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As Hosen (2007b) noted, many Muslim scholars, including Maududi (Maududi 1983), Patwari (Patwari 1991), and Mahmood (Tahir 1993), are firm in their belief that Sharia addresses the fundamentals of human rights. Those scholars identify the most important human rights principles in Islam to be: dignity and brotherhood; equality among members of the community without distinction on the basis of race, colour or class; respect for the honor, reputation and family of each individual; the rights of each individual to be presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty; and individual freedom. These arguments suggest that Islamic Law protects human rights according to its own set of values. These values are fixed in divine law and are considered superior to any law created by humans and established by international

institutions. Those Muslim scholars use the concept of cultural relativism25 _to

legitimise their adherence to Sharia visàvis human rights (Hosen 2007b).

Halliday (in Baderin 2001) identified at least four classes of Muslim responses to the international human rights debate. First, Islam is compatible with international human rights. Second, human rights can only be fully realised under Islamic Law. Third, the international human rights movement is an imperialist agenda that must be rejected. Fourth, Islam is incompatible with international human rights. Further, Baderin (Baderin 2001) added one more class as a fifth response of Muslims to international human rights: that the international human rights movement has an anti-religious agenda. This argument mainly refers to Ayatullah Khomeini, spiritual leader of Iran, who said: ‘What they call human rights is nothing but a collection of corrupt rules

25 _{Cultural relativism is the principle that an individual human’s belief and activities should be understood in terms} of his or her own culture (Hosen 2007b).

worked out by Zionists to destroy all true religions’(Mayer 1991, p. 28). According to Baderin (2001), these responses reflect the entrapment of human rights between international politics and humanitarianism rather than a disagreement of the concept of human rights in Islamic law.

In contrast, Bielefeldt (2000) argued that some scholars who claimed that human rights have always been recognised in Sharia simply deny that there are any problems such as gender equality and religious liberty. Although acknowledging women’s legal personality, Bielefeldt (2000) argued that Sharia did not include the principle of equality in rights for men and women. In particular, matters of marriage, family life, divorce and inheritance that differentiate legal standing between the genders have persisted to the present day. Measured against the standard of modern human rights, they must be considered discriminatory towards women. Further, Bielefeldt (2000) argued that despite the Islamic tradition of religious tolerance, some forms of discrimination against religious minorities, such as restrictions on interreligious marriage, are still legally in force in most contemporary Islamic countries.

In relation to democracy in the Muslim world, Brumberg (2006) argued that naming Islam as the solution exaggerates the extent to which Islam shapes Muslims’ political identity. Chase (2006) argued for a contextualised understanding of the relationship between Islam and human rights in the Arab world, noting that the political, social and economic context explains the status of human rights for better or worse. Hence, Islam is neither responsible for the violations of rights, nor is it the core basis for advancing rights.

Their arguments were mainly supported by the comprehensive understanding of current social, cultural, political and legal developments in Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Palestine and even secular Turkey (Baderin 2007). These developments reveal different degrees of Islamic influence in both the private and public spheres of those states that directly or indirectly affect human rights issues. For example, Bielefeldt (in Baderin 2007) observed that traditional Sharia norms continue to mark family structures all over the Islamic world, and that the Sharia criminal law is still applied in a few Islamic countries today. Buskens (in Baderin 2007) observed that in

most Muslim societies, Islam infuses family law by denoting the cultural and legal influence of Islam in that regard, but conversely having a significant effect on the application of human rights law, especially in relation to women’s rights. Modirzadeh (Modirzadeh 2006) argued the need to involve Islamic Law in relation to the promotion and protection of human rights in the Muslim world. She observed that despite the increasing sophistication in the work of human rights organisations in the Muslim world, they remain unsure of how to address questions of Islamic Law when it conflicts with international human rights law. She argued that international NGOs need to take Islamic Law more seriously and engage with it in one way or another. Blitt (in Baderin 2007) observed that since the 1970s, Islam has become an increasingly important political factor, particularly in the Muslim world. This domestic influence of Islam is formally reflected in the constitutions of some Muslim states that declare Islam as the religion of the state, recognise Islamic Law as part of state law or provide for the establishment of state courts that apply Islamic Law (Baderin 2007).

Apart from the influence of Islam in each Muslim state, Baderin (Baderin 2007) and Hosen (Hosen 2007a) observed that Muslim states have also adopted regional instruments such as the Arab Charter on Human Rights, the Charter of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam and the OIC Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, all of which make reference to Islam as a relevant factor in the human rights discourse in the Muslim world. In addition, at the United Nations (UN) level, the OIC has submitted on behalf of Muslim states regarding proposed reforms of the UN Security Council, stating that ‘any reform proposal, which neglects the adequate representation

of the Islamic Ummah in any category of members in an expanded Security Council

will not be acceptable to the Islamic countries’ (UN 2004, p. 56). With regard to international human rights, the OIC:

… expressed its determination to vigorously pursue the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and encouraged greater transparency, cooperation, mutual tolerance and respect for religious values and cultural diversity in the field of universal promotion and protection of human rights (UN document 2004, p 57).

Further, Baderin (Baderin 2007) noted that within international human rights forums, questions regarding the relationship and effect of Islam generally, and Islamic law specifically, on the application of human rights law in Muslim states have been raised before the Human Rights Committee under the UN human rights system, the European Court of Human Rights under the European regional human rights system, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights under the African regional human rights system. These undoubtedly reflect the relevance of Islam to international human rights discourse generally, but particularly its effect and role in relation to Muslim states (Baderin 2007). An-Na’im (2000) argued that the implementation of international human rights norms in any society requires thoughtful and well-informed engagement with religion because of its strong influence on human belief systems and behaviour. Hence, religious considerations are too important to the majority of people for human rights scholars and advocates to continue to dismiss them as irrelevant, insignificant or problematic.