While applauding the increasing use of Q methodology (Q) as a research and policy tool, Wolf (2008/09) expresses concern about Q studies that fail to adequately account for the theory that underpins Q. Wolf’s concern is significant because Q methodology is a theory with distinct epistemological features. It is therefore appropriate to begin this chapter with an explication of Q as theory.
Q methodology provides for the “systematic study of subjectivity” (Brown, 1991, p.2) where subjectivity is defined as “an individual’s point of view” (McKeown & Thomas, 2013, p.ix) and “first person viewpoints” (Watts & Stenner, 2012, p.4). Q methodology is based on the premise that while subjectivity is unable to be proved in an empirical sense, it can “be shown to have structure and form” (Brown, 1980 p.6). William Stephenson (1902-1989), the founder of Q, describes Q as “ . . . a mathematical-statistical key to what everyone calls ‘mind’ . . . it fits where nothing has before” (Stephenson, 1993/94, p.1). Watts and Stenner (2012) describe Q as “making a science of the subjective” (p.30).
The term subjectivity used in relation to Q methodology has a distinct meaning which is different to its everyday usage, as described below. Stephenson was a physicist and psychologist (of the Behaviourism School). In this school, the concept of operant describes a type of behaviour with two distinct features: behaviour is produced naturally, rather than being caused by something else; and behaviour is defined by the relationship it establishes with, and its impact on the immediate environment (Watts, 2011). Drawing on this conceptual frame, Stephenson
describes subjectivity as operant in relation to the immediate environment (Watts, 2011). Such a definition rejects the notion of subjectivity being a phenomenological concept (Watts, 2011) or, expressed more colloquially, “mind stuff” (Watts &
Stenner, 2012, p.32), and confirms that a person’s subjectivity (viewpoint) only exists in relation to something or someone in their immediate environment.
Accordingly, a person’s subjectivity (viewpoint) is not static but may alter in relation to changes in or about the object or subject of the viewpoint (Watts, 2011). Another important characteristic of Stephenson’s subjectivity is that it is self-referent,
that is, subjectivity is the “internal frame of reference” of an individual towards something or someone (McKeown & Thomas, 2013, p.2) or “that which is mine” (Wolf, 2008/09, p.10).
A second important concept in Q methodology is concourse theory. Stephenson used the term concourse to describe “the volume of discussion about a topic” (Stephenson 1980, cited in McKeown & Thomas, 2013, p.3) or “common
knowledge” on a topic (Watts & Stenner, 2012, p.33). A concourse comprises words, pictures or objects about a topic, from the formal (such as academic papers) to the informal (such as cartoons), and other mediums such as music (Brown, 1991). Van Excel and de Graaf (2005) note that the terms concourse and discourse should not be confused. A concourse refers to relevant aspects of all of the discourses on a topic. Despite its centrality to Q, Watts and Stenner (2012) note that Stephenson’s discussion of concourse theory is variable, making it “a difficult concept to pin down” (p.34).
Epistemologically, Stephenson developed the conceptual frameworks for Q
methodology in two important ways. Firstly, he articulated and clarified the notion of operant subjectivity and secondly, he developed concourse theory, both of which are described above. His ideas of both subjectivity and concourse depended in part on his understanding of abduction. According to Brown (1980), Stephenson
viewed exploratory factor analysis used in Q (described in section 6.2) as “the technical or methodological extension of Peirce’s theory of abduction” (p.134). Unlike empirical research, Q does not start with the researcher’s “external frame of reference” (McKeown & Thomas, 2013, p.ix) as expressed in a research instrument such as a survey or interview guide. Rather, Q allows the person to express their viewpoint on the topic of interest according to statements representing the range of discourses on the topic. (This is discussed further in section 5.2). Writing about the use of Q to study political behaviour, Brown (1980) describes this feature in a descriptive manner: “[Q methodology] . . . takes a position on the frontier of behaviour, stripped of rating scales which carry their own meaning, and, shivering in the cold of uncertainty, tries to understand the political ramblings of the average citizen” (p.1).
More significantly, Stephenson rejected the dualism of “an objective natural world” (which can be scientifically investigated) and “a subjective human world” (outside of scientific enquiry) (Stenner, 2011, p.201). Stephenson (1953) asserted that “inner experience and behaviour are alike. Both are matters for objective
. . . study” (p. 4). This challenge to the dominant empirical paradigm of the 1950s resulted in Stephenson’s work being subjected to on-going criticism from his peers. This is reflected in Stephenson’s account of the reaction to his initial papers about Q which “no one was prepared to take seriously” (1953, p.339). Q methodology was made more “radical and challenging” (Stenner, 2011, p.196) as a result of Stephenson’s assertion that Q sits outside of quantitative and qualitative research paradigms (McKeown & Watts, 2013): “Stephenson proposed Q methodology . . . as a fully-fledged scientific enterprise, replete with a distinctive logic of enquiry that, taken in its entirety, is tantamount to a subjective science of paradigmatic proportions” (p.73).
While some authors of Q studies describe Q as mixed methods because it uses both qualitative and quantitative methods (for example, Newman & Ramlo, 2010; Ramlo, 2016), this is not supported by other Q authors. Stenner and Stainton Rogers (2004) emphasise Stephenson’s stance that Q stands outside of existing theoretical frameworks. These authors proposed a new term qualiquantology “to grasp the peculiarity hybrid qualities of Q methodology” (Stenner, 2011, p.192). Further, the claim that Q is a mixed method reinforces the object/subject dualism that Stephenson aimed to dispel (Stenner, 2011).
It is this paradigmatic challenge to the traditional dichotomy of quantitative (object) and qualitative (subject) that gives Q its unique epistemology which remains challenging and controversial (for example, Kampen & Tamas, 2014). According to Stenner (2011), becoming a Q convert involves a “high epistemic cost” (p.192). This is evidenced in Q researchers’ posts on the Q methodology Network reporting difficulties in getting their studies published in quantitative-focused journals. This is attributed to journal editors failing to understand Q’s distinctive epistemology despite its use of the quantitative methods of correlation and factor analysis (Ramlo, 2016). For those researchers who have become Q converts, Q offers an abductive approach to “capturing and understanding personal viewpoints and attitudes on a topic of interest, that is both versatile and novel” (Ramlo, 2016, p.28). Given its abductive feature, Q offers opportunities for new perspectives and insights that can be used for theory generation.