Tareas de la ingeniería

In zone one countries, intelligentsia, as well as the West, are largely immune from large scale critiques in mainstream debates of thefields of power. Thus, as I have proposed, besides the “dependence doxa”, which makes a critical analysis of the relationship between Central Europe (zone one) and the Western core in terms of dependence difficult, I see another important doxa, which considerably complicates a critical analysis of the political situation in the region. I call it the intelligentsia doxa and consider it as being of special relevance in zone one of the region. As I argue, the intelligentsia, which con-stitutes a specific Central and East European class or strata, can be considered as a dominant group in societies of the region. Poland presents an especially clear case in point in this regard. As I have argued above and more extensively elsewhere (Zarycki, 2009a), intelligentsia’s dominance can be particularly seen in contemporary Poland, where its social status is defined not only in terms of higher education, but also in cultural and moral terms. At the same time, this special status is also related to intelligentsia’s important political and economic functions. Even if intelligentsia’s status is not based on political capital and, moreover, it is formally defined in opposition to economic hierarchies, intelli-gentsia plays an important role in the legitimization of the status of political and economic elites, and, at the same time, in the legitimization of the dependent position of its country in the hierarchies of the world system. We can prob-ably talk about naturalization of the symbolic domination of the intelligentsia in countries like Poland and Hungary and about its key role in legitimization of political and economic hierarchies. This makes overt criticism of intelligentsia difficult, and, in effect, discourses critical of intelligentsia usually amount to its internal narratives that are restricted to attacks on its particular factions;

the latter are presented as illegitimately claiming intelligentsia leadership.

There is thus a constant criticism of “fake intelligentsia members” or “first generation intelligentsia members” allegedly contradicting its “true ethos”.

One could note that criticism of the intelligentsia, just like that of the role of Western capital in zone one, has been accepted by the mainstream of thefield of power only in the early communist period until the end of the Stalinist period, which was characterized by a clear marginalization of both cultural and economic elites by the new political elites. The best example in the case

of Poland is provided by sociologist Józef Chałasin´ski and his seminal 1946 essay Genealogy of the Polish Intelligentsia (Chałasin´ski, 1946). In his piece he denounced the allegedly destructive role of the old intelligentsia and earlier petty gentry, which he saw as narrow-mined comprador elites. However, criticism of the intelligentsia became more difficult, especially in the post-1968 period, where the intelligentsia-critical communist political elite lost much of its previous status. At the same time, the liberal intelligentsia gradually became a political enemy of the system and, by allying itself with the con-servative intelligentsia faction, it successfully legitimized itself as a primary agent of Westernization and modernization of the region’s societies. Even if the intelligentsia ethos was far from central for the communist elite, the autho-rities were not able to ignore it, and after the end of Stalinism, which could be seen as political-capital-sustained system, they needed a symbolic support of at least part of the liberal elite of the intelligentsia. However, in Poland during the late communist period, the majority of the intelligentsia slowly moved towards the anti-communist opposition and their support became crucial for the wide social movement led by Solidarity. Thefinal political and moral victory of anti-communist forces in zone one countries further reinforced the naturalization of the dominant role of the intelligentsia. At the same time, the later part of the post-communist period brought a split in the former anti-communist camp and emergence of liberal pro-European camps as well as of Euro-skeptic conservative camps. While criticizing the intelligentsia elites of their opponents, both camps subscribe to the cult of the intelligentsia as a

“natural” elite of the nation. As mentioned above, the situation is different in zone three, that is, Russia, and in part of zone two, where criticism of the intelligentsia is frequent. We also could note, in effect, the presence of much more critical analyses of Western domination in Russia. These may be linked to the fact that Western actors are lacking symbolic legitimization there, which the intelligentsia provides them in zone one.

Compensatory mechanisms and capitals

The privileged role of the intelligentsia in zone one countries (Central Europe), as well as the special role of the political elite in zone three (that is, primarily Russia), could be interpreted within a model, in which the roles of specific types of capital in particular societies would be linked to their positions in the world-system. One of the key elements of my proposal is the notion of compensatory capitals. They would be defined as having a function of com-pensatory resources of frailer actors in a given system. Compensation would entail, in this context, mostly generation and reproduction of substitute resources in order to enable peripheral social systems, like countries, regions or societies, to have a degree of autonomy higher than their position in the world system would normally allow.

There may be several problems linked to this concept. First, one can note that compensatory resources may be seen as having a dual role. Besides

allowing a certain degree of autonomy, they may be also seen as increasing dependence. By heavily investing in what can be considered “compensatory”

resources, peripheral actors may increase the degree of incompatibility of their systems with the wider, dominant structures. Those adapting “compen-satory” strategies may be thus seen as both increasing the autonomy of their sub-fields, but, at the same time, deepening their marginality, which may also imply growing dependence. At the same time, the very notion of compensa-tion is relative, as it assumes that there is a certain “normal” hierarchy or composition of a portfolio of capitals. Defining some types of capital as

“compensatory” in contrast to others, recognized as “principal” or “dominant”, may be, therefore, seen as an arbitrary act of power, which may heavily depend on“norms” defined by hegemonic actors in the world system. Currently, with American domination in the world system, one can assume that what is typically recognized as “normal” is a capitalist society, which privileges the economic capital as a central asset and imposes its logic on the entire social system. Subordinate to it are cultural capital and social capital; the latter being institutionalized by modern states. The idea of characterizing particular countries’ social structure in terms of hierarchies of capitals has been first proposed in the model of Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi and Eleanor Townsley. This model was presented in their seminal Making Capitalism Without Capitalist (Eyal et al. 1998). They proposed their scheme also as a tool for analysis of the evolution of Central European societies over the period from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. Thus, as they argued, in the pre-communist period the social hierarchies of these states have been dominated by social capital defined as possessing a traditional honor status, which privi-leged aristocracy and nobility. In the Stalinist period, it was again the political capital which was at the top of the hierarchy but this time in a completely dif-ferent form, namely, it was institutionalized as political capital monopolized by communist parties. The fall of communism was accompanied by a gradual decrease in the importance of political capital and by an increase of the role of economic and cultural capitals. At the end of that road, that is, after the fall of communism, economic capital had become one of the key bases of social logic, however, not necessarily the dominant one. As Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley have argued, in the countries of Central Europe, in particular in Hungary and Poland, it was rather the cultural capital, which has become the dominant dimension of the social hierarchy and the key asset of the new/old social elite. During the transition period, as these authors have argued, only those members of the former communist nomenclatura were able to sustain their relatively privileged social status, who besides political capital, have also possessed considerable amounts of cultural capital. On the other hand, in Russia, and in some other states of Eastern Europe, it was the political capital which retained the dominant position, although in newly reconfigured forms and in combination with economic capital. In the Russian case however, both cultural as well as economic capital remained subordinated to the political logic. This contrast between Central Europe, on the one hand, and Russia, on

the other hand, has been described by Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley as an opposition between“capitalism without capitalists” in Central Europe, that is, zone one as a region that lacks strong bourgeoisie, and “capitalism without capitalism” in Russia, that is, zone three, where the economic elite is relatively affluent, but acts according to a specific, politically defined logic rather than adopting the classic legal logic of Western capitalism. This can be inter-preted as a situation in which, on the one hand, cultural capital and broadly defined cultural elite are dominant in the field of power of Central Europe and, on the other hand, political capital and political elite are dominant in Russia. Both types of elite, or their specific factions, may at times acquire considerable assets of economic capital, but it is not a crucial source of their status. In some cases, they may publicly renounce opportunities to gain economic assets in order to emphasize their specific status of “cultural capi-talists”, allegedly free of the temptations of the “dirty” economic world (Zarycki, 2009b).

This specific construction of the social status of peripheral elite may be linked to one of its important functions, namely, the role of an intermediary in contacts between their own peripheral societies and the core of the world system. Among the authors who noted this role, in particular that of the bourgeoisie in post-colonial settings, was Frantz Fanon (Fanon, 1965). As he has argued, post-colonial states which can be seen as a type of peripheral regions, usually lack fully-fledged economic or financial bourgeoisie, as their financial systems are weak and dependent on the core of the world system. At the same time, cultural capital controlled by the local elites, may be seen as the key asset of peripheral countries. In the context of Central Europe, it is the intelligentsia, which is the dominant actor in the culturalfield. The field may attain a considerable degree of autonomy in relation to other fields of per-ipheral societies, in particular to the economic one, which usually plays a role of the main dimension in the subordination of peripheries. In effect, the elite of such autonomous and relatively privileged cultural field may present itself and, in particular, its assets as key compensatory resources in its country in the context of global competition. A perfect example of such an ideology has been presented by the Polish cinema director Robert Glin´ski who argued that:

Films of the distinguished Polish film directors and they themselves through their contacts with their audience since many years prove to the Europeans that Poland is not only a country of car thieves and whores ( … ) What can we offer Europe while joining the EU? Polish films, music, theatre and literature are the only export commodity we have. No one in Germany or France will buy our shoes, cars or milk. But they want to buyfilms. But only those about our-selves, our problems, rooted in our traditions, telling something important about our corner of Europe.

(Glin´ski, 2002: A5)

Recognition of the role of the cultural elite abroad, in particular in core countries, gives it an additional leverage in the nationalfield of power when it can claim the role of an indispensable middleman in contacts with the core.

At the same time, one could point to the fact that emphasis on the cultural capital as a compensatory resource may have an unintended effect of manifesta-tion of weaknesses on the part of a given country or community. Direct refer-ences to culture, and especially to a glorious past, presented as compensatory as opposed to primary resources, may signal deficiencies of other resources, in particular, political and economic. Let me quote in this context Alexander Kiossev’s note on the Bulgarian discourse of glorious past.

Among all the Slavic peoples it was precisely the Bulgarians who were the most glorious nation– they were the first to crown their kings, they were thefirst to have an Orthodox patriarch, they were the first to be baptized and they have conquered the greatest territories.’ For a long time we have been used to thinking that the rhetorical strategy of this phrase, as well as, of the entire ‘History’ is quite clear – it attempts to carry out the already mentioned reversal of the binary oppositions and to transform the negative into positive, the ignorance into glorious history, the lack of achievements into presence of honorable figures and great events in the historical memory – the shame and the formlessness into pride and identity. What is rarely mentioned is the fact that under the layer of its conscious rhetoric this text expresses something quite different as well – it reproduces the trauma it is trying to overcome and sublimate.

(Kiossev, 1999: 13) The compensatory use of cultural capital in international dimension, in parti-cular when it clearly refers to the past and suffering of the nation, may be problematic as far as it has the ability to improve the status of a given country among the international hierarchies. However, such strategies, even if questionable from the point of view of their impact on the international status of particular nations, undoubtedly reinforce the internal (national) status of cultural elites.

The idea of compensation of peripheral weakness in the cultural sphere is one of the key intelligentsia concepts. Intelligentsia, as it usually claims, is able to build a national high culture equal to those of core countries, and in this way, to build a basis for self-confidence among the inhabitants of the periph-ery. More generally, the intelligentsia builds its identity through its role of a guardian of national culture, which is the essence of national character and is supposed to be compatible with modern Western high cultures. In effect, the intelligentsia members are characterized by a feeling of being torn between the Western world and its own “people”. This internal tension in intelligentsia’s identity could be related to its double legitimization. On the one hand, it aspires to be a representative of the higher, Western civilization in the per-ipheries, and its task is to“civilize” the natives. On the other hand, it claims to be the most patriotic and loyal defender of its peripheral community against

any external threats, including those coming from the Western core. Intelli-gentsia has thus, on the one hand, a tendency to decline any links with the common people of the peripheries, emphasizing its belonging to the European elite and feeling at home in the European core. On the other hand, it tends to present itself as the essence of the nation, in the name of which it suffers and is not afraid to sacrifice everything for the nations interest. It will, when needed, publicly denounce the duplicity of foreign powers and condemn all those oppressing the nation and its people. The identity of intelligentsia is thus clearly characterized by tension between these two roles, both of which are defined in highly moral terms, often colored by ambitions of pastoral status.

Such tensions are even more dramatic in the case of Russian intelligentsia, given the much stronger duality of the nation, torn between the ambitions of enjoying a status of a super power, a separate pole in a multipolar world, and the will to be recognized as an equal among the family of great European nations. Boris Uspenski considers that such traits, comparable to those exhibited by Russian intelligentsia, could also historically be found among the German intellectual elite, for whom complexes of inferiority were mixed with nationalistic pride (Uspienski, 2000). In the case of Russian intelligentsia, there is an additional dimension of conflict, which divides the intelligentsia, on the one hand, as a group into two poles, and, on the other hand, internally in terms of duality of identity. It is the attitude towards the Russian or the Soviet state. On the one hand, the state is considered as a source of the country’s strength, prestige and unity, and intelligentsia sees itself its benefactor and ser-vant. On the other hand, the state is often considered as oppressive, brutal, totalitarian, undemocratic and non-civilized, and the intelligentsia sees itself among its main victims and opponents. Thus, Russian intelligentsia is split between, on the one hand, the conservative statists (gossudarstvenniki) who idealize their state and defend its ruthless actions and leaders, and, on the other hand, the pro-Western liberals, some of whom are close to anarchist calls for demise of the Russian state, or, at least, for radical reform and democratization. As mentioned earlier, while the liberal, pro-European Russian elites tend to identify themselves with the intelligentsia ethos, much of the conservatives, including Kremlin loyalists, communists or nationalists, decline the intelligentsia identity and look at it critically.

Such dilemmas are much less obvious for Central European (zone one) intelligentsias, since their countries are usually weak, and even radical anti-European elites are not able to take over and control power for a prolonged period. In any case, the force of state is usually balanced by strong external influences and sometimes, as in the Polish case, by strong intelligentsia. At the same time, during periods of Russian occupation or Soviet domination, Polish, Lithuanian or Ukrainian intelligentsias were confronted with the Russian/Soviet state, who in some cases became their ally, while in others their opponent, which pushed them into alliances with the state-critical Russian intelligentsia. One can note that in the case of the Russian intelligentsia, the two cleavages mentioned above (pro-vs. anti-Western and pro-vs. anti-state)

are strongly correlated, since usually the supporters of the strong Russian

are strongly correlated, since usually the supporters of the strong Russian