Tercer Caso: La transformación por el trabajo

As Europeanization is a concept without its own methodology, one can proceed with either the actor-based or the institution-based approach (Hėritier 2000). In the area of foreign policy, Europeanization has been used in combination with the new institutionalism theoretical approach (see, e.g. Tonra 2000, Denca 2011, Mennon 2011, Pomorska 2011a, 2011b, Alecu de Flers 2012). New institutionalism is suitable in that it not only acknowledges the role of member states but it also stresses the impact of institutions on member state interaction (Jupile & Caporaso 1999). This study agrees that institutional environment is crucial, in particular under the Lisbon Treaty, which substantially strengthened the institutional framework for EU foreign policy-making. Without taking into account the institutional constraints, uploading can be interpreted as a “slightly modified version of intergovernmentalism or liberal intergovernmentalism” (Denca 2009:45).

New institutionalism traditionally has been divided into three branches: historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalisms (Hall & Taylor, 1996), which vary in their “views about the nature of reality and relationship between the structure and agent” (Rosamond 2000:114). All three branches assume that ‘institutions matter,’ meaning that they create formal and informal rules within which member states operate. For analysing Europeanization, rational choice and sociological institutionalisms have been applied most of all. Both of them explore the member states’ interactions within the given institutional environmet. However, their logic differs. While sociological institutionalism follows the ‘logic of appropriateness,’ rational choice institutionalism perceives member states as goal- seeking actors following their preferences (‘logic of consequentialism’) (March & Olsen 1998:949). Recently one more branch - normative institutionalism, has been advanced as a suitable framework for analysing uploading in the CFSP (Thomas, et al. 2011). I further discuss these branches in more detail.

Sociological institutionalism assumes that institutional environment “constitutes who we are, our identities as social beings” (Pollack 2010:24). It considers that institutions shape actor (member state) identities and preferences. From this perspective actors, facing a conflicting situation, do not follow their preferences, but take into account “socially constructed roles and institutional rules” (ibid). They interact according to appropriate behaviour, i.e. do “the right thing” (March & Olsen

34 2005:3). At a deeper level, it can be understood as a logic of habitual action, when choices are made almost automatically without reaching the level of conscious decision-making (Beach 2012:145).

When applied to the context of EU foreign policy-making, sociological institutionalism expects member state’s compliance to the institutional rules and norms. Member states interact in EU foreign policy through the process of ‘socialisation’, which means “inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2007:5). Through socialization via interaction member states are supposed to engage in ‘truth-seeking.’ They “miss their rational motivations behind the process” (Juncos and Pomorska 2006), and change their preferences. However, as demonstrated by Juncos and Pomorska (2006) socialisation in the CFSP working groups in fact followed a ‘strategic calculus.’

Second branch of new institutionalism – rational choice institutionalism – draws on actor-based approach and ‘logic of consequences.’ Rational choice institutionalism is built on methodological individualism, goal-seeking action under institutional constraints (Pollack 2006:4). Originally developed by American scholars in 1970s, rational choice institutionalism has been used for studying EU policy- making, including Europeanization (see e.g. Schimmelfenning 2001, 2003). The benefit of it in exploring uploading is that member states are assumed to pursue their consistent national preferences, where they are constrained by institutions.

From the rational actor perspective, member state’s influence on the EU level has been extensively studied by intergovernmentalism (see, e.g. Keohane 1984, Moravcsik 1993, 1988, Wallace & Wallace 1996). It assumes that member states are key actors in the EU. Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal intergovernmentalism draws on the three-step model, connecting preference formation at the national level with an intergovernmental EU-level bargaining and a model of institutional choice (Pollack 2010:20). This approach assumes that national preferences derive from member states’ domestic economic (material) interests. For instance, it assumes that behind the ‘rhetoric idealism’ of EU-15 support for the 2004 enlargement there were “measurable economic and geopolitical benefits” (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2005:206). Regarding the second step, preference projection, it takes the form of interstate bargaining (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). From this perspective, bargaining takes distributive (hard) form with the EU institutions having little influence (Pollack 2010:21).

35 Although liberal intergovernmentalism may be useful for exploring uploading, its relevance has been questioned due to neglecting the role of institutions, and thereby many scholars do not opt for it. In this approach, the national representatives do not have flexibility; they are only agents representing domestic interest groups. If influential domestic groups seek to achieve their preferences through the state level, governments face bargaining with a high potential for conflict, and the outcome will be zero-sum or deadlock (Moravcsik 1997:521). In addition, this approach explains decision-making at the highest political level (intergovernmental conferences), rather than a day-to-day decision-making in the EU Council, which this study deals with.

Accordingly, rational choice institutionalism is more suitable for this study. First, it assumes that member states are goal-seeking actors and have consistent preferences. They make choices based on their preferences, and they act strategically (‘logic of consequences’). Second, rational choice institutionalism takes into account the constraining role of EU institutional environment. Overall, the rational choice institutionalism accepts Moravcsik’s rationalist assumptions, while it rejects his ‘institution-free’ model of intergovernmental bargaining (Pollack 2010:21).

In the scholarship on Europeanization, rational choice institutionalism has been applied for exploring downloading through the mechanism of conditionality (Börzel & Risse 2006, Schimmelfennig 2003, Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005), whereas in uploading it has not been used. Yet, uploading, where member states are “primary actors of change [..,] shares many similarities with rational-choice interest- based accounts” (Milward 1992, 200, Bulmer & Burch 1999, Laffan & Stubb 2003, cited in Wong 2005:9). Rational choice institutionalism as a theoretical framework has been used in extensive studies on member states’ interaction in the EU Council by Thomson and Holsti (2006), by Thomson (2011a, 2011b), as well as by Dür and Mateo (2010a, 2010b), thereby providing a good basis for this study.

Rational choice institutionalism assumes that member states pursue their preferences within the institutional constraints. Here one needs to clarify the meaning of institutional constraints since liberal intergovernmentalism also takes the role of institutions into account. In contrast from the latter, rational choice institutionalism treats institutional constraints as both formal and informal institutions (see, e.g. Thomson 2011a, Scharpf 2012). Institutions, which are “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction,” consist of formal (e.g. laws, voting procedures) and informal constraints (e.g. codes of conduct) (North 1991:97).

36 Especially in EU foreign policy-making it is not sufficient to take only formal institutional constraints into account, as this policy area is driven by informal consensus. These constraints also include “the potential players in that game” (Mennon 2011:85). Thereby, the institutional constraints are formal and informal rules, “adherence to which depends only on the actors themselves” (Thomson 2011a:8). They together with the EU actors’ preferences and uploading efforts form the EU foreign policy environment.

Apart from rational choice institutionalism, a very similar version of new institutionalism, which may be useful for exploring uploading, is so-called ‘normative institutionalism.’ This approach has recently been advocated by a number of scholars as a ‘robust theory’ to explain EU foreign policy-making (Schimmelfennig & Thomas 2009, Thomas 2011, Thomas & Tonra 2012). Contrary to sociological institutionalism, normative institutionalism advocates such causal mechanisms as bargaining (cooperative) and ‘rhetoric entrapment’ to reach the EU compromise agreement (ibid). This is a crucial step forward, showing that EU foreign policy- making is not exclusive EU decision-making fora, consisting only of socialisation, but also involves bargaining. One confusion, however, is that normative institutionalism assumes that “national preferences are exogenous to institutions,” while at the same time suggesting that the “habit of consultation has produced a partial convergence.” This leads to the question on using the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and ‘logic of consequence.’ i.e. “where does consensus stop and convergence begin” (Menon 2011:208-209). Normative institutionalism also overlaps with rational choice institutionalism in terms of uploading mechanisms by using the same mechanism of informal cooperative bargaining7.

At the same time a number of aspects of normative institutionalism should be taken into account, as it provides relevant uploading mechanisms, namely, ‘cooperative bargaining.’ Furthermore, bargaining is here contrasted to socialisation – the main mechanism of sociological institutionalism. In this way, it reveals that the EU foreign policy-making is not different from the other EU policy areas, as argued by the constructivist scholars (see, e.g. Checkel 2007), but as a result of increased institutionalization in EU foreign policy is similar to Council’s decision-making in

7 _{R.Thomson (2011a) drawing on rational choice institutionalism analyzes the EU decision-making as}

‘informal cooperative bargaining’, whereas D.Thomas (2011) applies ‘informal cooperative bargaining’ as a property of the normative institutionalism.

37 general. It concludes that in EU foreign policy environment, with its consensus rule and consultation reflex, ‘cooperative bargaining’ is a more efficient mechanism than socialization. By recognizing ‘bargaining’ as the main mechanism, which is perceived as a property of rationalism, normative institutionalism shares crucial elements of the rational choice institutionalism approach, which is the basis for this study.

Accordingly, this study chooses to rely on rational choice institutionalism. It places an emphasis on national preferences, while recognising the importance of the institutional environment. Actors’ pursuit of their preferences does not imply that “preferences are always stable or that actors are always fully aware of the consequences as uncertainty belong[s] to interaction process” (Thomson & Holsti 2006:6). The essence of this approach is that actors are constrained by institutions in their pursuit of preferences (Thomson 2011a).

I further discuss the main components of the uploading process. In answering the research question of how a member state can influence EU foreign policy in the case of intensely held references, one needs to clarify the meaning of national preferences, influence, uploading mechanisms, and EU foreign policy environment.