TABLE : Définition théorique des émotions

Fran<;:ois Chatelet has always defined himself as a rationalist, but there are many kinds of rationalism . He frequently al­

ludes to Plato, to Hegel, and to Marx. However, above all he is an Aristotelian . What distinguishes him from a Thomist?

Without a doubt it is the manner in which h e rej ects God and all transcendence. All transcendence, all beliefs in another world, he calls presumptions (outre-cuidances) . Never before has there been a philosophy more tranquilly atheist (with the exception of Nietzsche 's, of course) . A tranquil atheism is a philosophy for which God is not a proble m . The non-exis­

tence or even the death of God are not problems but rathe r the conditions o n e must have alre ady acquired in order to make the true problems surge forth : there is no other mod­

esty. Never before has philosophy established itself so firmly in a pure field of immanence.

In our philosophical j argon, we call transcendence a prin­

ciple posed both as a source of all explanation and as a su­

perior reality. The word has a nice ring to it and I find it fitting. The presumptuous, small or large, from the leader of a small group to that of the president of the United S tates, from a psychiatrist to a CEO can only function by recou rse (coups) to transcendence - just as a drunk might get by through sips (coups) of red wine. The medieval God has spread him­

self thin, without losing his strength or his profound formal

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unity. Science, the ·working Class, the Motherland, Progress, Health , Defense, Democracy, Socialism - the list would be too long - are all among his avatars. These transcendences, which exercise with a heightened ferocity their lab ors of or­

ganization and extermination, have taken his place (to such a degree that we can say he is still there, omnipresent) .

(Les arznees de dbnolition , p. 263) Immanence, the field of immanence, consists of a Poten­

tial-Act relation. ¹ The tvvo notions are inseparable and exist only in correlation. It is in this that Chatelet is Aristotelian . First of all, he experiences a sort of fascination with poten­

tial: man is potential, man is matter (matiere) :

I'm not interested in political power (pouvoir) . For me, the contra-power, the anti-power are traps. \Vhat interests me is potential, that which makes power power. Now, strictly speak­

ing, potential lies in the ordinary person. I take pleasure in exercising my potential - in doing what I can (pouz,oir) - to understand and unveil the mechanisms of the capitation of potential wherever I have 'information' - perhaps only to main tain my taste for potential, to keep it alive in me, and to awaken , reawaken , this potential around me. Potential has also been called freedom.

( Chronique des idees perdues, p. 2 1 8) But how do we proceed to the act? vVhat is the act of this potential? The act is reason, but we must understand that reason is a process, not a faculty, and that it consists precisely in actualizing a potential or in forming a matter (matiere) . Be­

cause we have no motive to think of either the act or the matter as unique, there is a pluralism of reason. A process of rationalization is thus defined, or invented, each time human relations are established in any matter whatever, in any col­

lection (ensemble) whatever, in any multiplicity whatever. The

Pericles and Verdi 1 5 5 act itself, being a relation, is always political . Reason as a pro­

cess is political . This can be in the city, but in other groups as well, in small groups, or in me, in nothing other than my­

self. Psychology, or rather the only supportable psychology, is a politics because I always have to create human relations with myself. There is not a psychology, but a politics of the self (moi) . There is no metaphysics, but a politics of being.

No science, but a politics of matter since m an is burdened by matter itself. Even illness: one must 'manage ' it when it cannot be overcome and impose upon it human relations.

Take, for example, a sonorous matter: the scale or rather a scale is a process of rationalization which consists in estab­

lishing human relations in this matter in such a way that it actualizes its potential and becomes human. Marx analyzed the sense organs from this point of view in order to show through them a man-Nature immanence : the ear becomes the human ear when the sonorous obj ect becomes musical.

It is the extremely diverse set of processes of rationalization which constitutes the becoming or the activity of man, the Praxis or praxes. 'J\Te cannot tell whether a human unity ex­

ists, in this respect, from either the historical point of view or the general point of view.

Is there a properly human matter, a pure potential which is distinct from the act and capable of fascinating us? It would not be our freedom if it did not at the same time appear as its opposite, 'capitation', as Chatelet said above . This would be an obtuse act of potential as opposed to an act capable of realization, an inverse of reason, or even more than an op­

posite - a privation or an alienation . It is as if there were a

non-human relation interior or immanent to the human rela­

tion itself, an inhumanity proper to man . Freedom becomes man's capacity to defe at man, but also to be defe ated . Poten­

tial is pathos, that is, passivity, receptivity. But receptivity is first of all the potential to give and receive blows - a strange endurance. One can always write the history of systems of

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domination and the activities of masters, but these would be nothing without the desire of those who in the name of the blows which they receive aspire to give them back. They fight for their servitude as if it were their freedom, said Spinoza.

So much so that whether it is exercised or suffe red, power ^· (pouvoir) is not only the activity of man's social existence but also the passivity of his natural existence. A unity of war and earth, such as C h:helet found traces of in Claude Simon.

O r even in Marxism, which has never separated the active existence of historical man from the p assive existence of a natural being which is its double :

Reason and its irrationality was Marx's theme, and it is ours . . . . It wants to be a critical science of effective passiv­

ity, the land-tax of humanity. Man does not die because he is mortal (no more than he lies because he is ' dishonest' or loves because he is 'amorous'). He dies because he doesn't eat enough, because he is reduced to the state of a beast, because he is killed. Historical materialism reminds us of these facts, and in Capital, Marx lays the foundations of a method which could allow the analysis of the mechanisms that govern , dur­

ing a given epoch (a particularly revelatory epoch for that matter) , the fact of passivity.

( Questions, Objections, p. 1 1 5) Are there not values proper to pathos, even if only that de­

spair of the world which is so present in Chatelet beneath an extreme poli teness? Men are continually destroying (demolir) one another to such an extent that it might seem better to destroy oneself in agree able or even fictional circumstances.

'Of course all life is a process of bre aking down (un processus de demolition) ' , Fitzgerald said, and this 'of course ' resounds as a guarantee of immanence : this non-human relation in the relation with oneself.2 Chatelet's sole novel, Les annees de demolition, exhibits a profoundly Fitzgeraldian inspiration, an

Pericles and Verdi 1 5 7 elegance in disaster. It is not a question of dying, or of a de­

sire to die, but of investing the temptation to die in a sublime element like music . And again, this is not a psychoanalytic affair, but a political one. One must take into account this vector of destruction which is able to traverse a collectivity or a man, Athens or Pericles. Pericles: this was Chatelet's first book. For C hatelet, Pericles will always be the image of the great man or hero, e ven in his 'passivity', even in his failure which will become the failure of democracy, even in follow­

ing the disquieting vector.

Pathos h as a second value : politeness - in truth a Greek politeness which would already be the sketch or outline of human relations and the beginnings of an act of reason.

Human relations begin with a metric or an organization of space which holds the city together. It is an art of establish­

ing the right distances between men, not hierarchical but geometrical, so that they are neither too close nor too far and are unable to exchange blows. It makes the encounter between men a rite, a sort of ritual of immanence, even if a little schizophrenia is necessary. The Greeks have taught us, as Gernet and Vernant have shown, to not nail ourselves down to an established center, but to acquire the capacity to carry the center with ourselves in order to organize groups (ensembles) of symmetrical and reversible relations effectu­

ated by free men. Perhaps this is not enough to overcome the desp air of the world: there are less and less polite men, and it takes at least two to be polite. The extreme politeness of Fran<;ois Chatelet, however, is itself nothing more than a mask for a third value of p athos which we could call kindness or affe ctionate benevolence. Perhaps this is not the most suit­

able name, but this quality, this value, belonged profoundly to C hatelet. More than a value or a quality, however, it is a disposition of thought, an act of thought .

It consists in this: t o not know i n advance how someone will eventually find himself capable of establishing in and outside

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of himself a process of rationalization. There are of course all of the lost cases (despair), and perhaps we are all born on a ground of demolition. But we never pass up a chance to get out. vVhen an opportunity presents itself, what would we have to do in order to escape our demolitions? There is no pure Reason or rationality par excellence. There are only hetero­

geneous processes of rationalization which are very different depending on the different domains, epochs, groups, and peo­

ple. They never stop aborting, sliding, getting into impasses, but also pulling themselves together elsewhere, with new mea­

sures, new rhythms, new attitudes. The plurality of processes of rationalization have already been the obj ect of basic epis­

temological analyses (Koyre , Bachelard, C anguilhem) and so­

ciopolitical analyses (Max \1\Teber) . And in his last books Fou­

cault oriented this pluralism towards an analysis of human relations which would have constituted the proj ect of a new ethics from the point of view of what he called 'processes of subj ectification . ' He showed the bifurcations, the derivations, the shattered history of a reason which was always in a state of liberation or alienation in the relations of man with him­

self. And it was necessary for Foucault to go all the \vay back to the Greeks not in order to find once and for all the miracle, the miserable miracle, of reason par excellence, but only in order to di agnose there perhaps the first rough sketch of a process of rationalization from which many others followed under different conditions and different attitudes. Foucault no longer defined the Greek city according to the organization

of a new space, but by a human relation determinable as a ri­

valry between free men or citizens (in politics, but also in love, gymnastics, j ustice . . . )^: in the prolongation of a rationaliza­

tion and a subj ectification a free man could only govern other free men, in principle, if he was able to govern himself. Such is the properly Greek act or process which is not a founding act but a singular event in a shattered chain. It is without a doubt here that Chatelet, who for his part had taken the Greek city

Pericles and Verdi 1 5 9 as his point of departure, encounters Foucault. It is the idea of magistracy which allows Chatelet to define the Greek city not only in its difference from other notions (the priest, the imperial functionary . . . ) but also in its correlates which en­

ter into corresponding processes of rationalization (the lottery for example). Nobody has demonstrated as well as Chatelet how the lottery is caught up in a movement of reason. For Chatelet rationalization is a historical and political process which experienced, through Athens, its first event, but also, in Pericles, its defeat and effacement from which furthe r events caught in other processes would break away. Athens was not the advent of an eternal reason, but the singular event of a provisional rationalization, all the more dazzling.

\�Vhenever we affirm one unique reason, universal by right, we fall precisely into what Chatelet calls 'presumption' - a sort of metaphysical impoliteness. He discovered this first in Plato, but even when we recognize in reason a human and only hu­

man faculty, a faculty of the ends of man, we uphold in it a transcendence which is still theological. Instead of a pluralism of processes, we erect a dualism which opposes discourse to violence, as though violence did not continue to build a home in discourse itself and furnish it with so many meanderings and motivations. Chatelet had long believed, under the pro­

found influence of Eric \Veil, in the opposition of violence and discourse following a Platonic and Hegelian model . But he discovered, to the contrary, the aptitude of discourse to make the inhumanity proper to man speak: it is up to discourse to engage the process of its own rationalization, but only in a becoming, under the pressure of certain motives, on behalf of certain events. \Vhat makes La naissance de l'histoire so important is that in it Chatelet creates an image of discourse or logos closer to Thucydides than to Plato or Hegel. And he always re­

j e cts the two corollaries of a doctrine of universal reason: the utopian demand to invoke an ideal city or a universal state by right, which always turns back against democratic becomings;

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the apocalyptic demand to assign a deviation, a fundamental alienation to reason which would be produced once and for all and would reunite in one blow all violence or the non-hu­

man . The same 'presumption' (outre-cuidance) confers a tran­

scendence upon reason and its corruption, and, since Plato, doubles the one with the other.

C h atelet develops a rational empiricism, or an empirical and pluralist rationalism . ·what he calls ' empirical' (empirie) depends primarily on two negative principles: the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained; the . unive r­

sal does not exist, but only the singular, singularity, exists.

' Singularity' is not the individual, it is the case, the event, the potential (potential), or rather, the distribution of poten­

tials in a given matter. To draw a political map of an in­

dividual, of a group or of a society is essentially the same thing: it is a question of prolonging a singularity all the way to the neighborhood of another so that a 'configuration of events' is produced, that is, the richest or most consistent set (ensemble) possible. vVe could do this as historians : for ex­

ample, the history of Athens. But we are only historians if we know how to recapture the operation that Pericles him­

self made, that connection, that conj unction of singularities which would remain latent and isolated without a politics to which we rightly give the name Pericles. An individual, even insignificant, is himself one such field of singularities who receive s his proper name only from the operations that he undertakes upon himself and in a neighborhood in order to draw from them a prolongable configuration . Chatelet said of himself: I have a petit bourgeois education, I was influ­

enced by Hegel, I live d in one of those historical periods which sickens any somewhat sensitive soul. Here are three facts, 'without relation it seems. In short they form a plural ensemble, the display of something from which it is impos­

sible to tell whether it could be somebody. ' What we will call empirical (empirie), or history in the present, is independent of

Pericles and Verdi 1 6 1 the importance of the considered matter. It is neither the 'lived', which takes pleasure in singularities for themselves and leaves them stranded, nor the 'concept', which drowns them in the universal and turns them into simple moments.

It is the operation that emits a veritable throw of the dice in order to produce the most consistent configuration, the curve that determines the most singularities in a potential (potential).

It is an act of 'deployment' that weaves from one point to an­

other just as many human relations. It is an actualization of poten tial (puissance) ^{o r} a becoming active, a matter of life and its

continuation, of reason and its processes, and a victory over death, since there is no o ther immortality than this history in the present, no other life than that which makes neigh­

borhoods connect and converge. C h atelet will call it 'deci­

sion' , and his whole philosophy is a philosophy of decision, of the singularity of decision in opposition to the universals of reflection, communication . . . . vVhe ther in my room or in Athens, all action is 'periclean ' , and 'deep down that which pertains to periclean action is a decision . '

The weight of the empirical (empirique) imposes itself implacably as multiplicity or, more exactly, as a plural ensemble. Empirical (empirique) . We could j ust as well say historical, though not in the sense of the work of a historian who as a result of a demand or need for obj ectivity must keep at a distance and constitute an obj ect he treats as past, but in the sense of a history in the pres­

ent. Thus, for me, the field in which this discussion situates itself is the empirical (empirique) , this being understood as opposing itself at once to the lived - by nature, inessential - and to the conceptual - which belongs to another register.

( Chronique des idees per dues, p. 1 5) A p rocess of rationalization thus p resen ts itself: it is to actualize a po tential, to become active, to produce a human relation, to p rolong singularities, to decide. In sho rt, it is to

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cre ate movement. Are all of these exp ressions e quivalent?

In invoking the concrete, philosophers h ave always claime d to ' cre ate movement' rather than t o think it in t h e abstrac­

tion of the unive rsal . The universal h as never run nor swam, but h as always only run in place o r made the movements of swimming on dry sand because it is only occupied with ends.

The act of a singular reason is completely different. It leaps into the immanence of life because it gives itself its own motives (mobiles) . ' If it were p ossible to construct the image of such a man ' , the citizen of the unive rsal state, 'it would not be necessary to act politically, an d it would suffice, at le ast imaginarily, to construct his imaginary representatio n :

The act of a singular reason is completely different. It leaps into the immanence of life because it gives itself its own motives (mobiles) . ' If it were p ossible to construct the image of such a man ' , the citizen of the unive rsal state, 'it would not be necessary to act politically, an d it would suffice, at le ast imaginarily, to construct his imaginary representatio n :