Much of the resistance to genetically modified food stems from the environmental movement, who seem to be almost unanimous in their objections to it. While not all environmentalists are ecocentrists, it would seem reasonable to suppose in the light of the above, that ecocentric theorists will be critical of GM food. The previous chapter gives an example of a normative structure created by Fox according to Naess’s methods, designed to show an anti- environmentalist perspective based on excessive human interference with nature, which leads to the norm Genetic Engineering!10 Clearly here Fox considers genetic modification to be incompatible with ecocentrism (and environmentalism in a broader sense). Furthermore, according to Dobson:
[...] deep ecologists are likely to take up a prima facie position against genetic engineering precisely because it is a technology that expresses the very world view that they consider causes all the trouble: one of human mastery of the non- human natural world. The point, they say, is to develop practices and habits of mind that are an expression of membership rather than domination, of the non- human natural world. From this point of view the ethical argument is nothing less than an argument about what our relationship with the rest of the biotic (and abiotic) community should be.11
He then criticises this position by accusing ecocentrists (deep ecologists) of “throwing the baby out with the bath water” by paying too little attention to the
10
Fox 1995 p.p. 138-140
11
benefits genetic modification might bring. However, this reading of the literature on ecocentrism seems to paint an overly simplistic picture of the relationship between technology and ecocentrism. Naess' work does not specifically mention genetic modification, but does have direct applicability to it. His eight point characterisation of deep ecology detailed in Chapter Two includes Humans have
no right to reduce this richness or diversity except to satisfy vital needs12. According to Mellon and Rissler:
In general, the research applications of genetic engineering have made possible giant strides in the understanding of the biological world and how it operates. Also many of the pharmaceutical applications of engineered bacteria offer effective therapies to patients, pose few risks to those who do not derive benefits, and have few viable alternatives. In agriculture, however, the situation is murkier. Here the benefits of agricultural biotechnology to a country [the US] awash in food and agricultural commodities are less obvious, the risks of environmental harm are greater, and the alternatives more plentiful.13
This passage could be used to argue that the genetic modification of agricultural crops does not satisfy a vital human need, but that some medical applications do. Thus an ecocentrist could accept the latter application of the technology while rejecting the former. However, an ecocentrist could also reject both, on the grounds that developing the technology for medical purposes would lead to its use for agricultural purposes. This is an example of where different ecocentric communities could reach different decisions about their behaviour from the same principles, and appears to deal with Dobson’s objection.
The relationship between ecocentrism and agriculture in general is relevant here. The previous section outlined how genetic modification of food crops represents, in some respects, a continuation of current trends in industrial agriculture. Thus an exploration of ecocentrist attitudes to agriculture should be instructive, and Fox’s contention that organic agriculture is a logical derivation of an ecocentrist position14 is a useful starting point. Organic agriculture does not permit the use of chemical fertilisers or pesticides, specifies higher standards for animal welfare than provided for by UK legislation, and forbids the use of genetic modification, either of the final product or as part of the manufacturing process. However, it
12
Naess 1990 p.136
13
Mellon & Rissler 1996 p. 21
14
does not remove anthropocentrism from agriculture, since the process remains a manipulation of nature for the benefit of humanity. Crops and animals are used which have been bred over generations to serve humanity better, and natural processes are interfered with by promoting the growth of some species and inhibiting the growth of others, thereby maintaining an artificial environment. However, as in the above argument differentiating between different varieties of genetic modification, the acceptability of organic agriculture to ecocentrists compared to their rejection of industrial agriculture is a question of degree. Finding food can be considered an essential human need, and so provided the extent to which meeting this need compromises ecocentric principles is minimised, the practice is acceptable. The method of minimisation is not universally accepted however. It can be argued that it is better to cultivate agricultural land as intensively as possible in order to maximise the amount of land which can be set aside as wilderness, an approach termed High-Yield
Conservation15. This position regards as paradoxical that environmentalists oppose the use of chemicals in agriculture, yet oppose genetic modification which is presented as reducing chemical dependency. There appear to be no ecocentrist writers who support this position, and the wider environmental movement appear to be near unanimous in their rejection of GM food crops; their arguments tend to revolve around the social, cultural, political and economic context of agriculture in addition to its technical detail. Typically they will also cast doubt on the assumption that industrial agriculture produces higher yields than organic and traditional agriculture,16 particularly the ability of the industrial model to sustain yields in the long term.17
Ecocentrism can also inform attitudes to the genetic modification of food by the relative importance it gives individuals and communities18. Fundamental to ecocentrism is the notion of communities of interdependent entities, which implies a subordination of the interests of the individual to that of the community.
15 Avery 1997 16 Shiva 1993 p.p. 39-49 17
Levidow and Tait 1995 p.p 129-130, Shiva 1993 p.p. 50-59
18
Recall that ‘community’ for an ecocentrist refers to all the parts, animal, vegetable and mineral which make up an ecosystem.
However, individuals retain importance as they represent instantiations of species, which may be described in terms of the organism’s telos or nature. This argument necessarily rejects genetic modification by virtue of the alteration to the organism’s telos it involves.19 While this argument may seem more appropriate to the genetic modification of animals than it does to food crops in the absence of sentience in the latter, because of the breadth of moral community embraced by ecocentrism it remains for an ecocentrist a valid position.
On the level of species integrity, ecocentrists fall foul of arguments between biologists over whether the concept of species is a viable one. Darwinism posits genetic changes over time, and individuals of any given species show considerable variation from one individual to another. Furthermore, according to Ho, genes may be transferred between unrelated organisms via a multitude of mechanisms20, so here we see a notion of the species as a genetically porous concept, and the changing of a few genes within a species through genetic modification as being no more detrimental for the integrity of the species than the genetic changes which occur naturally. However, barriers to reproduction between species remain, so although the term may be less absolute than is commonly perceived it is still able to demarcate between reproductive activity which is, or approximates to that which could have occurred in nature, and that which doesn’t. The genetic modification of species then can be considered as a higher level of anthropocentric interference than that used in traditional plant breeding, and it appears that, like the organic/conventional example above, it crosses a line which ecocentrists consider unacceptable. Moreover, according to Holland, for genetic modification to be acceptable to ecocentrists it should be conducted in a manner compatible with the continued existence of the biosphere
viewed as a community.21 This implies, according to Dobson, that not only should individuals be given moral consideration as part of that community, but also species. It seems reasonable to assume given the well documented damage caused by the introduction of alien species into ecosystems22, that the genetic
19 Dobson 1995 p. 233 20 Ho 1998 p.p. 154-166 21 Cited in Dobson 1995 p. 232 22 Peretti 1998 p. 183
modification of a species may sometimes have a detrimental effect on the ecosystem or community of which it becomes a part.
Ecocentrism also includes a powerful sense of the ‘rightness’ of what already exists. This derives from an emphasis on community - if the community of entities functions together, its components must be ‘right’ and should not be tampered with. Rolston expresses this as what is being a standard for what ought to be23 This implies a blanket rejection of all genetic modification, even plant breeding. Again, for an ecocentrist, this is a factor to be minimised rather than be eliminated altogether, so that somatic gene therapy or conventional plant breeding might be deemed acceptable, while GM crops might not.