Testimonio de Desempeño Sobresaliente (TDSS)

If 4.2 and 4.3 reflect on certain ways that governments have to treat individuals to promote justice, here, the political process of determining what is just is analysed. As introduced in 4.1, the third opposition on how a just society should be organised has, on the one extreme, a model of society ruled by few specialists (technocracy) and, in the other, a proposal that avoids interference of specialists in democratic processes41. Through history, however, both models were exceptional, since societies used to be ruled by the most powerful without any popular participation in the decisions. And, though most states were grounded on totalitarian regimes, few appealed to optimisation of efficiency to justify such practices. Direct

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democracy was also rare – certain cities in ancient Greece are some of these exceptions42, where city-states were sufficiently small, there were not complex decisions to be taken (compared with current sophisticated issues related, for example, to the globalized economy) and citizens had time to deliberate and vote (only free landowner men (in Athens, 30,000) were considered citizens, and slaves and women used to do the ordinary work (Thorley, 2005, p.74)).

This thesis, however, is focused on Western contemporary democracies. In 2.6, t is claimed that democratic procedures, which somehow presuppose people‟s participation in states‟ decisions, are the consensual means to apply and refine certain principles of justice. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to realise that Western states have characteristics that make direct democracy impossible: they are formed by millions of people, all of them with an equal right to vote and with very complex problems to solve. Thus, in local, regional and national levels, certain people are chosen (and paid) to spend time thinking and debating in order to find the best alternatives for solving the problems of the societies they represent (representative democracy). They, through deliberation and aggregation of interests (two ideas discussed below) elaborate laws and policies, and check executive power (theoretically) on behalf of their voters.

Thus, a healthy representative model depends on people‟s trust in the political class. However, two recent phenomena from countries where this system seemed to work well have been considered important threats to representative democracy: in the UK, against most MPs‟ and specialists‟/experts‟ opinions, people voted for Brexit. A comment of Michael Gove, a former Education Minister and an important leader of Brexit, makes it evident: “people in this country have had enough of experts”43

; in the US, Trump, as discussed below, appealed to the same rhetoric. Interestingly, in both cases, amongst many other things, it is possible to identify a strong desire of unarticulated people, who normally do not belong to the central political system (the “establishment”), to question these centralised decisions.

Thus, neither extreme direct democracy, nor extreme specialist-based governments seem plausible, and the real alternatives are the different combinations of ordinary people‟s

42 _{Other non-Western examples, but also related to small communities, can be also identified (Graeber, 2004;}

Barclay, 1996; Clark, 2016)

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opinions and specialists‟ knowledge in decision-making processes. On the one hand, as presented in 3.7, peoples‟ opinions obtained through democratic processes are important for two reasons. First, currently, it is consensual in Western societies that all individuals should participate in the public decision-making. This consensus gives legitimacy for democratic governments and, then, stability for the society. Second, based on the debate on social choice theory, since many specialists have difficulty in understanding people‟s wills, consulting people‟s opinions seems to be the best way of identifying important characteristics of the common good.

On the other hand, specialists are important in order to ensure that democratic decisions are not simply aggregations of individuals‟ will. Specialists help to refine theories, translate them to ordinary people, and guarantee the respect of entrenched constitutional principles. Through reinforcing these principles, a common good is favoured and the danger of a dictatorship of majority groups is significantly reduced. Thus, some people have to be designated to think on what is just. They are, in the theoretical domain, humanities academics, opinion-makers, etc. and, in the practical domain, policymakers44. They are deliberately hired by the society to develop ideas that individuals in their ordinary lives do not have time or interest to develop.

In this way, academics and opinion-makers work towards increasing consensus, though often it is not produced: obviously, there are many disagreements amongst specialists, but, through theoretical debate, they look for consensus (even if they never reach it). In debates on justice, academics look forward to reaching minimal agreement that at least sustains constitutional principles. Voters and their representatives deal with dissensus. When debates reach the public sphere, it is because it is being accepted that consensus was not possible and people‟s opinions have to be consulted. Of course, through debates in the public sphere (pre and post elections), sometimes consensus is produced, though, many times, disagreements result in disputes ended by voting.

Thus, certain states‟ practices towards justice are guaranteed by constitutions, while others come and go through democratic decisions. Throughout history, societies developed very

44 _{Nichols (2017) differentiates experts (knowers) from policymakers (deciders). For the present discussion, this}

differentiation is not relevant, since policymakers are taken as specialists in governance. However, it is important to differentiate between deciders that are specialists in governance (and are chosen because of these qualities) from those who are only born into privilege (and are chosen because of their political influences). Many people consider that the deciders are far from being specialists in governance and, then, completely distrust them.

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different ways of combining direct participation and certain mechanisms of limiting majority will. They are usually differentiated by the higher or lower importance given to central power in comparison to local power, by more or less direct connection between the leader and the voters (the dispute between presidentialism versus parliamentarism symbolises this), and by the ways that representatives are chosen.

An way to reflect on how to give voice to the people in spite of the size of the nation is through comparing presidentialism and parliamentarism. Each system has advantages and disadvantages depending on people‟s level of trust in their local representatives. When this trust is low, it may be preferable that people choose directly the president, since they feel that, at least the choice of the president is based on their will, and, then, their voice is listened to. However, presidentialist regimes are normally based on the image of the leader as a saviour and get close to totalitarian practices. From this, undemocratic actions achieved by a bureaucratic establishment are recurrent. On the other hand, when people feel represented by their MPs, the channels of dialogue with the government, parliamentarism may be a better option, since representatives are in superior position to support but also to supervise and criticise the prime minister. Thus, the process of representatives‟ choice also deserves reflection.

Since a representative system seems essential to current democratic practices, it is important to identify good ways to achieve it. Three alternatives are, then, briefly compared. District representation is a system in which the nation (also municipalities and states) is divided in districts where citizens choose a single candidate for representing them. The most positive element of such a system is the stronger ties established by the candidate and the voters (Strom et al, 2006). In proportional representation systems, on the other hand, citizens vote for a party, rather than for a specific candidate. The main advantage of this system is that people vote based on a national project, that is, on a broader project, rather than basing their choices in local concerns. Group representation (Young, 1990) is a type of affirmative action that aims to guarantee some seats in parliament for groups historically excluded (for different reasons) from political representation. There is a long debate in these regards, but it seems that these three alternatives can be combined, being such a combination the best alternative to improve the efficacy of the representative system.

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Chapter 4 examines and shares the current Western debate about justice in three dimensions (economic, cultural and decision-making). This analytical option favours a more focused observation of different views of justice, and reduces the polarisation of the debate about justice. It is not the aim of this chapter to defend “the” just practices related to each dimension, but only to identify some reasonable limits on these regards. These limits added to empirical observations about human behaviours (chapter 5), especially Brazilian people‟s (chapter 6), help the identification of civic virtues that make people participate more effectively in the public sphere (chapter 8).

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5. Natural and cultural developments of ideas of justice

Chapters 3 and 4 develop reflections on justice from a theoretical point of view. However, many times, theories of justice are excessively idealistic and present proposals that are not perfectly compatible with real people‟s practices. Observing how human beings feel and are predisposed to act in the social sphere help to define how a just society should be. The focus of the present chapter is to dwell upon this reflection, from the empirical side of reflective equilibrium. Thus, it starts investigating (5.1) the role of natural selection and cultural practices in the development of people‟s notions of justice. Then, (5.2) humans‟ rationality and reasonability to advance from what is determined by nature and cultures is then presented. This reflection orients the discussions related to (5.3) moral developments of people towards both more concrete and more abstract ideas of justice. Finally, (5.4) this reflection on human nature and cultural constructions is organized through the three dimensions of justice introduced in chapter 4.