CAPÍTULO 5: EVALUACIÓN ECONÓMICA
6 Tabla 3.3 Estructura de inventario
The conflict could not prolong itself any longer, the use of force was not only tiring the IRA but also the Unionists and especially the British government were suffering from exhaustion, plus there was a military and political stalemate (Edwards, 2011), making it clear that the conflict between the Unionists and the Republicans would not end through military force. For this reason, the unsuccessful campaign under violence from both side, opened the window to consider a negotiation process as a means to end the conflict. The stage was set for the third stage of asymmetric conflicts to enter; the negotiation phase (Gallo & Marzano, 2000) was the next step to consider after decades of confrontations between the conflicting actors.
The Downing Street Declaration in December 1993 paved the way to peace, giving the right to self-determination to the Irish population, and the future possibility of transferring Northern Ireland from the UK to the Republic of Ireland, only if a majority of the Northern Irish population was in favour of such an outcome (Democratic Progress Institute, 2013). The declaration was also seen as a big contribution towards the establishment of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.
The conflict in Northern Ireland came to an end with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and it is viewed as a successful model for conflict resolution (Democratic Progress Institute, 2013), since it was able to establish power sharing within the Northern Irish government and community, giving political participation to both the Catholic Irish and to the Protestant community, result which translated into a sign of progress and recognition, “a pure majority government in a divided society would be inappropriate” (Mathews, 2009, p. 38). Moreover, the idea of a shared future presented by Powell & Moaz (2014), came into place here since both sides would be part of a new government.
The Agreement translated as a key victory for the IRA and Sinn Féin, and it became the first step towards a post –conflict environment seeking fairness and recognition for both sides involved in the conflict, creating democratic institutions10 and focusing
10The agreement is also characterised by sections regarding civil rights, safeguards, equality of opportunities, decommissioning, security, policing and overall the implementation of justice to all parts.
on the promotion and guarantee of human rights, especially for the Catholic minority within Northern Ireland. Overall, the Good Friday Agreement, is a testimony of the fourth stage of asymmetrical conflicts (Gallo & Marzano, 2009), since the negotiation phase, evolved into sustainable peace and the conflicting parties were able to agree on terms towards the establishment of a shared coexistence.
One of the techniques that helped put an end to the conflict were back-channel negotiations: “a secret communication between the leadership of opposing groups, conducted by a third party or even by an intermediary” (Democratic Progress Institute, 2013, p. 19). In the case of Northern Ireland, back-channel negotiations were held between the British Government and the Nationalist paramilitaries (PIRA mainly), achieving a ceasefire in 1994. “The effectiveness of any back-channel lies in its ability to foster the appropriate conditions for the development of mutual trust and solidarity between parties, as these crucial factors can move the positions of the respective parties forward” (Ibid. p. 20). The elements that helped this method were information sharing, personal relationships but overall, trust between the parties involved, this means that they have a transformative effect and build to contain and solve the conflict. Without the building of trust and respect towards each other, the negotiation process towards the Good Friday Agreement would have collapsed, for this reason, any type of asymmetric conflict that enters a stage of negotiation must foster an environment of trust and respect. “Building trust requires time, especially under conditions where both sides reject one another’s legitimacy, therefore continuity in personnel and entrusted individuals gave the secret channel high levels of validity, which came to be a defining characteristic for cooperative communication” (Ibid, p. 22). Furthermore, a lesson that has to be learnt from the conflict in Northern Ireland is that states should in the first place be prepared to talk to terrorists and lines of communication should always be open (Ranstrop & Brun, 2013). This is why back channel negotiations became a positive asset to the culmination of the conflict and resulted in the Good Friday Agreement.
The fact that back-channel communications are used instead of public official talks, allows the parties involved to focus on the very nature of problem solving and reaching a plausible agreement (Democratic Progress Institute, 2013). For this reason, those who conduct the back-channel communications and negotiations are not seeking public approval or attention, and helps to keep the tension off the negotiators from the public eye. Although, this method is not 100% flawless, there is
always a possibility that information gets leaked to the press and jeopardises the negotiation process.
In their essence, back channel negotiations seek to provide an environment of trust and the possibility to exchange information, they reduce uncertainty but can also provoke misunderstandings that can “hurt” the whole negotiation process. Building trust has also been mentioned by Powell & Moaz (2014) as a key step to establish negotiation and peace talks within asymmetric conflicts; therefore, the back-channel negotiations serve as a premise for this environment of trust.
These were a significant contribution to the peace process, since the conflict in Northern Ireland was strongly characterised by hatred and an environment of mistrust between the two divided communities (Senholzi, 2008). Back-channel negotiations are a step forward in easing the tensions between conflicting groups and pave the way to a fruitful negotiation process. Back channel negotiations can also be linked to Duman (2014) and his idea of Conflict Transformation (CT), where both parties foresee a joint future together and drawing upon scenarios of co- existence under peace.