Temas a Debatir

Deterding et al. cite Hamari and Eranti’s “Framework for Designing and Evaluating Game Achievements,” which proposes that “Achievements are goals in an achievement/reward system (different system than the core game) whose fulfilment is defined through activities and events in other systems (commonly in the core game)” (4). Whereas Hamari and Eranti are ready to argue that there are two games running in tandem, with one gamifying the other, Deterding et al. argue both of these are part of the same game’s design. It is important to note that their position is prescriptive, rather than descriptive. So while the gamification of games is possible, Deterding et al. would prefer that these elegantly feed back into each other, becoming

inseparable. They base their argument on three different principles outlined in the next three sections.

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Deterding et al. suggest that we commonly understand meta-games (as opposed to gamified processes) to be themselves fully-fledged games (4). While this criterion does not in itself suggest that gamified games and meta-games are distinct, their second claim is that the latter are fully-fledged games and that their creation is therefore game design, rather than gamification design. They write, “… from the designer’s perspective, given that the context of design is already that of games, it seems counter-productive to perceive the design of meta- games (or game elements) as distinct from the design of those games” (4). While it might be the case that games benefit from a holistic approach, where game and meta-game are designed in consideration of each other, it remains entirely possible for Deterding et al. to consider these as distinct and that a failure to properly enmesh the two might produce what they would call

gamification. In this model of design, I understand that contemporary games are capable of being composed of a variety of smaller games.

In order to make sense of this claim, I propose we consider Bernard Suits’s definition of games once more to ensure internal consistency (41). In this definition, a game proposes a

“prelusory” goal, some desired state of affairs for players to produce (39). If the game is “summit the mountain,” then the goal is simply having yourself at the peak of the mountain. A game also has obstacles which produce a “lusory attitude,” wherein players value the process of

overcoming those particular obstacles, because they make reaching the goal interesting (41). In the case of mountain climbing, we need only imagine the various reasons that one would turn down a helicopter ride to think about that attitude and the obstacles that make it possible.

In the case of a Deterding et al.’s conception of a meta-game, we might consider a chess tournament as a game played by playing iterative games of chess. The tournament itself is a game insofar as it has a goal (take home the trophy) and obstacles that are interesting to

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overcome (win chess games against a variety of opponents). In this case, the designer of the tournament is a game designer. In contrast, the classroom’s leaderboard, which works by

rewarding students with gold stars for behaving in desired ways, might not on the surface appear to be a game. In this instance, we might argue that since the means of accumulating those stars involves a complicated set of social practices that exist without the presence of those stars, the leaderboard is not itself a full game. However, thinking through Suits’s definition, the game has a goal (have the most gold stars) and obstacles worth overcoming (complete homework). To the degree that students value that obstacle and would not do things such as buying gold stars

themselves and surreptitiously placing additional unnoticed stars, we might consider this a game. Cheating here destroys the game, according to Suits, although it might foster new private games for those individuals. Instead of declaring this a special case, because there is gamification overlaid on games, we can instead find that the classroom’s leaderboard is itself a game as well. In lieu of granting meta-games special privilege, as Deterding et al. suggest, we may instead give that same privilege to regular gamification techniques of learning materials and consider these games as well. That is to say, unlike Deterding et al., I would argue that gamification is not special in the instance that it gamifies games.

Admittedly, doing so not only complicates Deterding et al.’s work, it similarly contradicts Landers’ work. Whereas Landers suggests that gamification processes are partial games that can be accumulated to the point of producing fully-fledged games, working through Suits’s definition, we can instead suggest that many gamification processes are themselves already games, and that their accumulation does not make them more game-like, but instead makes them appear more like socially appreciated games. In addition to maintaining logical consistency, rethinking gamified elements as games allows us to reconsider their distinction.

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Certainly, we do not want to equate these in terms of how they produce learning. Instead, I propose two spectra of games. With the first, there is the degree to which the game produces learning by modelling some source system, asking us to consider the source in relation to the system. This process is akin to what Ian Bogost writes about in regards to the simulation gap (2009). In the other spectrum, which Landers’ work points to, I would have us measure games by the degree to which they produce learning by incentivizing players to do tasks tied to knowledge acquisition, such as note-taking, memorizing, reading, etc.

Deterding et al.’s third and final claim for rejecting gamified elements as distinct games is that “in all cases where a meta-game system is not experienced as distinct from the 'primary' game, it appears unnecessary to create an artificial separation between the two” (4). Here I admit that the separation I propose is not one that is intuitively felt—or particularly useful to game designers in producing new intricate game systems. However, it remains a useful distinction to make in working through a close analysis of how games themselves communicate. Importantly, it will demonstrate how Landers’ argument for parsimony is incorrect, despite games and

gamification being even closer than he assumes in certain regards. While Deterding et al. suggest that meta-games are not instances of gamification, they “admit that this constitutes a complex case that warrants further empirical research” (5). Below, I offer a close analysis of two different games, where each promotes learning. Both will demonstrate the benefits of thinking about gamification as a means to increase learning behaviours—as distinct from learning through gleaning an understanding of a rule structure.