II. MÉTODO
2.4. Técnicas e instrumentos de recolección de datos
Rafiq Hariri was born in Sidon in 1944. Hariri’s father Baha’ al-Din owned a fruit orchard and rented another from an “unsympathetic landlord” (Blanford, 2006 p. 14).
After a particularly bad harvest, Hariri’s father lost both orchards. This was a major blow to Rafiq Hariri that was to shape his outlook and his early political activism.13 Baha’ al-Din Hariri was reduced to the status of a labourer and Rafiq Hariri would join him in his school holidays to work in the orchards. His father had thus been a victim of the crisis that swept Lebanese agriculture, in which large landowners and the
monopolists of inputs and marketing would squeeze small producers. As a young Sunni Muslim in the southern port city of Sidon, it was almost natural that Rafiq Hariri would join the urban protest movement that was most popular among his community at the time, the Nasserite Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). It was led by the Palestinian George Habash as well as Muhsin Ibrahim. A fellow activist from that time described Hariri as “a doer” who was reliable and fully committed.14 Hariri participated in
demonstrations, handed out pamphlets, and assisted clandestine operations, including smuggling ANM-leader George Habash out of Syria, where he had been imprisoned.15 Hariri received his early political education in the ANM. He also built up contacts with people he would later recruit for his post-war political project. The most important one was the friendship with Fu’ad Siniura, who came from a prominent Sidon trading family. The two young men were classmates in school and fellow activists in the same ANM cell (Blanford, 2006 p. 17). Siniura went on to chair Hariri’s Bank Mediterranée in the 1980s and served as finance minister when Hariri was prime minister. Hariri also
13 This is what Hariri related to his friend Robert Debbas. Interview with Robert Debbas, Beirut, 27th February 2008.
14 Interview with Muhammad Mashnuq, Beirut, 6th November 2008.
15 According to Fu’ad Siniura, who was in the same ANM cell as Hariri. Al Hayat, 21st May 2007, available in English translation at: http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/05-2007/Article-20070521-aeecdc4a-c0a8-10ed-01b2-ede88fe3e826/story.html, viewed on 6th March 2008.
built a relationship with leftist ANM intellectual Muhammad Kishli, who liaised with the Lebanese trade unions on Hariri’s behalf in the 1990s.16
After completing secondary school, Hariri moved to Beirut to study accounting at the Arab University, which had been founded by Egypt’s Nasir in 1960. However, Hariri was unable to finance his studies, a problem made all the more acute by the birth of his first child with his first wife Nida (Blanford, 2006 p. 17). In 1964, Hariri moved to Saudi Arabia where he first worked as a teacher, then as an accountant. There are diverging accounts of what happened next: Hariri’s supporters maintain that his wealth is due to his personal qualities as a businessman, while his opponents think of Hariri as a Saudi creation, made rich by the King and sent back to Lebanon as an instrument of Saudi power. The story of Hariri’s business success is more complicated than either narrative suggests.17 In 1973 Hariri worked as an accountant for a Saudi contracting company when oil prices rocketed. Input prices shot up as well, pushing the business into bankruptcy. Yet the position allowed Hariri to learn the ropes of contracting, handling all aspects of the business. Hariri then struck out on his own, founding a contracting company with his cousin. They fulfilled small sub-contracts for his former boss. This was part of a wider gold rush in Saudi Arabia at the time. Hundreds of thousands of small scale contracting and trading enterprises were registered in the 1970s and 1980s, creating a highly competitive environment of companies all pursuing big
contracts (Hertog, 2010 p. 295). However, this company fell victim to another oil-shock in 1975. Hariri faced a heavy debt burden. He was down and out, had to give up his apartment but continued to chase his dream of a big contract.
Hariri kept up appearances, dressing smartly and mingling with Western contractors.
His big break came when Nasir al-Rashid, an engineer who had won a contract from King Khalid, had difficulties realising a project in 1976.18 The American company that had promised to build three tower blocks in Riyadh pulled out in the last minute.
16 Lebanon Report, Spring 1996, p. 7.
17 Unless indicated otherwise, this account of Hariri’s business success is based on an interview with a business partner and friend to Rafiq Hariri. Interview with Robert Debbas, Beirut, 27th February 2008.
18 Interview with Robert Debbas, Beirut, 27th February 2008. Personal website of Nasir al-Rashid, http://www.nasseralrashid.net/, viewed on 11th September 2010. (Blanford, 2006 p. 18).
Rashid approached Hariri who managed to persuade an Italian company to take on the project. The commission Hariri received for this contract was enough to settle his outstanding debts. After the successful completion of the project, King Khalid asked al-Rashid and Hariri to tackle another highly ambitious contract: the Masara hotel in the resort of Ta’if, to be completed in only ten months. Hariri procured the French
construction company Oger as the contractor, overcoming the management’s initial reluctance to tackle the high-risk project. A contract for US$112.5 million was signed in January 1977.19 The contract was fulfilled in record time and with little regard for cost.
Without Hariri’s drive and energy, the project would have been impossible to realise.
Crown Prince Fahd was said to have been deeply impressed by al-Rashid’s and Hariri’s feat and they received a string of highly lucrative contracts. Hariri was also rewarded with a Saudi passport, a rare perk for a foreigner. Citizenship bestowed tangible monetary benefits because non-Saudis were legally obliged to rely on Saudi citizens as middlemen to obtain certain contracts (Beblawi, 1990 p. 92). In January 1978 Hariri established Saudi Oger to manage projects in the kingdom and in 1979 he bought the French mother-company. In summary, Hariri’s business success was due to a
combination of his personal abilities and the mechanics of Saudi royal patronage. The young Lebanese businessman was struggling to get a break in Saudi contracting. Only through his association with Nasir al-Rashid did he gain access to highly lucrative royal contracts. Al-Rashid is the scion of a clan, which had maintained an emirate centred in Ha’il throughout much of the 19th century but was defeated by Ibn Saud in 1921 (al-Rasheed, 2010 pp. 25-29, 41-42). The Saudi royals tended to co-opt their opponents and Nasir al-Rashid was still reaping the benefits of this policy in the 1970s, when he gained access to royal contracts. Hariri’s relationship to King Khalid and to Crown Prince Fahd was still purely commercial and managed by al-Rashid: Hariri had little direct access to the crown prince or the king while al-Rashid acted as a “gatekeeper”.20
Immediately after his initial business success in Saudi Arabia, Rafiq Hariri started his economic, philanthropic, and political engagement in Lebanon. Initially, he focused on his native Sidon. In 1977 he made a major donation to his former school, run by the
19 Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), 7th February 1977, p. 9.
20 Interview with Robert Debbas, Beirut, 27th February 2008. Hertog, 2010 pp. 290-291.
Sidon Maqasid association (Hariri Foundation, 2004 p. 25). In 1979 he founded his own philanthropic association called the Islamic Foundation for Culture and Higher
Education. In 1979 Hariri opened a branch of his Oger company in Lebanon in order to build the Kfar Fallus centre near Sidon. Hariri would later repeat the pattern of
engagement in local politics of Sidon on a national scale.21 Rather than displacing the city’s notable families or militias, Hariri sought to win them over by using patronage.
His financial means were far superior to those of established local actors. Hariri also placed allied technocrats in municipal administration and clientelised the Sunni mufti of Sidon. The Bizri family, who brought forth the leading zu’ama of the city, eventually became Hariri allies. Hariri enjoyed a more tense relationship with Mustafa Sa’d and his son ‘Ussama, who were leading the Sunni-dominated leftist and popular movement in Sidon.22
Hariri also started investing in the economy. In 1981 Hariri bought a 73% stake in the Mediterranean Investment Group (MIG), which owned Banque Mediterranée in France and Lebanon as well as some other interests.23 Khuri had steered the bank into trouble by speculating in the silver market. Hariri provided the necessary capital to keep the bank afloat. However, in 1983 Hariri eased Khuri out of the chairmanship of MIG, reportedly because he had hidden the true extent of the bank’s troubles from Hariri.
Fu’ad Siniura became chairman and general director of Banque Mediterranée in France and Lebanon. Hariri also obtained a license to open the Saudi Lebanese Bank in 1981.24 In his book on post-war Lebanese corruption, Najah Wakim claims that Hariri met President Sarkis in 1978 to discuss a maintenance contract for Lebanon’s electricity system (Wakim, 2006 p. 18). If true, this would indicate a very early desire to obtain construction contracts in Lebanon. After his initial business success in Saudi Arabia between 1976 and 1978, Hariri immediately turned his attention to business
21 Unless otherwise indicated, the following section is based on Bonne, 1995.
22 Hariri paid for Mustafa Sa’d’s medical treatment when he lost his eyesight in a bomb attack in 1985 but his son ‘Ussama ran against Bahiya Hariri in several post-war elections. Al-Safir, 23rd January 1985, p.
8. MEI, 10th September 1996, p. 12.
23 Unless indicated otherwise, the following information is based on ANARAM, 7th February 1983, p. 4-5.
24 According to the chairman and general manager of Saudi-Lebanese Bank. Interview with Sabah al-Haj, Beirut, 8th November 2008.
opportunities in Lebanon. However, he made little headway until the Israeli invasion in 1982.