TÓPICO ESPECIAL: EL GOBIERNO HUMANO I. INTRODUCCIÓN

As we have seen in Chapter 6.1 and 6.2, Shelley and Guyer focus on interpreting Hume’s concept of “true judge”, and their interpretations have flaws and fail to place Hume’s aesthetics in his general philosophy. However, a recent interpretation sheds light on the connection between Hume’s aesthetics and his general philosophical enterprise. Costelloe argues, “Commentators have not paid sufficient attention to the fact that Hume himself characterizes the standard in terms of a general rule, and have thus overlooked the possibility that clarifying this concept could shed light on the kind of standard Hume aims to discover” (Costelloe 2007, 21). Given that in his essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” Hume frequently equates the standard of taste with “rules of art” or “general rules of beauty”, in order to understand the concept of “rules of art” it is natural to ask what Hume means by “general rules”. For the clarification of the meaning of general rules in Hume’s aesthetics, Costelloe scrutinizes the discussion of general rules in his epistemology. I agree with the general direction of his strategy. Hence, this section critically examines Costelloe’s understanding of “general rules” in the Treatise and of “rules of art” in “Of the Standard of Taste”. And then my own understanding will be suggested.

characterization of the standard in terms of a rule generally regard it as an inductive generalization, inferred from empirical observation about what has pleased and displeased across time and place” (Costelloe 2007, 5). However, according to him, they make this claim “without paying due attention to” the nature of Hume’s concept of general rules (Costelloe 2007, 5). Hence, he aims to differentiate his understanding of general rules from other commentators’ understanding of general rules as an “inductive generalization, inferred from empirical observation” by examining the nature of general rules in the Treatise, where we can find “Hume’s most elaborate discussion of general rules” (Costelloe 2007, 5).

According to Costelloe, there are three types of people in Hume’s system: the wise, the vulgar, and

philosophers. And they are further divided into two groups: group of ordinary people and philosophers. The wise and the vulgar belong to the group of ordinary people, contrasted to the group of philosophers. The criterion of the distinction is whether they exercise “ordinary reflection” or “philosophical reflection”. Ordinary people correct their errors of judgment by exercising “ordinary reflection”, while philosophers establish general rules by the use of “philosophical reflection”:

Philosophy … is a particular application of the general capacity to express formally the principles that organize common life. The difference is that whereas ordinary reflection enables individuals to correct errors of judgment, philosophy corrects by discovering principles, which, as in the case of the clock that will not go, explain the phenomenon in question. (Costelloe 2007, 12)

I agree with Costelloe’s distinction between the group of ordinary people, who exercise “ordinary reflection” and the group of philosophers, who use “philosophical reflection”. As we have seen in the previous section, Hume says, “Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations [of ordinary people] in life regard the former … The science [of philosophers], which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chymistry, etc. where the qualities, causes, and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into” (EHU 12.30-31, SBN 164). And his distinction between “particular deliberations” of ordinary people and “general reasonings” of philosophers in his essay “Of Commerce” supports Costelloe’s distinction, I believe (E 254-255).

After making the distinction, Costelloe clarifies the role of philosophers in Hume’s system:

Thus when Hume delineates the eight rules by which we ought to judge of cause and effect, he is reflecting upon and making explicit what people do implicitly and as a matter of course when they make correct judgments about causal connection. This set of rules or “logic,” as Hume also describes it, is already supplied “by the natural principles of our understanding” (T 1.3.15.11, SBN 175), but is given expression as a set of philosophical rules in their second influence. (Costelloe, 12)

That is, for Hume, Costelloe argues, ordinary people already use general rules implicitly when they make judgments concerning causal connection, but those who establish them explicitly are philosophers. On the basis of the clarification of the role of philosophers, Costelloe argues that the role of true judges in aesthetics can be explained in the same way if we consider, “delicacy of taste is analogous to judgment in relations of cause and effect, except correct aesthetic judgment – rules by which one ought to judge of beauty and deformity – are formed not on the faculty of understanding, but on that of taste” (Costelloe 2007, 13-14).

And he continues:

like the wise man who judges correctly of cause and effect, good taste consists in overcoming the natural weakness of the faculties and the “faint and dubious perception of beauty” that prevails in pre- reflective life (ST 243). It involves following general rules in their second influence that have their basis in experience, and which, grasped through reflection, correct the first influence of general rules that otherwise produces errors of judgment or bad taste. (Costelloe 2007, 14)

Ordinary people, whether they have good taste or not, would exercise general rules of art implicitly in making aesthetic judgments, but those who establish the general rules of art explicitly are true judges. Hence, he concludes, “[true judges’] judgments are manifestations or expressions of standards presupposed by everybody, and explicitly accepted by those with sufficient experience and an educated taste” (Costelloe 2007, 21). According to him, the true judge can be regarded as “a personification of general rules” (Costelloe 2007, 21). I agree with this line of Costelloe’s argumentation since I believe true judges are the causal experts who establish general rules concerning causal relationships between art objects and responses in ordinary art-perceivers by observation and reflection.

However, I disagree with Costelloe’s characterization of general rules as “ideal”, as opposed to other commentators’ characterization of general rules as “an inductive generalization, inferred from empirical observation about what has pleased and displeased across time and place” (Costelloe 2007, 5). And, thus, I disagree with his interpretation of rules of art as an ideal form as well. Following Hearn and Helm, he

distinguishes “philosophical general rules” formed by philosophers’ “philosophical reflection” from the general rules implicitly used in common life by ordinary people’s “ordinary reflection” (Costelloe 2007, 8-11).26 According to him, although by reflection ordinary people can correct their prejudiced judgements, which are produced by “general rules in their first influence”, this process of correction need to be understood as exercising “ordinary reflection” in the sense that ordinary people’s reflection can make errors: “As Hume says, ‘review and reflection’ is often required to revise the ‘first opinion’ received from the ‘judgments of our sense’ (T 1.2.4.23, SBN 47), which make errors such as taking a stick in water to be bent, or objects of the ‘same’ size to be equidistant” (Costelloe 2007, 11).

By contrast, Costelloe argues, philosophers’ reflection is qualitatively different from “ordinary reflection”: “Philosophy differs from other reflection in its task of ‘ordering and distinguishing … the operations of the mind’ through ‘a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflexion’ (EHU 1.13, SBN 13)”. Since philosophical reflection is qualitatively different from ordinary reflection, philosophical general rules formed by philosophical reflection have a qualitatively superior status to the general rules implicitly used in common life by ordinary reflection.

Costelloe then tries to articulate the concept of philosophical general rules by introducing Oakeshott’s definition of rules: “rules are ‘abridgments’ or ‘abstracts of some concrete activity’” (Costelloe 2007, 9). He says, “Since the rules are distilled from practices themselves, the knowledge thus presented takes a pure or ideal form:

26_{Hearn names Hume’s second sort of general rules as “reflective rules” (Hearn 1970, 410). And Helm calls} them “philosophical general rules” (Helm 1993, 128)

recipes in cookery books depict perfect dishes, as an English grammar presents the key for flawless

composition” (Costelloe 2007, 9). And he continues, “since philosophical general rules are abridgments, they are by definition post hoc summaries of the activity they abridge, which they present in ideal form because in practice judgments are not unassailable and mistakes are routinely made” (Costelloe 2007, 13). As we have seen, just as philosophical general rules concerning cause and effect are formed by philosophical reflection, so rules of art are formed by the aesthetic reflection of true judges. Hence, according to him, just as philosophical general rules are characterized as an ideal form which is abstracted from a concrete activity of making judgments concerning cause and effect, so rules of art are characterized as an ideal form which is abstracted from a concrete activity of making aesthetic judgments concerning the causal relationship between art objects and responses in art-perceivers.

However, in my view, this line of characterization of general rules as “ideal” is rejected for two reasons. First, unlike Costelloe’s distinction, for Hume there is no distinction between the general rules implicitly used in common life by ordinary reflection and the philosophical general rules established by philosophical reflection. It is important to note that Hume never uses the expressions like “the first sort of general rules” or “the second sort of general rules”. These expressions were first used by Hearn and then accepted by many commentators.27 Rather, Hume uses the expressions, “the first influence of general rules” and “the second influence of general rules”:

Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other. When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, tho’ the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first influence of general rules [on the imagination]. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it [the imagination] with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it [the imagination] to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish’d principles of reasoning; which is the cause of our rejecting it [the imagination]. This is a second influence of general rules [on the

understanding], and implies the condemnation of the former. (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 149-150)

Hume here says that our general rules are set in opposition to each other not because there are two opposite kinds of general rules, but because the first influence of general rules on the imagination is rejected by the second influence of general rules on the understanding. That is, the contents of general rules are the same both in the first influence and in the second influence of general rules. The conflict comes from two different “act of the mind”: When the imagination rashly applies general rules to the object which is “different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from” the cause, its application is reviewed and corrected by “the more general and authentic operations of the understanding”, which properly applies general rules to the cause. The influence of general rules is best explained by the concept of our “addiction to general rules” (Gill 1996,

27_{To the best of my knowledge, Hearn first used the expressions, “the first sort of rule” and “the second sort of} rule” for the first time in his paper “General Rules in Hume’s Treatise” (Hearn 1970, 410). And then this distinction between two sort of general rules has been widely accepted by other commentators such as Lorne Falkenstein (Falkenstein 1997), Bennett Helm (1993), Kenneth Winkler (2016), and Costelloe (2007).

34-38). In Book 3 of the Treatise, Hume gives a clear description of his conception of our “addiction to general rules”:

[W]e may observe, that the maxim wou’d here be false, that when the cause ceases, the effect must

cease also. For there is a principle of human nature, which we have frequently taken notice of, that

men are mightily addicted to general rules, and that we often carry our maxims beyond those reasons, which first induc’d us to establish them. Where cases are similar in many circumstances, we are apt to put them on the same footing, without considering, that they differ in the most material circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent than real. … [G]eneral rules commonly extend beyond the principles, on which they are founded. (T 3.2.9.3, SBN 551)

Since our imagination is easily influenced by general rules, that is, easily addicted to them, even when a cause ceases, we apply them to the cases “similar in many circumstances” but different “in the most material circumstances”.

Therefore, we can conclude that unlike Costelloe’s interpretation, Hume does not make a distinction between the general rules implicitly used in common life by ordinary reflection and the philosophical general rules established by philosophical reflection. In my view both general rules are the very same kind of rules, which share the same contents. In this sense, I agree with Hickerson’s interpretation of general rules:

Unlike Hearn and Falkenstein, I do not think that we need to understand such conflicts as shaping up between two distinct rules or sets of rules with opposing contents, i.e. ‘a “second” general rule… that condemns a number of “first” ones’. Instead the difference that Hume had in mind between the ‘first’ and ‘second’ influence of the General Rules is precisely the voluntary act of reflection itself, i.e. reflection that may be upon the very same rule or set of rules otherwise only instinctually employed. (Hickerson 2013, 1147)

What makes the difference between “the first influence of general rules” and “the second influence of general rules” is whether we use our imagination or our understanding when it comes to dealing with general rules. Second, Hume characterizes general rules not as a “pure or ideal form” but as a “logic of probability” (Costelloe 2007, 9; Serjeantson 2005, 192). According to Costelloe, philosophical general rules are defined as “post hoc

summaries of the activity they abridge, which they present in ideal form because in practice judgments are not

unassailable and mistakes are routinely made” (Costelloe 2007, 13). He analogizes philosophical general rules with “recipes in cookery books” which “depict perfect dishes” or “an English grammar” which presents the key for flawless composition” (Costelloe 2007, 9). That is, philosophical general rules themselves are unassailable but our judgments, which are the application of philosophical general rules, are error-prone in practice. Hume takes general rules as having the form that “all A’s are B’s” (Winkler 2016, 201): the “universal

propositions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole science in a single theorem” (E 254). For instance, Hume’s fourth rule is that “The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause” (T 1.3.15.6, SBN 173). The question is how we should understand Hume’s expressions “always” or “never” in this rule. Costelloe seems to understand them as ideal, and hence unassailable since they are abstracted in ideal form by philosophical reflection. In my view, his

interpretation is too strong. Hume calls general rules “logic”, but it must not be logic in the same sense as the logic in Aristotelian or Fregean deductive reasoning since his general rules as a logic deal with matters of fact, not relations of idea. Hence, as Serjeantson point out, Hume’s general rules must be understood as “a logic of probability” which is open to errors (Serjeantson 2005, 192).

After characterizing his eight general rules as “all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning”, Hume says:

perhaps even this [formulating eight rules explicitly] was not very necessary, but might have been supply’d by the natural principles of our understanding. Our scholastic head-pieces and logicians show no such superiority above the mere vulgar in their reason and ability, as to give us any

inclination to imitate them in delivering a long system of rules and precepts to direct our judgment, in philosophy. All the rules of this nature [of our understanding] are very easy in their invention, but extremely difficult in their application; and even experimental philosophy, which seems the most natural and simple of any, requires the utmost stretch of human judgment. (T 1.3.15.11, SBN 175) Costelloe interprets this passage as saying: “When Hume draws a distinction between the ‘logic’ he employs in his ‘reasoning’ and the ‘natural principles of the understanding’ (T 1.3.15.11), he separates rules in their first influence from rules in their second, and shows how the former are ‘supply’d by’ the latter” (Costolloe 2007, 112). I do not believe that Hume here separates philosophical general rules from the “natural principles of the understanding”. What he says here is that general rules as a logic are already imbedded in “the natural principles of our understanding”. Even “the mere vulgar” use the general rules as a logic implicitly “in their reason and ability”. The difficulty is in establishing those rules explicitly by observation and reflection. This is the role of philosophers and true judges.

In sum, although I disagree with Costelloe’s characterization of general rules as ideal, I agree with his understanding of the role of philosophers and true judges. Their role is in abstracting and establishing general rules explicitly, which are already used implicitly or unreflectively in ordinary people’s common life. Using Hume’s term, philosophers and true judges do “moral reasoning” concerning “general facts” (EHU 12.30, SBN 164).