SOCIAL TRADITIONS
In Tables 4.1 and 5.1 there are a number of reports of behaviours in monkeys and apes which have been referred to as local or social traditions. Kummer (1971) defined a social tradition as "behavioural modification induced by the social environment. " Box (1984) explains that:
"... a strong case can be made that a pattern of behaviour does constitute a social tradition under conditions in which closely related (such as the same subspecies) but separate populations, living in very similar ecological conditions, are compared, and a behavioural deviation is found in one of the populations" (p. 222).
One must be very careful when considering already established behaviours to ensure that differences in separate groups of animals are not primarily due to ecological variation rather than social influence. Tomasello (1990) suggests that in most cases of apparent non-human social traditions it is practically impossible to exclude the chance that ecological factors are responsible for the behavioural variation. He considers the case of differences in termite- fishing techniques which McGrew and Tutin and Baldwin (1979) found across the Gombe (Tanzania), Mt Assirik (Senegal) and Okorobiko (Rio Muni) chimpanzees. Most notably only the Mt Assirik chimpanzees prepared their probing sticks by peeling the bark off first. Tomasello (1990) comments:
"it is impossible in principle for ecological analyses by themselves to answer definitively questions about learning processes. On the one hand, a failure to find ecological differences between groups does not mean there are none. Perhaps bark peeling is advantageous for one group but not another, for example, because of some of subtlety in the behavior of the particular termites on their range (they reside deeper, they grow larger, they have learned to be wary, their mounds are wetter inside, and so on ad infinitum) and this guides the
individual learning of members of the two groups" (p.282).
traditions at least in Kummer's general sense of the term. The important point is not that the behaviour is learned through imitation, but that some kind of stable social transmission has occurred. Rather than considering established behavioural patterns, it is easier to identify a social tradition when novel practices are observed to spread through a group (Galef 1990).
Potato-washing in Japanese macaques constitutes one of the most famous cases of a social tradition in a non-human primate (see chapter 2 and chapter 5). The pattern of
propagation indicates that the practice spread through social influence since juveniles learned from their same-age play-mates, mothers learned from their juveniles, and infants learned from their mothers (Kawai 1965). Yet, the actual learning process involved could be exposure or local enhancement, rather than imitation (Green 1975; Galef 1976). Nevertheless, it still qualifies as a social tradition because it was behaviour that was "induced by the social environment" (Kummer 1971).
Social traditions, so defined, have been observed in species other than primates. Perhaps the most famous example is the rapid spread of milk-bottle-top opening by British tits (Paridae). The birds learned to pierce through foil tops on milk-bottles left on people's doorsteps and eat the layer of cream beneath. The practice spread rapidly throughout many parts of Britain. Sherry and Galef (1984) presented 16 captive black-capped chickadees
{Pams atricapillus - the American equivalent to British tits) with an equivalent problem, to study how the tits learned the behaviour. They found that chickadees who had their
attention drawn to already open tops learned to pierce undamaged tops without directly observing the exact method used. Therefore, the bottle-opening tradition could have been transmitted by stimulus enhancement rather than imitation.
The Japanese macaques' and the Tits' social traditions arose directly from the fact that the animals were being (intentionally or unintentionally) provisioned by humans. It is more difficult to assess to what extent social traditions are present in wild populations of animals where humans have not significantly affected the learning environment (McGrew 1992). Hauser's (1988) report of vervet acacia pod dipping (see chapter 3) is the only example of a naturally occurring social tradition in non-human primates, where there were direct observations of the rapid spread of a novel behaviour with non-provisioned food. If
the actual initial discovery and subsequent spread of a technical behaviour are not directly observed, one can not be sure that the members of a group did not acquire the practice through individual learning.
If an apparent social tradition does not involve manipulating objects or solving a technical problem, it is difficult to see how it could be transmitted by any process other than social influence. One such tradition is the Mahale chimpanzees' mutual grooming hand clasp described by McGrew and Tutin (1978), (see the database report number 48, chapter 4). The Mahale chimpanzees' strange grooming posture did not seem to be due to
ecological factors. Although the chimpanzees at Gombe had occasionally been seen holding on to low-hanging branches with one hand while mutually grooming with the other, there was no difference found in the number of available low-hanging branches between Gombe and Mahale. As ecological factors could not explain the behaviour, it must have been transmitted by some kind of social learning. The mechanism of transmission did not
necessarily have to be imitation, it could have been a kind of social moulding procedure (see comments accompanying the report in chapter 4 for greater detail). Nevertheless, as social influences appear to have been responsible for the spread of the grooming hand clasp, it does qualify as a social tradition (in Kummer's sense of the term).
McGrew (1977) comments:
"No one would deny now that social traditions (in the sense of Kummer's [1971] "behavioral modification induced by the social environment") can and do exist in free- ranging nonhuman primate populations. It can be further postulated that when social traditions are passed between generations the process of socialization is involved. The unanswered questions lie in the area of proximal mechanisms of social traditions, i.e., how novel behaviors are acquired, disseminated, and transmitted (Beck 1974)" (p. 263).
The fact that it has been shown that social traditions exist in non-human species is very important in its own right. Social traditions show that animals can benefit from the
innovative behaviours of others and these innovations can be maintained across generations. In terms of the practical benefits to an animal's inclusive fitness, it matters very little if the innovative behaviours are learned by imitation or some other social learning process. There is a danger that too strict a focus on imitation can blind researchers to the relevance of data
relating to social traditions in terms of inclusive fitness (Box 1992). NON-HUMAN CULTURE?
One hotly debated issue is whether the social traditions found in non-human species constitute evidence of non-human "culture". The concept of "culture" has proved as
difficult to define as "imitation". Traditionally, culture has been defined in terms of being a purely human activity (e.g., Tylor 1871; Huxley 1958; Montagu 1968). Box (1984)
comments:
"With very few exceptions (e.g., Harris, 1964), discussions of culture have excluded infrahuman species by definition. In a much quoted example by Tylor (1871), culture was described as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." ... Further, Kroeber and Kluckhold (1952) list over two hundred descriptions of culture which reflect the anthropological bias which was understandably in the literature, given the lack of comparative evidence to the contrary" (p. 224).
When the Japanese macaque studies of culture in a non-human primate were
published, (such as potato-washing (Kawamura 1954), wheat eating (Yamada 1957), candy eating (Itani 1958), hot-spring bathing (Suzuki 1965), swimming and a "gimme" begging gesture (Kawai 1965)), many anthropologists chose either to ignore them (e.g., Montagu 1968), dismiss them without proper discussion (e.g., Dobzhansky 1972) or to tighten up the definition of culture so that it even more stringently excluded non-human primates (e.g., Mann 1972). McGrew (1992) comments:
"The overall impression is that until recently anthropologists either long ignored the evidence for non-human culture, erected ad hominem criteria which avoided taking the phenomenon seriously or, having considered the problem felt it necessary to move the goal posts" (p. 73).
McGrew (1992) calls for an "operational definition of culture, that is, one that stipulates properties that are empirically observable and measurable" (p. 75). McGrew and Tutin (1978) took the first steps towards a working definition by "being as painstaking as
possible in abstracting those qualities of culture that are thought to be crucial” (McGrew 1992, p. 76). They identify six conditions (innovation, dissemination, standardization, durability, diffusion, and tradition), which form a logical chronological sequence. McGrew (1992) adds two more conditions to these initial six (non-subsistence and naturalness). Table 7.1 is reproduced from McGrew (1992), it lists and defines the eight conditions for
recognizing cultural acts.
None of McGrew's conditions stipulate that cultural acts must be disseminated by imitation. However, Tomasello et al. (1993) argue that the distinguishing mark of culture is that:
"cultural products share, among other things, the characteristic that they accumulate
modifications over time. Once a practice is begun by some member or members of a culture others acquire it relatively faithfully, but then modify it as needed to deal with novel
exigencies. The modified practice is then acquired by others, including progeny, who may in turn add their own modifications, and so on across generations. This modification across time is often called the "ratchet-effect, " because each modification stays firmly in place until further modifications are made" (p. 495).
Tomasello et al. (1993) argue that only learning processes at least as complex as imitation, (which they define in terms of understanding the intentional state underlying a model's behaviour (p. 497)), can ensure the fidelity of transmission needed to support the ratchet effect.
Bruner (1993) argues that Tomasello et al. 's account of culture is too individualistic. He suggests that members of an existing culture indoctrinate new members in such a way that they promote and maintain cultural norms.
"For it is through cultural institutionalization that the most enduring "ratchet effect" is assured. Without such institutionalization, Kawamura’s (1959) Japanese macaques do not pass on potato washing as a culture-wide tradition: it could easily disappear in a generation. For traditional cultural transmission requires not only an appreciation of "other minds." It also requires such intraspecific support as guilt and shame for non-compliance, as well as such punitively external ones as the compulsion of legal systems, the unavoidability of rites of passage assuring participation ..., incest taboos, and so forth" (p. 516).
It seems possible that cultural practices can be initially acquired through any social learning process. For example, the Thai people have a cultural practice whereby they avoid
Table 7.1 Criteria for recognizing cultural acts in other species (from McGrew 1992. p. 77)
Innovation New pattern is invented or modified
Dissemination Pattern acquired from another by innovator
Standardisation Form of pattern is consistent and stylised
Durability Pattern performed outwith presence of demonstrator
Diffusion Pattern spreads from one group to another
Tradition Pattern persists from innovator's generation to next one
Non-subsistence Pattern transcends subsistence
crossing their ankles because it is considered offensive. It seems very unlikely that members of the Thai culture learn not to cross their ankles through imitation. Simply punishing a child for sitting with his or her ankles crossed would be sufficient to teach him or her through operant conditioning not to sit that way. A foreign visitor could learn the practice without she or he ever having "an understanding of the intentional state underlying the behavior" (Tomasello et al.'s 1993 definition of imitation). In fact, despite having lived in Thailand for three years as a child, I have no idea why Thai people find crossed ankles offensive. The important factor in learning cultural norms is not precisely how or by what mechanism these behaviours or practices are learned, but that they are maintained or institutionalized in the way Bruner describes.
Heyes (1993) also argues that, "research on imitation in non-human animals has no direct or special bearing on "the question of animal culture" (p. 1006). She notes that there is no reason why individuals who imitate should not, even during retention of a novel behaviour, adjust their behaviour in response to the environment regardless of the initial actions performed by a model. According to Heyes, if "behaviour acquired through imitation is not insulated from modification by the environment during retention" (p. 1005) then it can not form a firm enough basis for Tomasello et al.'s ratchet effect. Heyes (1993) concludes, "the psychological processes that support culture are those that insulate socially transmitted information from modification through individual learning, that prevent or discourage individuals from "testing" information acquired from conspecifics. " It seems feasible that Bruner's process of intraspecific support is the essential element needed for culture rather than imitation.
Does this mean that the evidence for social traditions in non-human primates is of absolutely no relevance in relation to the evolution of human culture? First, it does seem to be a mistake to suggest that evidence of one or two socially transmitted behaviours in nonhuman primates means that in some sense they have a culture. The concepts of "social tradition" and "culture" are not equivalent. To illustrate this point, imagine two tribes of people who live in exactly the same environment and who behave in exactly the same ways except for one practice: all the members of tribe A cut their hair short, while everyone in
tribe B lets their hair grow long. Based on the evidence of one idiosyncratic difference in behaviour, it seems sensible to conclude that the two tribes have basically the same culture,
but they differ in respect to one social tradition or custom.
In our every day sense of the word, a culture constitutes a much more all-embracing phenomenon than simply consisting of one or two social traditions. Cultural systems or practices define a group or population, and they are a means by which the members of that culture define themselves and the world in which they live. When we talk about Western Culture the concept incorporates elements such as a shared history, art, religion, philosophy, literature, music, and technology. Social traditions or customs (such as, for example, the way Westerners shake hands when formally greeting one another) form a small part of the whole complex cultural system. It is no wonder, when the every day meaning of "culture" refers to a complex, interrelated, and socially maintained system of knowledge, beliefs and customs, that anthropologists have ignored or dismissed the evidence for one or two social traditions in animals.
I suggest, therefore, that much of the discussion of non-human culture and
McGrew's eight cultural conditions relate to social traditions, not culture. However, since social traditions are a small element in the whole system of a culture, they are significant in relation to it. One problem in studying human culture is that it is so incredibly complex it is difficult to differentiate all the different elements involved. Studying non-human primates who seem to exhibit one component of culture, in their social traditions, may offer an insight into the evolution of the complicated edifice of human cultural activities. In other words, instead of arguing about the semantics of whether or not non-human primates can properly be said to have culture, we should re-focus the debate to ask exactly what we can learn from their behaviour about the evolution of human culture. (Exactly the same can be said of the debate over ape "language" projects. Instead of arguing whether signing or symbol use by apes should properly be called language, we should re-focus the debate on what the apes' behaviour can tell us about the evolution of human linguistic abilities (McGrew 1992).)
Chapter 8