GARCH model, which are the conditional mean equation and the conditional variance equation. The conditional mean equations in the following sections help explain how factors including state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, trade interdependence, electoral cycles, and leadership change impact the negative-or-positive patterns of Taiwan and China’s behaviors. In other words, the conditional mean equations can be expressed as:

𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡 = 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1+ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝐴𝑅(1) + 𝑀𝐴(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝐶𝑇_𝑡 = 𝐷𝑇𝐶_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝐶𝑈_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑈𝐶_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑇𝑈_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑈𝑇_𝑡−1+ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝐴𝑅(1) + 𝑀𝐴(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡

The conditional variance equations in the following sections help examine how the same variables change the variance of Taiwan and China’s behaviors. A greater variance of a state behavior is defined as the instability of a state behavior. Thus, the conditional variance equations can be expressed as:

56 _{Since the time period (1990-2012) is the same as the analysis in Chapter 5, so the model is the same as the models} in Chapter 5.

𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑇𝐶_𝑡 = 𝐷𝐶𝑇_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝐶𝑈_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑈𝐶_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑇𝑈_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑈𝑇_𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑡−1+ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝐶𝑇_𝑡 = 𝐷𝑇𝐶_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝐶𝑈_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑈𝐶_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑇𝑈_𝑡−1+ 𝐷𝑈𝑇_𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑡−1+ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡

In general, besides the leadership dummy variables, all variables are the same as the dependence model in Chapter 5.57 _{The leadership dummies are the main objectives to observe in}

this chapter.58 _{There are three top leaders in Taiwan after 1990, and they are Lee Teng-hui (Lee),}

Chen Shui-bian (Chen), Ma Ying-jeou (Ma).