TÉCNICO BÁSICO.

Schmidt’s focus on the concept of discourse allows us to look at the processes of (ideational) change by examining forensically how ideas are developed and communicated. The

interactive element of discourse is, therefore, just as integral to successfully bringing about political change (see also Campbell 1998: 385, Table 1). Schmidt divides the ‘interactive dimension’ of policy discourse into two functions. The first function, ‘coordinative’

discourse, provides elite policy actors in epistemic communities (governments, parties, think tanks, etc.) ‘with a common language and ideational framework’ through which they can together construct a policy programme (Schmidt 2002: 230). This is essential to the first element of statecraft, effective management of party relations (see Bulpitt 1986). The second function, ‘communicative’ discourse, serves public-facing political actors ‘as the means for persuading the public, through discussion and deliberation, that the policies developed at the coordinative phase are necessary — cognitive function— and appropriate — normative function’ (Schmidt 2002: 230; 2008a: 310, emphasis added). This second function is equally crucial to the development of a policy package that can mobilise and enthuse the wider

80 _{We could take, for example, Keynesianism as one historical example of a particularly powerful set of ideas in}

this regard (see Hall 1993).

81 _{There are, of course, many ideas that possess a powerful internal logic, but which would be not be}

‘appropriate’ for the development of a social democratic alternative to austerity. Monetarism, for instance, provided the Thatcher governments with a set of powerful economic arguments that underpinned a rationale for departure from the post-War Keynesian paradigm in the context of the economic crises of the 1970s. Yet, crucially, it also resonated with the free-market values that the Thatcher regime intended to promote (see Hall 1993: 284-7; Hay 1999b; Gamble 1990b [1981]). Thus, as per the distinction set out in Chapter 1, in order to support a specifically ‘social democratic’ alternative, ideas must resonate with the core values of social democracy, as also defined in Chapter 1.

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electorate, necessary for a winning electoral strategy and the establishment of political argument hegemony, in Bulpitt’s (1986) terms.

Whilst Schmidt’s conception of ‘coordinative discourse' involves the inner policy elites who develop policy and her conception of ‘communicative discourse’ involves public- facing actors, Finlayson (2013: 71) has described the need to consider an intermediate sphere of ‘ideational activity within historically shaped ideological communities’ (see also Osborne 2004 on the role of ‘intellectual mediators’). This is an important addition to my

understanding of the policy development process, bringing into scope the role of

organisations such as think tanks, academic networks and individual experts or influential commentators.82 _{The influence of such networks will thus be considered as an additional}

important source of ideational development, alongside the processes that occur internally within parties.

Support for policy programmes must, therefore, be developed both internally (within the party) at the coordinative stage of discourse and externally (amongst the electorate) at the communicative stage of discourse.83 _{Both Weir (1989: 56) and Hall (1989: 370) similarly}

write of the need for ideas to secure the support of the relevant ‘authorities’ or ‘social groups’. Whilst I utilise Schmidt’s framework, others similarly discuss the need for ideas to appear ‘relevant’ and ‘persuasive’. Hall (1989: 369), for instance, argues that ‘persuasiveness is an inherently relational concept, determined as much by the shape of current economic and political circumstances as by the shape of the ideas themselves … changes in material

circumstances can affect the pertinence and appeal of certain ideas’.

As the preceding sections of this chapter have demonstrated, however, it would be misleading to view the capacity of ideas as directly and solely relational to the material environment; from such a perspective, ideas become epiphenomenal, subservient to the

82 _{Whilst Finlayson (2013) rightly sees this as an intermediate sphere, for the sake of parsimony I include these}

instances of ideational activity within the ‘coordinative’ stage of discourse, given that they remain a step removed from the public’s engagement with politics.

83 _{For example, at the coordinative stage during a presidential campaign, whilst a group of economic thinkers}

may be providing powerful new ideas to a presidential candidate, if these ideas find little support within the party or are deemed too risky by the presidential candidate or other advisors, they may never see the light of day and thus have no impact on the social world. At the communicative stage, the set of ideas agreed upon at the coordinative stage are required to legitimise a policy programme, both by demonstrating its necessity in cognitive terms and its appropriateness in normative terms.

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concrete material reality. As Widmaier et al. (2007: 755) argue, ‘the success of any elite group engaged in persuasion is often less related to their analytic skills than to the broad mass intuitions of the moment’. Hindmoor’s (2004) account demonstrates, moreover, why it is important to remain aware of the way in which political actors can actively construct ‘political space’ by drawing upon their leadership and rhetoric skills, as well as the innovation and framing of new policies. Indeed, there is clear evidence of how particular ideas, such as the need for the state to ‘balance the books’ like a private household, can be highly effective in mobilising political change by communicating complex economic ideas in easily understood language that appeals to a mass ‘common sense’ (see Gamble 2013b: 55; see also Hall 1989: 370; Stanley 2014).

In focusing on the development of a policy programme and the delivery of that programme to the public, respectively, the interactive element of discourse thus provides a third criterion for assessing the ideational foundations of statecraft: the mobilisation of support, both internally and externally, for the policy programme being developed (see also Wright 2010; Hall (ed.) 1989; 1993; Goes 2016: 7). In order to study the interactive element of discourse, then, my empirical investigation must cover not only the types of ideas

discussed by key actors, but also who these actors are and how their actions and experiences have shaped the development of discourse in the two cases.