Técnicas Evaluativas desde el Enfoque Comunicativo

Chemical warfare materials are scattered within and in many cases outside the designated Baltic Sea dumping areas. In addition to the dumping areas marked on sea charts, chemical warfare materials were also disposed of item-by-item en route from the loading harbours (e.g., Wolgast and Flensburg) to the desig- nated dumping areas. Moreover, there are some beaches in the southern Baltic Sea which are occasionally contaminated with white phosphorus stemming from incendiary munitions.

Because of the scarcity of information on the dumpsite off Måseskär bordering the Helsinki Convention Area, further national and/or international studies are needed (e.g., in cooperation with OSPAR).

There still remains uncertainty on the amounts and locations of dumped chemical warfare materials; however, during the course of preparing this updated HELCOM report on sea-dumped chemical munitions some additional information became available and provided clarification for certain areas and operations. In most cases, the available information on dumping activities originates from official summary reports from the time of manufacturing chemical warfare materials, or is based on estimates deduced from official documents or officially documented follow-up accounts. Rarely is gapless and precise information available from of- ficial correspondence that must have accompanied the activities of trafficking chemical warfare materials over land, in harbours and at sea.

In accordance with the 1994 CHEMU Report, it is re-confirmed that a total of 40,000 tonnes of chemical warfare materials were dumped. Recent archive inves- tigations indicate that the amounts of chemical warfare agent mixtures contained in them was 15,000 tonnes, which is slightly more than estimated earlier (13,000 tonnes, BSEP 64B, HELCOM 1996).

Sulfur mustard mixtures represent about 63% of all materials dumped near Gotland and Bornholm. However, probably due to the formation of persistent lumps, this hazardous material is involved in 88% of all reported fishing incidents. Sulfur mustard poses a present risk to humans who come into direct contact with it and to organisms within its immediate vicinity. In comparison with the situa- tion at the time of the 1994/1995 HELCOM CHEMU reports, the amount of active chemical warfare agents has decreased as a result of the corrosive disintegration of munitions casings and the ensuing release and possible concomitant degrada- tion of chemical warfare agents. In addition, a small amount of warfare materials has been removed (e.g., caught by fishermen and destroyed by the authorities).

According to existing knowledge, chemicals originating from chemical warfare materials can spread out from the location of the containers through natural and anthropogenic processes. Varying stages of contamination by chemicals, presum- ably originating from chemical warfare materials, have been found in sediments in and in the vicinity of the dumping grounds.

Arsenic-containing warfare agents have been shown to contaminate areas of the sea bottom and to spread both within and outside the dumpsites. However, in all cases investigated to date, no chemical warfare agent parent compounds or degradation products were detected in the water column in measurable quanti- ties. The environmental impact of chemical warfare agents has been assessed by ecotoxicological means and by theoretical considerations; however, little is known about the magnitude of the effect of different chemical warfare degrada- tion products on the marine environment.

The general recommendations of the ‘Final Report of the ad hoc Working Group on Dumped Chemical Munitions (HELCOM CHEMU) to the 16th _{Meeting of the}

Helsinki Commission (1995)’ are considered to be valid, but are superseded by the HELCOM MUNI recommendations given in this report.

Especially taking into account the continuously increasing scientific knowledge and new information resulting from previous and on-going activities of the Con- tracting Parties (e.g., Lithuania, Poland and Germany), the HELCOM MUNI expert group was of the opinion that the formerly drawn conclusions and recommenda- tions need to be re-adjusted in order to adequately reflect the current state of knowledge.

Although dumped chemical munitions were recovered in the 1960s, in 1995 HELCOM recommended that chemical munitions should not be recovered due to their degraded state and the lack of suitable technological solutions for safely removing and destroying them. Even today, the risks associated with handling them are still high.

For people working in the marine environment of the southern and western Baltic Sea (e.g., fishermen or workers involved in offshore construction activities), the risk of encountering chemical warfare materials cannot be ruled out.

With regard to the increasing utilization of the seafloor for economic purposes (e.g., offshore wind farms, sea cables, pipelines), the risk of encountering sea- dumped munitions is increasing. Furthermore, white phosphorus has been found washed up on the beaches of the southern Baltic Sea. This incendiary agent con- stitutes a risk for beach goers.

Taking into account the advancement of technological options developed in the context of the offshore oil and gas industry over the past decades, as well as existing means for professional, efficient and safer disposal of chemical warfare materials, the option of recovering dumped chemical munitions should no longer be entirely excluded; rather, it should be considered as an option on a site-specific basis, when applicable, and in accordance with nationally accepted guidelines or the results of risk assessments.

As the Contracting Parties are conducting various activities nationally and inter- nationally, and thereby adding to the existing state of the knowledge on dumped chemical warfare materials in the Baltic Sea and their

impacts on the ecosystem, this report should be updated when significant new findings become available. The HELCOM CHEMU recommendations from 1994/1995 have been reviewed and updated as follows and arranged into three groups:

Investigate

• Historical Research - new or additional information on the dumping of chemi- cal warfare materials and the possible co-disposal of conventional munitions in the Baltic Sea is likely to be obtained by archival research as shown by the information on en route dumping in the Flensburg Fjord.

The Contracting Parties are encouraged to carry out, support and facilitate his- torical research in national and international archives, especially to undertake efforts to get access to still classified documents of relevance e.g., in the archives of the WWII Allies.

• Technical Research – precise, site-specific data on the types, quantities, status and spreading of sea-dumped warfare materials and their constituents in the Baltic Sea.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to carry out, support and facilitate technical research, e.g. within international projects, in known and suspected areas using technology specifically suitable for the task.

• Research Transfer – inter-regional sharing of information would increase the overall knowledge regarding the issue; technical research is needed to com- plement historical data to allow for well-informed risk assessments. Likewise, single findings of warfare materials should be cross-checked with historical references.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to share detailed information on the findings both within and outside the Baltic Sea region taking into account the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/65/149. Furthermore, it is advisable to investigate dumpsites bordering the Helsinki Convention Area, e.g. the dumpsite off Måseskär.

Inform

Manage

Manage

• Analytical Capability – the further development of chemical analytical methods is needed as well as updating the ecotoxicological and physicochemical proper- ties assessments.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to support and facilitate the devel- opment of suitable analytical methods and improving analytical capabilities.

• Periodical Surveys - guidelines for the periodical performance of intrusive/ non-intrusive sampling and testing of suitable methods both in known and suspected dumpsites are necessary in order to establish trends and foresee possible changes in the environment in these areas.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to support and facilitate the develop- ment of suitable guidelines for carrying out surveys and testing methods.

• Risk Assessments - suitable instruments and methods for site-specific risk as- sessments of selected dumpsites should be developed, taking into account the threats to humans and the marine environment, including possible acute, chronic and long-term effects.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to support and facilitate the devel- opment of suitable instruments and methods for site-specific risk assessments.

• Intentional Recovery - with regard to the increasing use of the seafloor, the intentional recovery of chemical warfare materials, where applicable, might no longer be excluded as a site-specific management option in accordance with nationally accepted guidelines or the results of risk assessments, as seen in other areas for chemical munitions dumping.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to transfer procedures and experi- ences for intentional recovery that exist under the provisions of current interna- tional legal instruments.

• Unintentional Catches - risks associated with unintentional catches of chemical warfare materials are still present for the crews of fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of dumping areas.

The Contracting Parties are recommended that response teams should be de- ployed and that on their advice relocation of caught chemical warfare material may be considered as an acceptable emergency measure.

Inform

• Document Updating - with regard to on-going national and international activi- ties and projects, periodical updates of the HELCOM report on dumped chemi- cal warfare materials will become necessary.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to consider this report as a step in an on-going process and to establish a working process for periodical updates after significant new information becomes available.

• Public Awareness - up-to-date information on sea-dumped warfare mate- rials, including white phosphorus in the Baltic Sea region, and on-going ac- tivities should be provided via easily accessible public information at nation- al and HELCOM levels, taking into account UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/65/149. Furthermore, specific local information should be available in areas of concern for the possible occurrence of white phosphorus such as tourist information leaflets and warning signs.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to support and facilitate the develop- ment and operation of such information portals and other relevant measures to increase public awareness.

• Knowledge Provision - national centres or responsible organizations for the collection of information on sea-dumped warfare materials, the coordination of response and training activities for the decontamination of vessels and equip- ment, as well as the treatment of affected people are necessary.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to support and facilitate such na- tional centres.

• New Guidelines - increasing use of the seafloor for the construction of offshore facilities, such as wind farms and sea cables, bring new groups into potential contact with sea-dumped chemical and conventional munitions, necessitating new and updated guidelines for possibly affected groups. When active in the vicinity of areas with known or suspected contamination by chemical warfare materials, contingency measures for dealing with both chemical and conven- tional warfare materials should be in place.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to carry out, support and facilitate the update and development of suitable guidelines for all potentially affected groups.

• Up-to-date Charts - technical investigations have provided and are still provid- ing information on the actual positions of sea-dumped chemical munitions. No special code for chemical warfare materials will be available for future Elec- tronic Nautical Charts.

The Contracting Parties are recommended to update sea charts to reflect the extensions of primary and secondary dumpsites, and to ensure that no informa- tion is lost on nautical charts when the transition to Electronic Nautical Charts is made.