The study of ourselves in the moments of our lives is not a novel idea. In the 18th Century Kant wrote of viewing our existence through a synthesis of what we perceive as observed experiences in the physical and social world and how we mentally process what we encounter, and signalled a departure from considering the basis of our existence in terms of a physically present set of objects (Kant, 1881). Having defined enlightenment as ‘human being’s emergence from his self-incurred…inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from another’ (Kant, 1784, p:1) he introduced concepts through which to describe how we understand and relate to our social world; the study of human life.
Towards the late 19th Century, recognisable constituents of perceived human experience, described by Durkheim as the ‘social facts’ of our human lives, were seen as external influences evoking different responses from individuals, and evident in society as independent ideas, attitudes, practices – yet functioning as phenomena which can be
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identified at the centre of human activity and capable of altering social interactions (Durkheim, 1972, Durkheim, 1953, Durkheim, 1982).
Although he acknowledged the impalpable and unobservable nature of social facts, Durkheim argued that social life should be studied as objectively as scientists study the natural world, with social facts considered as formative influences on human behaviour. Instead of responding to a distant objective view, he noted that our analysis of ideas generated by close and familiar objects exerted greater influence on reactions and behaviour than distant realities (Durkheim, 1972, Durkheim, 1982).
Weber agreed that study of social life should focus on individual human beings as the basic units of society, each a ‘sole carrier of meaningful conduct’ (Weber, 1948). He shared Durkheim’s desire for greater ‘precision’ of concepts developed on the basis of the best achievable exploration of meaning (Weber, 1962). Rather than social structures, he regarded socially active units (human beings) as potentially transformative background forces within society, whose conduct should be studied not simply as descriptions, nor limited to analysis and interpretation, but by proposing causal explanations of social processes (Weber, 1968). In contrast to Durkheim who believed humans a complex amalgam of many influences, Weber introduced the term ‘ideal types’ to enable consideration of ‘typical’ responses; this has been represented as a device better suited to retrospective analysis than applied to current and fluid social processes (Durkheim, 1953, Weber, 1962, Weber, 1948).
Since in Mead’s conceptual frame, minds and selves arise within and are modified by social interactions, and develop in cooperation with others’ demands through communication of roles and attitudes, it follows that experience feeds expectations, informs responses and changes in how it is perceived as new experiences are added (Mead, 1934). As these frames are in turn reflected back into society and onto the individual, Mead drew attention to
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the importance of interaction between individuals by viewing the characteristics of a society as determined by social constructions between those who constitute it, according to whatever meanings they attach to anything they encounter, adopted roles, interactions and by whatever operating rules or structures they have created (Mead, 1934, Stryker, 2008). He viewed human variability as a consequence of socially determined influences; in effect that we behave in response to social forces acting on us as they are perceived in our consciousness and reflected upon as remembered events, images or gestures (Mead, 1913). Proposing a theory of symbolic interactionism, his theoretical frame specified ’a manageable set of assumptions and concepts assumed important in investigating particular social behaviour’, which alerts the researcher/observer to what is likely to be important to observe or investigate (Stryker, 2008).
Although Mead did not extensively write beyond his primary theoretical frame, Blumer’s later explication established these basic premises:
1."Human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings they ascribe to those things."
2."The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with others and the society."
3."These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he/she encounters."
(Blumer, 1969, p:3-5)
On this foundation Blumer and others established methodological developments which equipped researchers to develop theories about observed behaviours and test those theories (Stryker, 2008). Assuming with Mead that "the individual mind can exist only in relation to other minds with shared meanings" (Mead, 1934), he proposed that a means of understanding social actions, individual behaviour, and interactions with others, lay in exploration of interactive processes involved in living in a world comprised of objects to
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which we attribute meaning and with multiple individuals whose meanings are shared or dissimilar (Blaikie, 1993, Lee, 2005, Rao et al., 2003). Access to inner meanings is however only possible to the extent that they can be communicated by language or gestures (Weber, 1962).
Influences from phenomenological perspectives developed following Husserl’s lead as Logical Investigations described a model in which he sought to strip back to ‘the ‘sources’ from which the basic concepts and ideal laws of pure logic ‘flow’’ (Husserl, 2001, p:166), in order to bring ‘clearness and distinctness’ to understanding ‘lived experience’. Rather than focus on observable interactions, Husserl considered phenomena, objects to which human minds attach meaning, as components essential to understanding the essence of a thing (event, cause, effect, etc.) and what may be understood by knowledge of it– though his implied position, that experience is the source of all knowledge, was countered by Heidegger’s concept of human existence and actions as being ‘in the world’ (Husserl, 2001, Heidegger, 1962).
Making sense based on experience
Since plain description of phenomena did not effectively convey the ‘whatness’ or ‘aboutness’ of natural objects and social processes, the emergence of hermeneutic phenomenology marked a growing of interest in interpretation of what is observed or expressed (Husserl, 2001, Heidegger, 1962, Gadamer, 1975, Gadamer, 1976, Dilthey, 1976, Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Describing this interpretive understanding as an art rather than a rules-based science, and one which built on ‘a natural power’ of interpretation, Gadamer believed that it should be undertaken by a researcher motivated only by a desire to gain knowledge while Dilthey held that depth of understanding depended on investment of sustained attention (Gadamer, 1976, Dilthey, 1972, Van Manen, 1990).
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When interpreting other viewpoints it is important to recognise the influence of our own perception of the world, our own being in the world, and alert to a fusion of horizons created by experiences from the past and present (Heidegger, 1962, Merleau-Ponty, 1964). These may be demonstrated by mediating influences of each on the other, underlining the importance of shifting back and forth, relating the whole and parts of experience to obtain a better view, to identify connections between them (Gadamer, 1975, Dilthey, 1972). Taking this perspective, where no a priori assumptions were considered necessary, was characterised by first seeking to describe the meaning attributed to objects rather than to explain or account for either meaning or actions and demanded that a researcher enter the field of study without preconceived ideas (Pivčević and Husserl, 1970, Husserl, 2001, Johnson, 1982).
For Schutz, whose guiding principle was to focus on the subjective consciousness of the individual, the entirety of human experience was considered open to greater understanding through gaining deeper insight into the meanings individually attributed to everything within the compass of existence (Schutz, 1967, Etzrodt, 2008). In his methodological text, The Phenomenology of the Social World, he theorised that behaviour was not distinct from underlying meanings which gave rise to that behaviour, recognised that attributed meanings may change with the passage of time and that experience was not perceived in a completed manner while continuing to be experienced. Effects of past experience, reflection from a more distant perspective and current thought processes combined to produce a continual flow of pooled experience on which an individual might draw for the future.
Schutz proposed that whilst the most intimate experiences occurring closest to the core of an individual (and linked to Dasein, the word applied by Heidegger to encapsulate an individual’s presence in the world as an entity interacting with and in the world) might be inaccessible to conscious recall, these unconscious experiences could affect actions which were difficult to account for on other grounds. By delving deeper than other interactionist
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approaches, he sought to establish ‘taken for granted’ assumptions which elsewhere emerged as notions of ‘common sense’ despite their very particular origins in individuals or cultural settings.
The effects of performance and presentation on interpretation of lived experience
The above assumptive positions established a view of human life as a lived reality, experienced by individual perceptions, modified and shaped by encounters in the physical and social world, shared by language, gestures and images, and through various means of communication made available for interpretation by another person. In contrast to study of natural science looking in from the outside, study of social phenomena ‘requires an understanding of the social world which people have constructed and which they reproduce through their continuing activities’ (Blaikie, 1993); a study which attempts to see with the eyes of another, to dig under their skin.
By exploring secrets and intimacies which constitute the world, phenomenological research examines how individuals orientate themselves in their world (Van Manen, 1990). Through ongoing interactions and interpretations, meaning and relevance constantly shift, generating social processes which inform a mutable understanding of social life (Touraine, 1974).
Schutz emphasised a need to carefully acquire and analyse both ‘external’ data which was effortlessly told and less-accessible ‘internal’ data, while Geertz referred to details of life experience as discovered prominently on the surface or discerned through deeper interpretive analysis (Schutz, 1967, Geertz, 1983). Geertz believed cultural influences and contexts of historical importance influenced how these constructions of meaning and relevance were enacted, but their effects were not universal – each individual engaged with the world as they encountered and were conscious of it, adorning objective existence with subjective meaning (Geertz, 1973, Crotty, 1998).
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Gaining phenomenological insight did not for Schutz represent an end in itself; he viewed it as a means to the proper formulation of a sociological problem;
‘The intended meaning of a lived experience is nothing more nor less than self- interpretation of that lived experience from the point of view of a new lived experience’ (Schutz, 1967, p:78)
Uniting internalised and interactional aspects of individual experience as represented by Goffman (1922-1982) resonates with my general understanding of how each person in their particular cultural setting reflects on their encounters with the natural and social world, forms attitudes and organises actions in relation to others (Goffman, 1990). New encounters are processed to fit into a framework of understanding which is determined by and contributes to making sense of any event (Littlejohn, 1977). Presenting social life as occurring through how one presents self through verbal and non-verbal communication, Goffman noted that while the former is relatively easily controlled, non-verbal cues and behaviours tend to escape conscious control, conveying messages to an observer who naturally attempts to match both forms of information (Goffman, 1990).
Part of the purpose of a controlled ‘performance’ is to achieve an expected response of being treated as presented, a form of ‘impression management’ (Tseelon, 1992); in this way a doctor might adopt an approach which is expected of a health professional when in consultation with patients to elicit a patient-response from them, but may carry this into other social situations to elicit positive reactions from others (Goffman, 1967).
Social life is knitted together by interpersonal communication – negotiations of status, roles, and social relations are facilitated by trust, though performers may opt to misrepresent (through impersonation, distortions, exaggerations or by cynical performances). Strategies to defend or protect specific interests may be adopted; performers may decide to produce an erroneous performance or even persuade themselves of its veracity. Settings for interactions
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may be chosen where physical surroundings or indicators of status serve to boost the credibility of a performer; e.g. ‘clinical’ décor, medical equipment, uniforms, computers, assistants. Similarly a certain manner of speaking style or use of language may enhance an intended image. An ‘idealised’ interview performance – constituted by recognisably co- operative behaviour – may be displayed by acting according to what a researcher would regard as a good informant, but by adhering to an idealised pattern, more difficult or contentious topics which extend beyond an ‘ideal’ view may be omitted.
The complexity of team interactions was accorded separate consideration in Goffman’s writing. Since each team member’s experience is contingent on colleagues and coherence of performance in public depends on joint performances, relations between team members determine internal balances and impressions conveyed outside the team. Effective induction of new team members, tactful dealing with public mis-performances, negotiation of internal decision-making – all may serve to create team cohesion built on loyalty and shared success. More difficulty is encountered when considering how far a team member will bend their own opinions or motivations to maintain a joint team performance; whether they can privately or perhaps jokingly object to the constraints of team-rules but in practice observe them – in a balancing act of maintaining face and not breaching team rules (Goffman, 1955, Goffman, 1967, Goffman, 1990).
Making sense through organisation of experiences according to a frame or multiple frameworks allowed Goffman to classify actions at different levels and to observe how they triggered culturally influenced responses (Goffman, 1986). Miller argued that Goffman tended to overstate impression-management aspects of everyday life – proposing instead that individuals were constantly gauging and responding to developing situations in a contrived but explicable manner; a concept of behavioural predictability bearing some resemblance to Bourdieu’s more settled habitus (Miller, 1986, Bourdieu, 1977). In contrast to Foucault’s focus on relations of power, Goffman’s observations produced representations
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of everyday life where agentic individuals controlled interactions including their adoption of deviant practices (Misztal, 2001). His emphasis on individuals and their interactions with others can be seen as a small-scale counterpart to large-scale systems prominent in Foucault’s writing (Hacking, 2004).
Applications of Goffman’s work encompass many fields including study of behind-the-scenes behaviour in operating theatre (Tanner and Timmons, 2000), analysis of the effects of using computers during medical consultations (Pearce et al., 2008, Pearce et al., 2009), study of employees’ behaviour when breaching accepted norms (Morgan and Krone, 2001), and as a frame for understanding organisational change (McCormick, 2007). With these diverse applications, his legacy has powerfully supported development of person-centred research (Treviño, 2003).
Drawing on these concepts, I proposed to investigate the lives of a group of clinicians recognising each as a subjective and objective individual who against background cultures and contexts would construct meaning and generate responses to the actions of others depending on the influences of prior experience (Bourdieu, 1977, Geertz, 1973, Geertz, 1983).