Consequently, Curzon, with the approval of Bonar Law, informed Allenby that Nasim's text was unacceptable because it would give rise to apprehensions in the Sudan and
'It will be regarded generally as indicative that His Majesty's Government are un- 2
able to resist Egyptian pretensions in that country...' Instead Curzon proposed that two alternatives be presented to Nasim: either the inclusion in the constitution of the following formulae -
The King shall have the title King of Egypt
This provision is without prejudice to any rights which His Majesty may enjoy in the Sudan.
The present constitution is applicable to the Kingdom of Egypt.
This provision is without prejudice to any rights possessed by Egypt in the Sudan,3
or, failing that, to present and then publish a note to the Egyptian government con demning the constitution as an attempt to nullify the 1899 Convention and the
declaration of February 1922 and warning that
...in the event of the Egyptian Government taking any action which in the opinion of His Majesty's Government is inconsistent with the status quo in the Sudan His Majesty's Government will consider themselves free to disregard said convention of 1899 and to resume complete liberty of action in regard to that country.4
Thus the Egyptian government would be faced with the choice of either accepting the British version of the status quo in the Sudan or jeopardising the 1899 Convention for titles and formulae that at present would be meaningless without British agree ment.
Meanwhile the Residency was coming quickly to the conclusion that Fuad, 'playing high for power and [with]hopes to attain his object through Tawfiq Nessim, backed by
1. C^urzon}., Minute, 16.1.23, to ibid. Also, see: Murray and R.C.L[indsay]], , Minutes, 15.1.23 and Jan. 15, to ibid. Other reactions were equally negative. For example, Lord Stamfordham, the King's Secretary, wrote that 'King George hopes that whatever be the development of our policy in Egypt we shall never give up the Sudan.' Stamfordham to Crowe, January 15, 1923, FO/371/8959. Curzon fin ally vetoed any consideration of this title since the argument for it 'cannot be considered as having any serious relevancy to present situation...' Curzon to Allenby, January 19, 1923, Tel. No. 14, FO/371/8959.
2. Curzon to Allenby, January 18, 1923, Tel. No. 24, FO/371/8959.
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the Zaghlulists,' was the major obstacle to a satisfactory solution. The view held by a number of Allenby’s advisors was that ’For the moment progress is held up owing to the intrigue of the King and the machinations of the Zaghlulist party...' and that 'Beyond his power as a maintainer of order Nessim is...at the moment poli tically useless to us unless he receives a "mot d'ordre" from the King to be con-
1
ciliatory.' A firm stand on the Sudan, therefore, now appeared attractive. If the Ministry could be forced through the King to accede to British demands, it would earn Residency support as well as become unpopular with the Wafd. In the event of
failure, Adli was always in the wings.
The Residency was further concerned by the Prime Minister's hesitation over pro mulgating an act of indemnity simultaneously with the constitution. Ostensibly Nasim was concerned that promulgating both at the same time would detract from the good political effect of a constitution. In addition, he was hesitant about promul gating an indemnity law until the end of martial law was in sight or, at least, until there was some significant act of amnesty by the British towards Egyptians im prisoned for political offences. Nasim therefore proposed the immediate promulgation of the constitution without reference to the act of indemnity, but that the latter should be promulgated before the constitution came into effect.
Allenby, however, was not convinced by Nasim's assurance that an act of indemnity would not be revised by a future parliament because it would be protected from par liamentary interference by the constitutional guarantee of the sanctity of internation al agreements. Although this position was correct legally, Allenby believed that 'as time goes on Ministry will feel increasing rather than diminished hesitation in
2
committing themselves to an indemnity law without Parliament sanction.1
The general drift in all areas of the constitution was becoming worrisome.
Throughout Nasim's term in office there were signs that amendments had been introduced greatly increasing the King's authority. According to reports, the clause stating that the nation was the source of authority was to be omitted; the King would have wide power in the distribution of honours; the King could dissolve the entire par liament and not merely the Chamber of Deputies; the King would control religious endowments; he could issue decree laws even while parliament was in session; and,
1. OMT^weedy]to Kerr, January 21, 1923, FO/141/484(278). Furness in a minute of the same date concurred, ibid.
there now would be much larger number of appointed Senators than before.'*’
Allenby was extremely disturbed by these developments and on a later date des cribed Fu a d 1s behaviour and intentions in grim terms:
Starting with double aim of ridding himself of a disagreeable ministry and arrogating power to himself, he has been obliged to put subservient ministry in office, and in default of other support to cajole Zaghloulists. They support him in hope that they will obtain return of Zaghloul, which he presumably does not want and which he forsees that we shall prevent, and he takes the opportunity of increasing his own power. Thus, while he has been compelled to show eagerness about constitution .in order to keep public opinion quiet and has focused attention on Sudan articles, he has changed draft in direction of giving more power to senate and creating in fluence by the Crown over that body. He has also revised statutes of all the Egyptian orders so as to place them in his personal grant and thus prepare for restoring the pernicious regime of per sonal bribery associated with Abbas Hilmi {the ex-Khedive] ...2
Therefore, because of the direction of events and the Foreign Office's refusal to accept Tawfiq Nasim's formula, Allenby informed London that, in order to prevent the promulgation of the present draft of the constitution, it would be necessary to address a far sharper rebuke to the Egyptian ministry than previously considered. Consequently, Allenby informed Nasim only of the Foreign Office proposals for the amended Sudan clauses, but did not tell him of the contents of the note that would be delivered if the present draft was promulgated.
On January 24, Nasim handed Allenby an unsigned note repeating Egypt's position 3
on this question. The following evening Allenby warned Nasim that if the unsigned note constituted an expression of Egyptian intentions 'His Majesty's Government
would regard it as unfriendly act and as attempt not only to denounce 1899 convention but also to repudiate February declaration and that consequently such a policy would
1. For details, see: Kedourie, op.cit., p.358ff.
2. Allenby to Curzon, January 25, 1923, Tel. No. 41, FO/371/8959. The Residency believed that the eminence grise behind Fuad was Nasha'at Bey who was to play an
important part in Palace intrigues in coming years: 1 It is now quite certain that the greater part of our immediate troubles with the King as well as those that occurred during the Sarwat Ministry are due to Nashat Bey. This young man
...has now a complete ascendancy over the King. It was he who first started the understanding between the Palace and the Zaghlulists....He has caused much dis-
sention [sic] in the Palace itself and is well hated by Zulficar Pasha and Nessim Pasha.' Keown Boyd to Kerr, February 11, 1923, FO/141/584(13062), \j:his entire file deals with N a s h a ’a t 1s activities over the years].
3. The text of this note is in Allenby to Curzon, January 25, 1923, Tel. No. 40, FO/371/8959.
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be far-reaching.'^* Allenby then asked the Foreign Office for authority to give Fuad a note stating that Britain would not recognise the assumption of the title 'King of Egypt and the Sudan', that foreign governments would be so informed, and that such an act would be considered discourteous and unfriendly to the British leaving them free to reconsider policy with regard to the 1899 convention and the 1922 declaration. In addition, Allenby recommended that the note to Fuad explicitly and forcefully
state that
...the King will forfeit amity of His Majesty's Government who have for some time past viewed with disquietude His Majesty's sustained efforts to arrogate to himself autocratic powers and bearing in mind evils of personal regime which brought about their intervention in Egypt in 1882, they will henceforth closely scrutinize His Majesty's personal acts.^
Fuad could not mistake the ominous and thinly veiled allusions to the British invasion of 1882 or to the deposition of the ex-Khedive because of his attitude towards Britain.
Allenby then decided that he would not permit Fuad to extricate himself from his difficulties by verbal assurances which he could then disregard in the future. He, therefore, recommended that the King should be given a clear choice between two documents. If the King decided to promulgate the constitution as it now stood, Allenby's proposed rebuke would be presented and published. If, on the other hand, the King acquiesced to the British demands, he should be forced to signify his agree ment by signing a statement which gave the British view of the conflict and ended in total surrender to the British demands:
His Majesty£the King of Egypt}...has authorised His Excellency the High Commissioner to transmit communication to His Britannic Majesty's Government in which His Majesty states that having taken representation of British Government into most serious consideration and being no less desirous than is British Government that establishment of constitutional institutions in Egypt should be accomplished without controversy, His Majesty acquiesces in views of His Britannic Majesty's Government.3
To further make his threat credible, Allenby called for a display of naval and marine force at Alexandria and Port Said. This was authorised by London on January
4