Though it may be obvious, I will start by underscoring that corruption cannot be seen strictly as a legal concept. In the tangled web of legality and morality, the concept of corruption often goes beyond the category of the criminal. We can observe this when a public servant has juggled a bit too deftly with principles and codes of conduct, or when a politician has grafted or embezzled, but still slid through the cracks of the legal system: The condemnations of the act and the outrage displayed in press and visual media shows that transgression is not only perceived in relation to a legal framework. Laws, whether bendable or clear-cut, are just one set of configurations enacting a moral order of justification. Other values can be at stake, and critique of perceived corruption frequently invokes extra-legal moralities (although such moral frames may very well be implicit). Thus, in many cases people perceive a corrupt act to be offensive, even if the act is not strictly illegal. Why? Because a corrupt act constitutes a transgression relative to several ideas about the common good and their associated modes of justifying or criticizing actions.
This, of course, makes for good television as well as flaming headlines: As the scandal breaks, critique and condemnation forms the bulk of the news material until (if ever) evidence is produced and a juridical process is initiated. Across a range of positions, including economic, liberal-democratic, juridical, institutional, developmental and moral standpoints, the normative condemnation of corruption is agreed upon. But every position in this repertoire hinges upon a particular notion of the common good: for the sake of equality before the law, for mutual economic benefit, for the quality of public institutions – and every single
evaluation thus contains or implies a reference to at least one specific polity debased by corruption. Of course, several polities might be activated in debates concerning corruption scandals, even in the same text or sentence, and every polity might be put to the test concerning its particular attributions of value (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 133).
A test, in the framework of Boltanski and Thévenot models how contention is constituted initially by differing schemata of value-attribution. The elements of the situation and their worth in the differing grammars will be included in such a test, and the arguments will bring forth deficiencies and challenge the given
order, eventually maintaining or adjusting this order as required (ibid.). Thus, in
the case of a corrupt politician, for instance, a test of his worth could proceed from the differing states of worth attributed to his corrupt actions; the test will attempt an unequivocal ranking in a hierarchy of worth. Continuing this example, the test could determine whether the politician had corrupt intentions or only incidentally transgressed the principles of democracy in his well-meaning efforts to serve his constituency.
Because the repertoire of polities available is contingent upon political and historical processes, the common good is not a world- or nation-wide, all- encompassing notion (as the founding fathers and midwives of modern anthropology remind us). This is not only apparent when visiting the notorious site of ethnographic fieldwork in all its exotic splendour or wildness, but obvious in the most trivial corruption scandals. When parliamentarians and office holders fall from grace in a Western society (whatever that may mean) and the public opinion makes a transgressor exit the Garden of Liberal Democracy, alternate ways of justifying transgressive actions in modern governance often emerge. The potential conflict of different polities might then form a second pool of raw material for the media to process. A few examples of different stances on corruption will suffice:
In the history of corruption studies, ‘traditional economy’, based on personal partaking in transactions, has often been noted as an alternative to Western bureaucratic governance. This was theoretically (as well as empirically) explored
as early as Mauss’s The gift (1923-24), and has emerged many times since,
conceptualized as ‘corruption’ in developing states as well as established democracies. More recently, others have documented the alternative legitimacies developed in the wake of state transformations (e.g. Rivkin-Fish, 2005; Rose- Ackerman, 2009), the pragmatic solutions to lifestyles at the fringe of society (Gill, 2000), the embedding of bribes in highly formalized contracting processes (Li, 2011), the aura of charisma and audacity clinging to a leader that gets things done (Cotta, 2008), and even sexual potency associated with political thrust in
the murky domains of law (Mbembe, 2001: 13ff). In sum, the family, network connections, respect for professional qualities, and even the ideal of Progress can require illicit payments, just as personal qualities in individuals can justify their extra-legal dealings. Such modes of justification can easily eclipse the polities invoked in Western conceptions of the liberal-democratic state, replacing them with locally adapted definitions of the common good.
To summarize, corruption is constructed as a transgression from multiple angles, and justifications, such as the aforementioned, can similarly be criticized and condemned from a range of polities. When the media and politicians hold ‘bribes’, ‘graft’, or ‘embezzlement’ up for scrutiny against standards of transparency, efficient bureaucracy, and good governance, the grammars of economic, rational, legal and moral polities are invoked. In organizational settings, specific and more local notions about the shadow side of an organization might also form the vantage point from which to condemn corruption (e.g. Bowles, 1991; Kociatkiewicz and Kostera, 2010; Lennerfors, 2008: 350). Indeed, during the last twenty-five years such invocations and scrutiny have multiplied in different societal domains and produced an audit society (Power, 1997), to the extent that ‘we can think of audit as an actant to which all kind of powers are attributed’, as Marilyn Strathern remarks (2000: 5). But beyond these seemingly very diverse orders of liberal-democratic governance lie other realms, locally vested with power and legitimacy. Every polity draws its boundary conditions for defining corruption differently, based on its specific grammar of worth developed through semantic and historical contingencies. For this reason, it is beyond the scope of this article to provide an exhaustive list of the modes condemning corruption across the globe. Rather, in the next section, I will delve into a theory describing processes for creating and controlling the boundaries of social orders, before eventually heading into a discussion of the contestation of such boundaries in the public space of the media.