Técnicas de EMD y LA aplicadas al estudio del desarrollo de la asignatura

The purpose of this chapter and the last has been to provide the reader with a work- ing grip on edenic idealism. I’ve also explained the epistemic and semantic attractions of such a view. But of course, there are many reasons why idealist views are not popular in contemporary metaphysics. So far, I have said little about how the edenic idealist might respond to such objections.

Now, suppose we try to read offX’s color inWM directly fromWE. Since the laws vary so widely, we

would have to look directly to the experiencesWEsupports inr1,r2, etc. in order to determineX’s color. But this is just what we would do when following the Deference Principle. Because of its complexity, this is a case where the direct strategy and the Deference Principle collapse together.

21_{The present discussion is also relevant to the question of what vocabulary should be used to specify}

the contexts insi. On the approach that I will defend in 9.3, these contexts employ vocabulary that directly

refer to the items ofWM. An alternative approach would be to employ vocabulary that describesWE. For

example, supposeWEis the Newtonian world. Instead of using the context: “the experience I would have if

I were to rotate the book”, we might instead use the description: “the experience I would have if the particles inWN evolved in such-and-such way”. (Obviously, the description would depend on whatWEis like.)

This alternative may be acceptable in certain cases, but it should not replace the “manifest approach”. For one thing, this alternative will not be available when we cannot conceive whatWEis like in itself or when

the link betweenWE andWM is unclear. Furthermore, the manifest approach ensures that there is a tight

connection between the Deference Principle and our ordinary epistemology. This is because, when speakers engage in ordinary object discourse, they are working under the manifest image. I will discuss this issue in 9.3.

Within this dissertation, I have divided objections to idealism into three main groups. Under each general heading, I mention several specific questions confronting the edenic idealist.

1. The discrepancy objection: In many cases, we think our experiences do not accu- rately present the world. The idealist cannot accommodate the discrepancies between the world and our experience of it.

• How will the edenic idealist account for the distinction between veridical and falsidi- cal experiences?

• What will the edenic idealist say about cases where different subjects have incom- patible experiences of a single object?

• Can the edenic idealist account for the ways in which we think that science corrects our manifest understanding of the world? Is edenic idealist consistent with the deliv- erances of fundamental physics?

2. The incompleteness objection: Our experience does not present an entire world; at best, it presents a limited perspective on a small part of a world. The idealist cannot accommo- date the sense in which the world outstrips our experiences of it.

• How will the edenic idealist account for truths about objects in environments where human phenomenal experiences are not nomically possible?

• Can the edenic idealist appeal to counterfactual experiences without falling into cir- cularity or regress?

• Why should we think thatWE determinately supports all of the counterfactual expe-

riences needed to settle the truths of manifest sentences inWM?

• The Subjectivity Objection: There is strong reason to think that ordinary objects would exist even if humans did not exist. By countenancing a close link between ordinary objects and our experiences of them, the idealist makes ordinary objects too subjective.

• The Intersubjectivity Objection: The idealist cannot account for the sense in which different subjects are all part of the same world.

• The Ordinary Language Objection: Idealism conflicts with common sense and the ordinary use of our language. For example, ordinary subjects would immediately deny that there are two worlds relevant to the truth of our ordinary object judgments.

• The Battle Cry Objection: Given that they agree on the truth value of most of our ordinary judgments, there is no substantive disagreement between the idealist and the realist.

In the next three chapters, I will show that the edenic idealist can respond to each of these families of objections.

8 THE DISCREPANCY OBJECTION

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will defend edenic idealism from the following family of objections:

Discrepancy Objection: In many cases, we think that the world does not align with our phenomenal experiences. The idealist cannot accommodate these dis- crepancies between the world and our experience of it.

In particular, I will discuss the following three questions in the next three sections:

• How will the edenic idealist account for the distinction between veridical and falsidi- cal experiences?

• What will the edenic idealist say about cases where different subjects have incom- patible experiences of a single object?

• Can the edenic idealist account for the ways in which we think that science corrects our manifest understanding of the world? Is edenic idealist consistent with the deliv- erances of fundamental physics?