Discusión

The attention in this sub-section is paid to the geostrategic interests of both superpowers in the DRC at the time of independence and to the external support granted to the peripheries involved in secessionism, as well as finally to the centre.

4.4.1.1 Geostrategic interests in the DRC

This sub-section looks at the involvement of the USA and the USSR in the Congo crisis in the 1960s. The already delicate and weak centre-periphery relations should not be seen in isolation of the geostrategic interests of the territory. These interests would be exploited by the secessionists, but at the same time international interests would attempt to exploit weaknesses in the centre-periphery relations. As Stalin is reported to have said, ‘you cannot export a revolution unless the people want it.’

At the time of the Cold War, the USA and the USSR were competing in order to spread their ideology around the world and particularly in the newly independent Africa. One of the reasons why Christophe Gbenye and other followers of Lumumba created a breakaway communist

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state on September 7, 1964, was because in their opinion the DRC had fallen into the hands of imperialists.

The USA was, however, determined to prevent the spread of Communist ideology in Africa.

Amy Claire Thompson (2013) argues that many in the West believed that moving Africans towards the realm of potential freedom was highly dangerous, because it would lead to Communist tendencies. Poverty was regarded as a breeding-ground for potential communists. Oddly the USSR does not seem to have been concerned either way. In the 1950s, there were only two Communist Parties active in Africa, in South Africa and in Egypt, and Communist ideology itself was not common among African independence leaders. Wherever the USA and other western states saw the potential for collaboration or if a leader exhibited leftist leanings and could be manipulated, they were more likely to become involved.

The coming of independence to the DRC in 1960, however, was of particular concern to the USA. It was thought by many in the West that Patrice Lumumba was dangerous, crazy and probably a Communist. It was also well-known that the DRC had rich uranium ore to be mined, and it was also geo-strategically important given its size and number of borders. Concern grew that, without intervention, there would be a significant chance of the DRC being used as a base for subversive communist activity in neighbouring states. The West also had significant interests in the far south of Katanga Province, because of the mining and mineral wealth.

(Katanga borders the Zambian copper belt). The DRC was thus considered to be a sitting duck for Communist penetration (Thompson 2013: no page).

Apart from the internal dissension between politicians on the organization of the political life in the DRC, the ideological stakes in the international environment are an important factor that led to the creation of the People’s Republic of the Congo in 1964. Stephen R. Weissman (2014) argues that the root of the CIA’s intervention in the DRC was an overhyped analysis of the communist threat. Experts on the DRC have long been skeptical of the notion that had Lumumba stayed in power, his government would have fallen under the sway of the Soviet Union or China. At the time, even some US officials had doubts. In 1962, shortly after he retired as director of the CIA, Dulles admitted, ‘I think that we overrated the Soviet danger, let’s say, in the Congo’ (Weissman 2014: no page). The Kennedy administration’s initial policy paper, soon modified, advocated a broad-based government of ‘all principal political elements in the Congo,’ to be followed by the release of Lumumba (Weissman 2014: no page).

In his thesis, Erik M. Davis (2013) mentions that from a geostrategic perspective, the DRC was important to the USA for its potential influence on its neighbours - Cameroon, Gabon, the Central African Republic, and Sudan. US officials were worried that if a pro-Communist government came to power, it could set the tone for other African nations to follow and, assist the Soviet Union in spreading Communist ideology. An unfriendly government in Leopoldville

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could quickly influence the heart of Africa in a negative manner for the USA. An unfriendly government in Leopoldville that was controlled by communists could be exploited by the Soviets to spread their influence into the DRC’s neighbours thus creating a Soviet sphere of influence in central Africa (Davis 2013:.51-52).

A look at the geostrategic interests in the DRC, as well as the positioning of the DRC in the East-West cleavage, was set to analyze the external support granted to the restive peripheries.

4.4.1.2 External supports to the restive peripheries

The attempted secessions would have been impossible without external support. Each secessionist movement had insufficient resources to succeed. Success subsequently depended on the weakness of the centre and on external support. Thus this sub-section focuses on the role played by other states in secessionism within the territory of the DRC.

The Central Government of the DRC was unable to be represented throughout the huge territory by reliable public servants who would oppose all threats to the territorial integrity of the state. What would have prompted secessionism is the balance of power that was in favour of the breakaway states in view of the support they received from other states. Before proclaiming the independence of the provinces, secessionist leaders certainly assessed the chance to achieve their projects by military means. At that time, the Congolese National Army was a deterrent and the Central Government was unable to keep its peripheries together. The weakness of the national security forces gave rise to the desire for secession in the peripheries.

As a consequence, with purposes of right-sizing the DRC by strengthening the centre, Lumumba requested military aid from the Soviet Union after the UN was reluctant to intervene and particularly in the attempt at secession of Katanga.

In terms of right-sizing the state Lustick (2011) mentions that in the event of a violent breakaway it can only succeed if the breakaway state has more military power than the centre.

The fact is that the centre in the DRC was too weak to prevent breakaways and it could only quell the situation with the assistance of the international community. However, the breakaway states did not in the long run have sufficient power to be successful either.

Belgium’s role in helping Katanga to secede and taking additional measures to sustain the breakaway state to develop was beyond dispute, according to Olivier Boehme (2005). Belgium did not want its relationship with the newly independent nation to end - not only for sentimental reasons but economic considerations as well. Fresh from breaking away, Katanga asked Belgium for help and Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens’ government obliged, and was willing to recognize Katanga’s de facto independence. In July 1960, the Belgian government created the Mission Technique Belge (Mistebel), an organization that would supply assistance

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to the breakaway province. Belgian policymakers, however, were not unanimous in the government’s decision to accommodate the breakaway state (Boehme 2005: no page, quoted by Bamfo 2012:39).

Because of the international involvement in Katanga’s secessionist movement due to the extraordinary mineral wealth of Katanga, the case of the creation of the State of Katanga is the one that produced a significant body of literature among scholars. Alexis Heraclides (1991) in his study on ‘The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics’ demonstrates that several states worldwide (for example: USA, Belgium, England and France) provided support to the attempted secession in Katanga and had relations with the State of Katanga (Heraclides 1991: no page). Foreign powers exploited weaknesses in the centre’s inability to exercise proper control over the territory of the DRC. Belgium provided financial and military support.

According to Abi-Saab (1978), the Belgian intervention also shifted the military balance of power in favour of Katanga. While Belgian forces in other parts of the Congo were instructed to

‘intervene when Belgian lives are threatened’ in Katanga they were instructed to occupy ‘all centres of importance’ (Abi-Saab 1978:41). Belgian troops in Katanga rounded up and neutralized the Force Publique (ANC), attacked troops loyal to the Central Government in their barracks and trained the Katangese gendarmeries (Oxford 2011:72). In addition, in terms of diplomacy, South African History Online (SAHO) (2014) mentions that Tshombe also received support from Western leaders including then US Vice-President Richard Nixon, who praised Tshombe as a pro-Western advocate and staunch anti-Communist Christian. However, after Tshombe's soldiers brutally executed the DRC’s first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, in January 1961, the UN and the USA ended their support for Katanga's secession from the DRC (SAHO 2014: no page).

In Claude Kangudie’s (2012) report on Albert Kalonji’s account of the events pertaining to the secessionist attempt in South Kasai, it is stated that Kalonji himself, revealed that the Belgians were behind the leaders of this new entity. All this was in the logic of the war led against Lumumba. It was necessary to deprive the Central Government of its cash flow. Thus MIBA put at the disposal of the new authorities its logistics and infrastructure. Kalonji was advised by Belgians, a Mr Cravatte of the MIBA and Dr. Letard, both Belgians he had known in Tshikapa.

Given the magnitude of the task, he wondered how to govern the new ‘state’. His Belgian advisers told him he had to do like in Katanga, to follow the example of Tshombe. MIBA promised to pay taxes to the State of Kasai that it owed to the Central Government. But as it had already paid the Central Government the first six months of the year, it promised to pay taxes in the second half. MIBA also placed at the disposal of the government (Autonomous Mining Republic of South Kasai) a number of villas reserved for its executive and administrative buildings for the operation of new institutions (my translation) (Kangudie 2012: no page). In this respect, the attempt at secession by South Kasai appears to have been insufficiently planned.

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This creates the idea that, while the revolt was encouraged by the Belgian colonists, the contagion of secessionism in neighbouring Katanga on South Kasai is important because of various similarities. Their economic weight in the DRC and the demand for provincial autonomy expressed earlier by their local leaders are of particular importance in this regard.

With regard to the People’s Republic of the Congo, the Armée Populaire de Libération commanded by General Nicholas Olenga received military assistance from the United Arab Republic (UAR), Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Congo-Brazzaville, Burundi and Sudan as prominent examples among African states. According to Robert Anthony Waters (2009), the rebels captured Stanleyville on August 4, 1964. Five US Embassy staff, including the consul and CIA agents, were captured and held prisoner for 111 days²⁵. For a few months they controlled almost two-thirds of the Congolese territory. Gbenye issued standing orders for the execution of hostages if attacked. In April 24, 1965, Che Guevara arrived with a contingent of approximately 120 Cuban troops (Waters 2009: xxx). The Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) supported the People’s Republic of the Congo through the International Committee for Aid to Algeria and the Congo (Leopoldville). According to Bruce D. Larkin (1973), arms and supplies were shipped to Christophe Gbenye’s forces around Stanleyville in December 1964 by China and the Soviet Union (Larkin 1973:57-58). The Cold War was more obvious during this phase of the DRC crisis; the latter was becoming an arena of global ideological confrontation.

The next sub-sections provide information on the attempts at secesssion which are a major aspect of conflict between Leopoldville and the restive peripheries.