CAPÍTULO II. MARCO TEÓRICO
A) Teoría de Mayra Allen
Shortly after coming into office in late 1999, the Labor government began work on the state’s key policy document Melbourne 2030 (DoI, 2002). Melbourne 2030 was intended to solidify a set of high level policy objectives and goals to guide Melbourne’s future growth. Following the creation of the Tram 109 department, the state announced the Think Tram programme (see Chapter 5). Central to the Think Tram programme was the Principle Public Transport Network (PPTN) policy outlined in Melbourne 2030 (DoI, 2002). Of concern here is the document’s discussion of the PPTN. Analysis reveals difficulty in assembling competencies and skills critical to closing the gap between policy development and policy implementation. This in turn speaks to challenges related to adopting a demand stance.
At the time interviews were conducted for this research (i.e. 2011), the two core policy documents guiding the state’s wider planning agenda were Melbourne @ 5 Million (DPCD, 2008) and the Victorian Transport Plan (DOT, 2008b). The clearway controversy had yet to be resolved in the Supreme Court. On the one hand, these high-level state policy documents acknowledged the PPTN’s important role in road space allocation. On the other hand, the documents never discussed how clearways, being advanced by VicRoads, aligned with the PPTN, being advanced by DOT.
A senior DPCD decision maker interviewed suggested that transport planners—at least within DPCD—didn’t immediately know how to implement the policies outlined in Melbourne 2030. For the first three years, Melbourne 2030 remained largely in the hands of policymakers concerned with collecting more data instead of implementing policy (Participant 20). The DPCD decision maker used the analogy of stopping an ocean liner to describe policy implementation: “you might put on the breaks, but in about three days later the boat might stop” (Participant 20). The analogy’s intent was to demonstrate the significant lag between innovation in thinking, and the evidence of such innovative thinking, such as new skills and knowledge. Similar comments were made by multiple, very senior decision makers in local and state government (Participants 20, 23, 42, 43).
Though the ocean liner analogy had its merits, five years had passed between the state’s adoption of Melbourne 2030 as its core policy framework and the interview. As such, the comments therefore further highlight the unknown nature of how constitutive elements intersect through the course of professional practice. For example, one senior DOT decision maker remarked that lag in innovation often stemmed from pragmatic reasons: “already agreed precinct structure plans and subdivisions exist…. and developers have the right to build what they're currently building” (Participant 23). This contrasted the “slow and ponderous” policy landscape alluded to in the ocean liner analogy (Participant 20). Whereas one described planning projects already in the pipeline, the other speaks to how Melbourne 2030 outlined policies that diverged from existing organisational conventions. Thus, as competencies and skills did not exist at the time, “they had to be sought” (Participant 20).
The PPTN policy was first mentioned in Melbourne 2030 (DoI, 2002). The PPTN was discussed as critical to ensuring stronger integration of Melbourne’s multi-modal public transport system “on an area-by-area basis, so that mobility and access, rather than provision of a particular modal service, is the end point” (DoI, 2002, p. 149). The PPTN
was therefore discussed as the way to integrate train, tram and bus modes into a whole system. Melbourne 2030 acknowledged the need for separate modal plans to develop investment priorities, but discussed the policy as a means to arrange and manage the existing—and future—multi-modal public transport network. Under Direction 8: Better transport links in Melbourne, the PPTN policy was defined as:
Policy 8.1 Upgrade and develop the Principal Public Transport Network and local public transport services to connect activity centres and link Melbourne to the regional cities (DoI, 2002, p.
145).
Melbourne 2030 outlined several initiatives under Policy 8.1, the first initiative dealt with how the PPTN policy would be implemented and measured.
Initiative 8.1.2 Define and publish targets for public transport service delivery (coverage, frequency and reliability) to be met by the various elements of the public transport system (DoI, 2002, p.
148).
However, Action 1 in the Implementation Plan that followed, two months after Melbourne 2030, dropped Initiative 8.1.2. In contrast with Melbourne 2030, the four tasks assigned to Action 1 (upgrade and develop the PPTN) were to “develop a metropolitan bus plan”, “develop a metropolitan tram plan”, “development a train plan”
and “improve ticketing systems” (DSE, 2002, p. 13).
A senior DOT decision maker interviewed who had worked on the PPTN policy, stated the initial perception of senior transport planners within DOI and VicRoads differed.
VicRoads staff argued that only one state authority should determine who a ‘priority user’ was, in relation to Melbourne’s road network. DOI staff sought to develop a network of public transport routes that could be integrated with future land use development. At its core, the PPTN policy sought to articulate what transport planning studies continue to advance; integrating land-use and transport infrastructure is a key factor to reducing car-dependent travel. This reflects a desire to transition towards a demand management stance. Importantly, development of the PPTN underscores how infrastructure influences resolution of the capacity tension.
The senior DOT decision maker interviewed summarised the policy’s rationale as engaging the “chicken and egg” dilemma, because where DOI staff desired to put major routes is where the developments are, and where the developments are is where the routes should go” (Participant 49). A long, conflicting body of international analysis
has continued to debate merits of increasing public transport patronage by integrating land use and transport infrastructure (Dieleman & Wegener, 2004; Mees, 2000;
Newman & Kenworthy, 1999). The PPTN described a network of public transport routes that DOI staff believed consisted of a “reasonable standard or could be made to be of a reasonable standard if there was sufficient development there” (Participant 49).
A secondary but equally important consideration was that once developed, the policy would assist transport planners in making a case for supporting or challenging a particular development approval. It would provide security to declare: “well that's not on the PPTN, therefore it's not desirable from a public transport point of view”
(Participant 49). Consequently, infrastructure played a determinate role in transitioning towards a demand management stance. Yet, lack of nfrastructure, a legacy stemming from the dominant car paradigm, constrained transitioning towards a demand stance.
The PPTN policy continued to be referred to as a core policy in state land-use policy documents, such as Melbourne @ 5 Million (DPCD, 2008), and state transport policy documents such as Meeting our Transport Challenges (DoI, 2006) and Victorian Transport Plan (DOT, 2008b). However, the high level policy documents never addressed existing governance. VicRoads remains the principle authority charged with allocating space of Melbourne’s declared road network. In contrast, DOI and subsequently DOT and PTV are charged with developing policy.
The role that this policy ambit had in road space allocation was identified by several senior level decision makers and transport planners within VicRoads and DOT (Participants 13, 21, 46). Ten years ago, VicRoads staff remained hesitant, if not explicitly against, advancing tram priority projects to the detriment of the car. The hesitation of VicRoads staff stemmed from unknown impacts that such projects might have to Melbourne’s road network. To offset potential such concerns, VicRoads staff advocated car infrastructure commensurate with tram priority infrastructure. This resulted in implementing car-specific infrastructure such as constructing an additional lane to ensure car travel was not affected. In contrast, a theme identified in the vast majority of interviews with both state and local transport planners, strongly suggests discussions regarding infrastructure construction and management between different state authorities is in flux.