CAPÍTULO II MARCO TEÓRICO
HABILIDADES SOCIALES Y MEJORA DEL TRABAJO EN EQUIPO DE LOS DOCENTES
A. Monitor Evaluador
2.3.2 Teoría de la inteligencia emocional
This research endeavoured to answer the following research question: How does COPA balances inside and outside strategies to influence EU regulatory outcome? Analysing how COPA balances strategies was conducted on two different regulations of the EU. The first regulation is about direct payments to farmers while the second one is on protective measures against pests of plants. The research goal was to investigate when and why COPA decides to use inside or outside strategies or combine them while attempting to influence EU regulations.
The study results have shown that COPA is a prominent interest group that uses both inside and outside strategies. As business interest group, COPA has many resources, and this facilitates them to undertake several activities and implement various tactics aimed at influencing regulatory outcome by means of interacting with policymakers directly. When they lobby policymakers directly, COPA performs implements a number of strategies such as issuing a detailed position papers, meetings with policymakers, providing relevant information and face-to-face contacts. Besides applying inside strategies, COPA also uses outside strategies to affect EU regulatory outcome. The analysis has revealed that outside strategies were mostly implemented when there are disagreements over regulatory issues between the Commission and COPA, and this done mainly through press releases, media and press conferences. In addition, outside strategies are implemented next to inside strategies and this has a lot of meanings for a prominent group such as COPA. Indeed, as an interest group that has a large membership, the use of outside strategies is relevant to show to the membership base that COPA is dynamic to defend their interests so that they can stay mobilized. Moreover, outside strategies are applied with the intention to mobilize citizens in favour of COPA preferences so that regulatory issues they defend can get the attention of large audience, thus influencing regulatory outcome.
Though the study focused on COPA by focusing on when they use certain strategies to influence EU regulatory outcome, the findings can be expanded and applied to other prominent groups working in other policy areas other than the agriculture. Most of prominent groups that lobby policymakers such EU associations are formed by large membership base with a lot of resources. This makes us to conclude that prominent interest groups use inside strategies to as default option to influence policy outcome because they have enough resources which enable them to interact with policymakers directly. In addition to that, they also use outside strategies when they disagree with the position of policymakers in a particular regulation and these strategies help to mobilize outside community.
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Studying how groups such as COPA uses different strategies is significant for researchers. It helps to expand our knowledge on factors that make an interest group to be perceived as powerful in shaping policy outcome. Next, this study is relevant to understand how prominent groups frame and Communicate their preferences by using a set different strategy while trying to affect regulatory outcome.
Although this study improves our understanding on how interest groups uses different strategies to influence regulatory outcome, there is still a huge necessity to carry out further investigation on other possible factors that enable prominent groups such as COPA to be regarded as influential in the EU policy- making process. A possible area of research could be to further investigate how COPA collaborate with their partner associations or other interest groups to influence EU policy outcome. Furthermore, a fruitful area of additional research would be also to study how the membership of COPA perceive their representation in the EU. This study has shown that COPA represents a large community of farmers in the EU. Therefore, it is important to study how COPA interacts with them in order to gather views and preferences to influence policy outcome. Moreover, another possible field of research could be to explore how the EU policymakers perceive COPA participation in the EU policy-making process. Finally, a research could examine how preferences of COPA are attained in the EU regulatory outcome given a number of strategies they use and resources they have to lobby EU policymakers.
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i COPA contribution to the Commission is an important document. It contains relevant information on expert
knowledge that COPA offered to the working document of the Commission during the initial phase. Even though it is not in the framework considered, it may be relevant to provide some information about COPA strategies