Tecnologías para el abastecimiento de agua en centros poblados

Faced with such daunting statistics which are so publicly aired, the population look to their elected government for explanations and appropriate action. The issue of crime prevention, surprisingly enough, has only reached the political agenda in the last decade, prior to which the police, courts and prison system were considered to be the ultimate deterrent for potential offenders. A valiant attempt had been made in the early sixties, by a committee under the leadership of a senior Home Office official W. H. Cornish, which introduced the concept of police crime prevention officers and central crime prevention training. However, the efforts were somewhat subsumed by other advances in policing, most important of which was the massive expansion in vehicular patrolling which, whilst providing quicker response times to call outs, had the disadvantage of reducing police/public contact (LAYCOCK & HEAL, 1989).

Home Secretary was significant in witnessing the return to crime prevention (HEAL, 1990), as the experience of prison overcrowding late seventies proved that reactive policing, and the criminal justice system alone were insufficient to curb the rising trends in crime. Added to this was the acknowledgement (via research such as the BCS), that recorded crime figures were only the tip of the iceberg. It was therefore logical to return to prevention as a means for tackling opportunity crime, as by definition, reactive tactics could not be expected to have any impact on unreported crimes

(LAYCOCK & HEAL, 1989).

In 1983, the Home Office set up the Crime Prevention Unit, with the specific remit to operate beyond the normal capacity of the Office to promote crime prevention.

The Research and Planning Unit in the Home Office has also been responsible for producing the British Crime Surveys discussed earlier in this chapter. Not only are these studies most valuable for their insights into patterns of unreported and unrecorded crimes over

time (three such surveys have been published to date), but for the impetus they have provided for more

localised victimisation surveys. For example, the Islington Crime Survey (JONES, et al, 1986) was commissioned by the London Borough of Islington, and involved surveys of over 2,000 households in the borough. Such surveys have the advantage of being able to target attention and resources towards particularly local problems

Lord Whitelaw was also successful in persuading other government departments that they had a critical role to play in crime prevention. Most notably, the Department of the Environment (DoE) is now accepted to be the most influential department (aside from the Home Office through its policing function) in aiding the prevention of crime through environmental change (LAYCOCK & HEAL, 1989). Control exercised over design, layout and management of housing estates is recognised as having the potential to significantly alter the occurrence of crime and anti-social behaviour, however the Department also acknowledges the lack of agreement between researchers about the precise nature of the environmental design and crime

relationship (as outlined in Chapter 2).

Through its regulating control over the planning system, the DoE has brought the issue of crime prevention to the attention of planners and developers. However, the weight attached to the advice contained within Government Circulars, Planning Policy Guidance Notes, Design Bulletins and the like, has stopped short of providing Local Planning Authorities with the requisite powers needed to enable them to have a strong enough lever (ie the threat of refusal of planning permission) to negotiate for crime prevention measures with developers.

Circular 1/84 (DoE, 1984) was jointly issued with a number of other government departments and essentially drew attention to the issue of crime prevention and the role that local planning authorities could play in it. It does, however, note that crime control would be unlikely to constitute a reason for withholding planning permission. Subsequent published guidance such as Circular 22/88 (DoE, 1988), Design Bulletin 32 (DoE/DoT, 1992), PPGl (DoE, 1992) as well as British Standard 8220: Part 1 Dwellings (BRITISH STANDARD

INSTITUTION, 1986) have all drawn attention to security considerations, most particularly at the level of individual buildings. Where layout advice is given, this closely mirrors the 'keeping people out' school of thought, and lean heavily towards estate designs which promote culs-de-sac and limit through movement of both vehicles and pedestrians.

The Government has also set up a range of initiatives and quango-type organisations, such as the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit, Crime Concern, The Safer Cities Project etc, which have between them produced a vast plethora of research papers, guidance manuals,

leaflets etc. The sheer quantity of material is daunting in itself, and there would certainly seem to be duplication of work in many areas of situational crime prevention. Furthermore, the obscurity of some of the organisations and their publications would tend to suggest that a single consolidated body would be the key. Such an organisation would have sufficient weight to be heard, and which could produce more readily accessible documents, whilst also being more able to liaise with various voluntary organisations (for example, the well-regarded National Association

& Care and Rehabilitation of Offenders (NACRO)), in their common field of interest.

The Morgan Report, issued August 1991, was set up with the task of "monitoring the progress made in the local delivery of crime prevention through the multi-agency or partnership approach in the light of the guidance contained in the booklet accompanying 44/90" (MORGAN, 1991: 10) J The Working Group involved in the study asked Chief Constables and the Chief Executives of local authorities to report on the nature of current and projected activities, and the commitment of resources to crime prevention. One hundred and two reports were received from which a series of findings and recommendations were formulated. The main findings and recommendations are attached as Appendix C. Of particular interest is the discovery and acknowledgement that crime prevention activities for both police forces and local authorities, represent a peripheral activity only. This supports the perception of one of the primary problems outlined at the beginning of this study, in that whilst all agencies agree that the issue is important and one worth pursuing, the practical realities of everyday

pressures on scarce resources demote its importance. Heal (1992) echoes this finding, and notes the

fragmented and patchy nature of crime prevention activity, duplicated efforts and the limited scale of co-ordination which are also reflected in a lack of agreement as to which professions are responsible for co-ordinating which activities.

James Morgan (MORGAN, 1991), in his preface, to the report, remarks on the 'good value' of crime prevention, particularly as compared to the massive costs associated with maintaining the criminal justice system. Expenditure on the system for the 1990/91 period totalled £7,335 million (HOME OFFICE, 1992a), and whilst it is difficult to put a precise figure on the cost of crime prevention, the fact remains that it is substantially less and yet far more cost-effective in the long term.

The examination of the governments response to the state of crime in England has thus far examined long term strategies, which are the result of substantial effort and research into the best way forward.

However, to the public at large, such measures mean little when faced with a ’crime explosion' as reported at all levels of the media. Joe Public is likely to be disinterested in the long-term partnership strategy advanced by the Morgan Report, wanting instead immediate action on an urgent problem. Faced with rising public concern and calls from many corners of the political forum, ministers are forced to respond with an 'instant' solution and a promise of action. A prime example of the 'knee-jerk' reaction was the

recent outcry concerning juvenile crime in Britain, prompted by the particularly emotive case involving the murder of James Bulger in Liverpool, and reinforced by the spate of young males and females involved in 'joy-riding'. The Home Secretary's response was to announce a new network of juvenile 'secure training c entres' despite having acknowledged in a white paper three years ago the research evidence which had detailed the failure of such approved schools, junior detention centres, junior borstals, etc. A special edition of The Guardian, attached as Appendix D, gives an example of media coverage of, and

It seems that political hot potatoes can provoke ministerial responses completely conflicting with the