TALLER DE PSICOLOGÍA TRANSPERSONAL DE MELCOR

As in other Soviet republics, economic decline and political turmoil of the 1990s were mirrored by an abatement of publicly run transport in all cities and towns in Tajikistan. Responsibility for running urban transport systems was transferred from central ministries to the municipalities, without any appropriate transfer of funding (Gwilliam, Kumar & Meakin, 2000, p. 1). The ageing rolling stock was decaying and no funding was available for the purchase of

39 This investment provided an important link, but was unsustainable at the time of construction, as no new trolleybuses or even spare parts were included in the investment package. It served above all as a showcase for the urban administration which was willing to present itself as catering to the population's needs.

40 The Soviet Unioneven spread the equation of trolleybuses with modern urbanism to Afghanistan. A trolleybus system for Kabul was planned in the mid-1970s as part of the urban development plan proposed by Leningrad specialists in the framework of Soviet development aid to the country, and executed with Czech technical assistance (Klimov, 2009, p. 2). The trolleybus system eventually opened with great pomp in February 1979, only some months after the Sawr revolution which brought the People's Democratic Party to power.

new vehicles or the maintenance of overhead lines. Running vehicles were taken out of service to cannibalise on the spare parts. Municipalities throughout Central Asia attempted to privatise bus fleets and created legislative frameworks for route tendering in the course of the 1990s – with various degrees of success (Akimov & Banister, 2010, pp. 9 ff, Gwilliam, 2003, p. 8). Contrary to bus systems, trams and trolleybuses did not lend themselves to privatisation due to high initial investment costs and remained therefore a severe financial burden on the urban budgets. The municipalities had to either keep up a high levels of subsidies – up to 70 % of the running costs according to Akimov & Banister (2010, p. 18) – or decide to close down the systems.

In the course of the 1990s, trolleybus traffic in Khujand became very irregular. Firstly, the lack of spare parts and neglect of overhead wirings led to frequent breakdowns. Secondly, unstable electricity provision destroyed the image of the trolleybus as a reliable means of transport. For these reasons, the trolleybus network was closed “indefinitely” in 2008 (2008b), yet surprisingly re-opened in 200941 _{(V sogde posle dolgogo prostoâ, 2009), with two buses}

running on the north-south line. In the course of my fieldwork in 2009 and 2010, I luckily witnessed running trolleybuses in Khujand (see illustration 20). Only during the last field trip in autumn 2010, I learned that trolleybuses had stopped running once again due to the breakdown of an electric substation. Neither the trolleybus agency nor the city administration were willing to shoulder the funds for repairing the substation, although the necessary investment would have only amounted to two working days with the appropriate equipment. As of 2010, the trolleybus enterprise only received 12000 Somoni (2000 €) a year in subsidies from the city administration – it was therefore impossible to pay for this larger repair (Interview Amonjon, 2010). The remaining handful of trolleybuses in working state therefore are rusting in the garage, while the drivers have left for Russia. No 'big' buses are seen on Khujand's streets either, at least not for urban transport42 _{– fostering the image that 'big' buses or trolleybuses are}

not appropriate vehicles for urban transport (Interview Amonjon, 2010).

New needs and possibilities, a new legal framework and new struggles for livelihood have

41 The swift reopening was only possible because it did not require any new investments: no repairs did take place and the funds for electricity and salaries were already budgeted. It was first of all the conviction of the city administration that trolleybuses would signal to the population that electricity supply was stable and available (albeit it was not), presenting the trolleybus service as a barometer of electricity provision, and a sign of a functioning state (Interview Amonjon, 2010).

42 Two buses remain on intercity routes, though: one red-coloured Ikarus 250 running to Zafarobod, and one LAZ 699 in yellow livery en route to Taboshar, both in dire condition. Furthermore, a dozen old LAZ buses shuttle schoolchildren and other 'volunteers' to cotton fields during the picking season, which does, however, not contribute to the popularity of 'big' buses.

drastically changed urban transport, as “new forms of social networking co-evolve with extensive changes to transport and communication systems” (Gillen & Hall, 2011, p. 33). While public transport enterprises were unable to meet basic mobility needs of the population, the gap has been filled by an ever growing fleet of marshrutkas43_{. In times of the Soviet Union, they}

institutionally reported to taxi companies rather than to the bus or tram companies which were meant to carry the majority of the passenger load according to Soviet urban planning principles. The taxi companies of the Soviet era were thus able to survive as large marshrutka providers, since they were independent from the ailing bus and tram companies. When industry plants were closed down and released thousands of persons into unemployment, the privatised marshrutka sector was able to absorb a large proportion of the working force, as the market entry barriers and necessary initial investments were very low. Every sixth vehicle in Tashkent's urban traffic is a marshrutka, and the proportion is comparably high in other large cities of Central Asia. Additionally, a considerable number of persons works on popular marshrutka routes on private cars, most of them on a part-time basis. Transportation is thus a vital branch of the Central Asian economy: Akimov & Banister estimate for Uzbekistan that one family in ten is supported by a member driving taxi or minibus (Akimov & Banister, 2010, p. 28). In Khujand, Sorbon – the privatised former taxi company – boasts a market share of around 90 per cent, employing salaried drivers as well as free-lancers with their own or leased minibuses, operating in a virtually unregulated and untaxed 'shadow market'. In order to integrate the marshrutka economy into a legal framework, a drastic regulatory campaign was launched. Since 2010, Marshrutkas and taxis in Tajikistan are required to seek official registration, to pay licence fees and bear special licence-plates. There surely are several shortcomings with regard to the marshrutkas, such as safety issues, low comfort when cramped, transport chaos around main stops, no reduced fares for pensioners or students, and so forth. Yet the major issue is that financial flows in the marshrutka sector are difficult to trace and to tax. Drivers usually pay a flat licence fee – which evidently does not apply to thousands of unlicensed free-lance drivers – and then keep the surplus. Structurally, the marshrutka sector operates therefore as in the early 1990s. Moreover, many Khujandis associate marshrutkas with the negatively connoted 'wild 1990s', with chaos, danger and struggle for survival44_{. And still – marshrutkas are one of the}

43 Marshrutkas first appeared in Soviet cities in the 1930s. At the beginning, they played a minor role, yet an ever-growing one, in particular since the first domestically-built minibus – RAF-10 of Latvian origin – appeared on the market. Contrary to standard taxis, they were assigned to fixed marching routes, thence their name. They provided a comfortable, albeit a rather expensive express service on major urban thoroughfares. See also illustrations 19, 21, 22

44 This point is particularly interesting from the point of view of nation-building. Regulation (not only of the marshrutka sector, but thought at large) was a central feature of administrative modernisation attempts of the 20th

very few functioning sectors of the economy, apart from bazaars and, to a minor degree, the mobile phone system and resource extraction. Getting a hold of the previously unregulated marshrutka sector and embedding it into a legal framework would show that the state has overcome the crisis of the 1990s, and has regained stability and regulative powers. At the same time, the ongoing regulation and consolidation of the atomised transport sector would additionally open up new illicit income opportunities for the bureaucracy through tendering, licensing and taxation procedures (Interview at the vegetables kiosk, 2010, Interview Davvom, 2010).

Given the role of the marshrutka sector in providing livelihoods for thousands of Khujand's citizens, marshrutka regulation is a politically highly sensitive issue. Even prior to regulation, the drivers’ profit margins were low, as most of them had to pay out of their own pockets for fuel, maintenance and repair, and eventually, installments for leased cars. Resistance patterns have therefore developed in order to circumvent registration45_{, but with relatively little success.}

Legal regulation of the marshrutka sector goes hand in hand with a strict spatial regulation aimed at establishing representative town centres. Akimov and Banister state for the case of Tashkent that the “leadership cares about the image of the city […]. Private providers' use of older buses from less reputable firms would negatively impact the city's image” (Akimov & Banister, 2010, p. 24). In Khujand's city centre, marshrutkas are only allowed to use designated stops, and a large marshrutka station was set up in the vicinity of the main bazaar. The topography does not allow banning marshrutkas from the main street altogether, as happened in Dushanbe, for there is no viable alternative to the Lenin Street. Yet the ambition is there to get marshrutkas off the streets: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development pledged to provide a credit of US$ 61.5 million for 600 new buses and trolleybuses. The first hundred Chinese-built buses were due to arrive towards the end of 2011 (Mèr Hudžanda 2011), but as of this writing, the buses had not appeared on the streets yet.

century, as Highmore argues (2005, pp. 6–7). As far as Tajikistan is concerned, attempts to promote nation- building through an education of urban culture indeed take place by means of urban transport.

45 Most prominently in Dushanbe, where unregistered vehicles play hide-and-seek on the streets, taking their destination plates down when a police patrol comes in sight. They pretend to be private people on a private trip, and put the plates back up again afterwards.