Tendencias curriculares

2. Compare and contrast Aristotle’s and Plato’s notion of universals 3. Distinguish between particulars and universals

4. Explain what led to Ockam’s position that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily

7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

Adamson, P. (2005). “On Knowledge of Particulars.” In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 105, pp. 257-278

Hayner, P. (1969). “Knowledge by Acquaintance.” In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 423-431

Locke, J. (). Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, iii, 11

Hofweber, T. (2016). Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics. Oxford: University Press.

MacBride, F. (2005). “The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?”

In Mind, New Series, Vol. 114, No. 455, pp. 565-614.

Marenbon, J. (2016). Medieval Philosophy: A Short Introduction. Oxford: oxford University Press

Russell, B. (2008). The Problems of Philosophy. Maryland: Arc Manor Books

Mumford, S. (eds). (2008). Russell on Metaphysics: Selections from the Writings of Bertrand Russell. London & New York: Routledge

CONTENTS 1.0 Introduction

2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes 3.0 Main Content

3.1 The History of the Problem of Appearance and Reality 3.2 The Ancient Origin of Problem of Universals and Particulars 3.3 Making Sense of Particulars

3.4 Making Sense of Universals 4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)

7.0 References and Suggestions for Further Reading

1.0 Introduction

In the previous unit we studied the problem of universals. We told you that the problem of universals is essentially about the problem of what exists. The discussion was whether what exists is universal or particulars. One problem that would have struck you in considering the problem of universals and particulars is the fact that you lost confidence about whether you know what is real from what appears. You are not alone. In considering the question of appearance and reality we shall operate at the intersection of metaphysics, epistemology and natural philosophy (known today as physics). So tighten your belt for a very interesting trip. In what follows we shall take a brief look at the problem of appearance and reality in Western Philosophy.

2.0 Intended Learning Objectives At the end of this unit, you will be able to

1. Trace the history of problem of appearance and reality

3.0 Main Content

3.1 The History of the Problem of Appearance and Reality

We first encountered the problem of appearance and reality in Unit 1 of Module 2 of this course. If you recall it was introduced in our discussion of Parmenides’ notion of Being.

Thus, Parmenides could be said to have originated the philosophical idea that things are not really as they appear. His take off point was the waxing and waning of the moon. The moon appears to us to be waxing and waning at different times where the waxing generates light which we see and the waning dims the light and therefore brings darkness. Parmenides was the first person to reason that the moon, though it appears to wax and wane at different times, does not change in reality. Indeed, the moon has no light in it but it appears to us as if it gives out light.

So all reality, all being, the All, the real world is unchanging: the firm, the lasting, the everlasting, hard firm matter. But what about appearance? It is unreal, it is nothing: it is no thing. It is, like a shadow, both light and night: a mere contrast, rather than a thing. And indeed, the waxing and waning of the Moon is exactly a shadow - a play of shadows of 'light and night', as Parmenides says again and again. Everybody knows that a shadow is unreal, deceptive, untrue. And if this is what a shadow is, then light must also be untrue. (Popper, 1998, p.100)

As a result, Parmenides holds that true knowledge of reality which is unchanging and eternal is gained only by reason whereas sensation only delivers opinion to us. The Greeks of Parmenides’ era believed that only the gods possessed true knowledge whereas men possessed false knowledge which he also called opinion. The consequence of regarding men’s knowledge as false is the origin of philosophy’s distrust of experiential knowledge.

Plato, who regarded Parmenides highly, would later secure his philosophy firmly beyond the reach of the senses in the world of forms. For Plato, reality cannot be found in things as they appear in this world. The ancients’ concern with appearance and reality intensified with Aristotle who disagreed with Parmenides and Plato. For Aristotle, the world of the senses is the real world and not the world of ideas as promoted by Plato.

There are also modern examples to this. Matter provides a ready example to us. In unit 3 of Module 4 above we treated matter as an existing reality of a sort and a large chunk of science is built on the belief that matter is real. In the mid 19th Century, Michael Faraday, working in the field of physics, held that matter could only be recognized by the forces acting on it and is not perceptible as initially thought by Descartes. On the basis of this,

Faraday argued that no reason exists to believe that matter exists. The Physical reality on which we have rested our belief on the existence of matter does not consist of matter but rather what he called fields which are mathematical structures defined by points and numbers. (Holt, 2012). Thus, in the face of the role mathematical numbers play in delineating reality, Frank Tipler holds that “at the most basic ontological level, the physical universe is a concept.” (Tipler, 1997, p.209)

Distinguishing what is real from what appears, you will learn, is a serious philosophical business. It is necessary if we must build our knowledge on a solid foundation.

References and Suggestions for Further Reading

Holt, J. (2012). Why Does the World Exist?: An Existential Detective Story. New York:

Liveright Publishing Corporation.

Tipler, F. (1997). The Physics of Immortality. New York: Anchor Books.

MODULE 3: ISSUES IN SPECIAL METAPHYSICS