TEORÍAS EN LAS QUE SE BASA EL LIDERAZGO DISTRIBUIDO Para García (2010), la perspectiva sobre Liderazgo Distribuido conlleva a un

In Section I, I motivated the claim that to believe rationally is to believe skillfully. In Section II I suggested that to believe rationally is to believe for good reason. I now want to call into question whether the claims of these two sections are compatible. The problem is that it is not the case, in general, that to Φ skillfully is to Φ for good reason (indeed, Φ-ing for good reason is not in general either necessary or sufficient for Φ-ing skillfully). If Φ-ing for good reason and Φ-ing skillfully are not identical, then by the transitivity of identity, Φ-ing rationally cannot be identical to both. This is some cause to worry that, in the particular case of belief, believing for good reason and believing skillfully are not identical, and if that is so then believing rationally cannot be identical to both. We must then consider whether one of the identifications suggested so far (rational belief = skillful belief, rational belief = belief for good reason) was mistaken.

Even if we maintain that these identifications were correct, they impose an explanatory burden: to make sense of why what does not hold true in general, does in the case of belief. Meeting this burden threatens to undermine the explanatory advantages of identifying rational belief with skillful belief in the first place. If we have to wheel in some ad hoc machinery to explain why skillful believing is a matter of believing for good reason, then it seems we might as well have appealed to such ad hoc-ery in the first place to explain the nature of rationality, and left skill out of the picture.

To see that Φ-ing skillfully is not, in general, the same as Φ-ing for good reason, consider the case of baking a cake. I might bake a cake for terrible reasons (perhaps in order to postpone an unpleasant but urgent task) and yet do so with great skill, expertly combining ingredients to produce a scrumptious result. On the other hand, I might bake a cake for an excellent reason (perhaps I intend it as a gift to cheer up a sad friend, knowing that cake always makes her happy) and yet do so with a terrible lack of skill, adding salt in place of sugar and overbaking until my cake is a blackened wreck. Given that baking skillfully and baking for good reason do not covary, clearly the two cannot be identical: to bake skillfully is not to bake for good reason, and more generally, the property of performances [being

skillful] is not identical to the property [being done for good reason].

None of this shows that being held for good reason is not what it takes for a belief in particular to be skillful. Skill is a determinable, determined in different manners in different domains. The requirements for skillful poetry-writing and skillful race-running are very different: among other things, the former requires careful word choice, and the latter requires moving quickly, although neither careful word choice nor moving quickly is plausibly identical to skill, per se. It could be that where poetry-skill involves careful word choice, belief-skill involves believing for good reason.

Indeed, something close to this is what I will end up saying (although I think the way in which the skill of a belief depends on one’s reasons turns out to be importantly different from the way in which skill in racing depends on the speed at which one moves, etc). However, what I think the cake-baking example shows is that my view faces a heavy

explanatory burden to avoid being problematically ad hoc. The deeper concern raised by the example is not just that there are cases where Φ-ing for good reason fails to guarantee Φ-ing

skillfully, and vice versa. Rather, the worry is that evaluation of performances as skillful or not, and as done for good reasons or not, are fundamentally distinct forms of evaluation, each of considerable interest but orthogonal.

Moreover, it seems plausible in general to equate rationality with the latter rather than the former: when we say that someone’s baking a cake was rational, for instance, this is more naturally heard as meaning that they baked the cake for a good reason than that they did so skillfully. The example therefore makes it tempting to embrace, across the board, the analysis of rationality in terms of reasons. Meanwhile, in those domains (like cake-baking) where we have a decent pre-theoretic grasp on what it takes to perform skillfully, performing skillfully seems to be a matter neither of one’s reasons nor of one’s rationality, but something quite different. I admit my own grasp on the notion of believing skillfully is decidedly post- theoretic. This combination of factors – the general chasm between reasons and rationality evaluation on the one hand and skill evaluation on the other, and the lack of a pre-theoretic grasp of how to carry out skill evaluation of beliefs in particular – renders my convenient claim that to believe rationally is to believe skillfully, that these normally distinct dimensions of evaluation come together in the case of belief, highly suspect. If I am to back it up, I need to do more than show that the claim is consistent with what we know about, e.g., cake- baking. I need, rather, to provide an explanation of this apparent coincidence, one that appeals to the nature of skill (generally) and to the nature of belief to show that it is no coincidence after all.

Achieving this goal will involve departing from Sosa’s account of skill. Recall that Sosa – as a reliabilist virtue epistemologist – is committed to a fundamentally reliabilist account of skill: on his view, to believe skillfully is to believe in a way that manifests one’s

sufficiently reliable disposition to believe the truth. Such a view of skill is indeed in tension with the view that believing skillfully is believing for good reason, for just as one may exercise a reliable disposition to bake successful cakes without baking for good reason, so also one may believe in a manner that manifests a reliable disposition to believe the truth without believing for a good reason. If I am to identify believing skillfully with believing for good reason, the account of skill to which I appeal cannot be a straightforwardly reliabilist one. This is not to deny that agents who believe skillfully exercise reliable dispositions to believe the truth in doing so; it is consistent with the account that I will offer that resulting from a reliable disposition is a necessary condition on skillful belief. One might hold that a reason r, in order to be a good reason for believing that p, must be such that beliefs that p held on the basis of r are reliably enough true.72 _{If this is correct, then reliabilism can get into} the view of rationality through the back door, as it were. But the reliabilism is not to be found in the account of skill itself. As a result, the account that I will develop here allows for some easing of the tensions between internalists and externalists, without erasing those tensions altogether. I hope to show how internalists can make use of skill-talk and how externalists can make use of reasons-talk to theorize about rationality, while conceding that ultimately both camps must still address the question of what makes for a good reason.

To begin working towards a resolution of our puzzle, I will for a time set aside the case of belief, and provide an account (albeit a partial one) of skill generally. I will then, in Section VI, apply that account back to belief to show how it resolves the puzzle and supports

72 _{A more sophisticated version of such a view would generalize to the case where a belief is held on}

my three-way identification of believing rationally, believing skillfully, and believing for good reason.