The bi-communal mosaic of the state structure is further complicated by the complex division of powers within each constitutional position. In order to achieve the conjoint rule of the island among the Greek majority and the Turkish minority, a matrix of powers which check and balance each other in varied ways are introduced. In this regard, the most important position to be occupied by a Turkish Cypriot in the Republic is that of vice-presidency. Dissimilar to the traditional role of a deputy whose main task is to act on a temporary basis as the chief executive in the president’s absence, the vice-president of Cyprus is granted powers that almost equal that of the president. The most significant of
40 Article 86.
41 Article 133 (1)(1).
42 Article 153 (1)(1).
43 Article 123 (1).
44 Article 129(1).
45 Article 130 sub-sections (1) and (2).
these powers are the entitlement to the ‘final veto’ of the decisions of the Council of Ministers,46 and of the laws of the House of Representatives.47 Article 57 of the constitution stipulates that the right of final veto in relation to the decisions of the Council of Ministers may be used by the vice-president either conjointly with the president or on his/her own accord.
Article 50 determines the vice-president’s right of final veto on any laws or decisions of the House of Representatives. According to this article, the right of final veto can be exercised on laws or decisions concerning the foreign affairs, questions of defence, and questions of security. Issues concerning the foreign affairs upon which the vice-president can exercise his/her right of final veto include the recognition of states, declaration of war, conclusion of peace and international treaties, and the protection of the citizens of the Republic abroad.48 The laws and decisions concerning the question of defence upon which the vice-president can exercise the right include ‘the composition and the size of the armed forces,’ ‘importation of war materials and explosives,’ and ‘cession of bases and other facilities to allied countries.’49 Finally, the issues of security involve the ‘distribution and stationing of forces,’ ‘emergency measures and martial law,’ and ‘police laws.’50
In addition to the right of final veto, vice-president also has the ‘right of return’ of the decisions of Council of Ministers51 and of laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.52 This right consists of the prerogative to send back to the Council any decisions53 or to the House any decisions or laws54 for reconsideration. Furthermore,
46 Article 49(d).
47 Article 49(f).
48 Article 50(1)(a).
49 Article 50(1)(b).
50 Article 50(1)(c).
51 Article 49(e).
52 Article 49(g).
53 Article 57(2).
54 Article 51(1).
president has the right of recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court55 and the prerogative of mercy in capital cases.56 Finally, vice-president designates and terminates the appointment of Turkish ministers to the Council of Ministers.57 Turkish Cypriots occupied three ministerial positions and their share of executive power required one of these positions to be chosen among the following ministries: the Ministry of Finance, or the Ministry of Defence, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.58
In terms of the legislature, Article 61 of the constitution provides that the House of Representatives has legislative power in all matters that do not fall within the legislative authority of the Chambers. The laws are passed in the House with a simple majority vote.59 There are exceptions to this rule if the House tries to amendment the Electoral Law or pass any laws concerning the municipalities, the imposition of duties, or taxes. In these cases, the constitution requires ‘a separate simple majority of the Representatives elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities respectively taking part in the vote.’60
Therefore, in most of the matters that fall within the legislative authority of the House, the total of the Turkish votes can only be effective in conjunction with the Greek votes. In other words, if Bill X61 comes before the House, fifteen Turkish votes, without any support from Greek members of the House, will not be sufficient to enact or prevent the enactment of this Bill. However, in matters that fall within the exceptions mentioned above, the Turkish vote acquires a determinative power. For instance, the Electoral Law cannot be amended unless out of the fifteen Turkish representatives, eight of them concur — i.e. a separate simple majority emerges from the Turkish vote.
55 Article 49(h).
56 Article 49(m).
57 Article 49(a).
58 Article 46.
59 Article 78(1).
60 Article 78 (2).
61 Assuming that this Bill concerns a matter which does not fall within the legislative authority of the Chambers and that it does not engage the exceptions to the simple majority vote.
In addition to the membership of the House of Representatives, the Turkish community enjoys legislative power through the Communal Chambers. Distinct from the House which accommodates elected members from both communities and requires collaboration among them, the Communal Chambers provide the Greek and the Turkish community with their respective legislative bodies. Article 87 of the constitution determines the legislative scope of each Chamber. Accordingly, the Chambers have the right to exercise legislative power over an extensive list of issues which solely concern their communities.
These issues include the following: religion, education, and culture; personal status; the composition and instances of courts dealing with certain civil disputes; the imposition of personal taxes and fees on the respective members of the communities; the charities and foundations; subsidiary legislation or bylaws for the functioning of the municipalities; the producers' and consumers' cooperatives; and the credit establishments.62
The intricate division of state power among the two communities continues within the judiciary of the Republic. It was previously observed that the Supreme Constitutional Court is composed of a Greek, a Turkish, and a neutral judge — the neutral judge being the president.63 The President and the Vice-president of the Republic jointly appoint the judges of the Court.64 However, if a disagreement arises among the President and the Vice-president vis-à-vis the appointment of the Greek and the Turkish judges, the President’s nominee succeeds to the position of the Greek judge, and the Vice-President’s nominee succeeds to the position of the Turkish judge.65 Regarding the appointment of the neutral judge the constitution provides that ‘[t]he neutral judge shall not be a subject or a citizen of the
62 Article 87(1).
63 Article 133(1).
64 Article 133(2).
65 Article 133(2).
Republic [of Cyprus] or of the Kingdom of Greece or of the Republic of Turkey or of the United Kingdom and the Colonies.’66
While the composition of the High Court of Justice slightly differs from that of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the presidency of the High Court is also entrusted to a neutral judge. Within the set-up of the High Court there are two Greek judges, a Turkish judge and a neutral judge.67 Despite the fact that the numerical equilibrium of Greek and Turkish judges of the Supreme Court is not maintained within the High Court structure, the neutral judge is granted two votes.68 This allows the neutral judge to cast a determinative vote in cases where a single vote from the neutral judge could result in a numerical tie. For instance, in a case heard before the High Court, the Greek judges could vote to allow an appeal from one of the parties. In turn, the Turkish judge could vote to dismiss the appeal. If the neutral judge had only one vote and s/he were to side with the Turkish judge in his/her decision, the case would remain unsolved. Thus, the neutral judge’s second vote is a potential tie-breaker.
Furthermore, it also has the capability to ensure that any probable intra-communal bias of the numerically superior Greek judges can be held in check.