The year 1747 presented a watershed in Dutch political history when an economic crisis coincided with foreign military threat (Israel, 1998: 1067-1069; Randeraad & Wolffram, 1998: 37). In April 1747 a small French army entered the Generality province of State Flanders. While apparently only intended as a warning to the Estates General, the act was perceived as a full-scale invasion just like the one in 1672 and caused widespread unrest and fear (Israel, 1998: 796-806). To many the ‘invasion’ proved the failure of the ruling elite (the regents in the Estates General and the Holland cities) to govern and protect the Republic. Adding to the grievances was the old and corrupted system of private tax farming in the Republic. Large-scale protest against tax farming became intertwined with calls for administrative (Dekker, 1996; Israel, 1998: 1072-1075) and moral reform (see chapter six). The problems led to calls for the return to power of a strong leader, meaning the restoration of the Stadholder. The latter had been deposed of by the provinces and the Estates General during the so-called second Stadholderless period from 1702 to 1747 in which the Holland regents decided not to appoint a Stadholder. In 1747, however, strife between the Estates General, Holland and its regents on one side and the Stadholder and populace on the other erupted once again. This time the latter ‘faction’ won and William IV (1747 – 1751) became the hereditary Stadholder for all the provinces.
William immediately tightened his grip on administration. Formally he was now allowed to recommend even more people for offices (see chapter seven). This meant he had more power then his predecessors ever had. Informally, his now hereditary title also increased his standing and power. The advent of William IV and his Orangist followers also went hand in
hand with popular calls by the so-called Doelisten for administrative reform of the regent system, such as ending corrupt practices of office rotation and allowing wider participation in politics. In chapters five and six I will discuss this reform movement more elaborately. For now, however, it remains to be said that in reality none of the demands for reform of 1747 – 1751 were realized. It quickly became obvious to most contemporary observers that the promised reforms would not be pushed through (Israel, 1998: 1076-1078; Rogier, 1980: 203- 205; De Voogd, 1914: 79-80). Instead, the ‘Revolution’ of 1747 proved to be a ‘conservative’ victory for the Stadholder and his moderate Orangist followers (Schutte, 1978: 300) since it succeeded in concentrating power at the centre in the hands of the Stadholder. Some, like Willem Bentinck van Rhoon (1704 – 1774), the trusted advisor of the Prince (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 137-145), had wanted reform but this did not include actually transferring power to citizens, ‘the people’ or regents outside the oligarchies, contracts of correspondence or existing patronage networks (see chapters five and eight). Bentinck could see that all the necessary ingredients for ‘unity of command’ under a single leader were now present. For one, the city regents were intimidated by the populace and the Stadholder got more powers to appoint people and was as close to becoming a monarch as he would ever be. Bentinck’s attempts to create ‘ministries’ (defence, navy, trade, finances, internal and foreign affairs) led by a few capable and reliable persons and headed by the Prince, however, failed (Israel, 1998: 1077- 1080; Schama, 1977: 55; Schutte, 1978: 301-302). William IV thought the proposal was too revolutionary and his influential wife, Princess Anna of Hanover, did not trust Bentinck. As a result, only a limited number of regents were indeed deposed since William urged the Estates General only to get rid of regents when it was absolutely necessary to restore order in the cities.
Any chance of alternative actions by William IV disappeared when he died unexpect- edly in October 1751. Furthermore, opposition from a still powerful regent elite continued to frustrate any attempts at reform (Rogier, 1980: 203-205; De Voogd, 1914: 79-80; Wagenaar, 2004: 551-553). The Doelist Ockers, for instance, already lamented: “how are we better off now that the Prince is Stadholder? […] He has changed the government to his liking and everything else is wrong; his highness has not reinstated the burgher in his right” (De Voogd, 1914: 209). Such popular disillusionment and frustration – aggravated by economic decay – did not make much difference, at least in the short term. The death of William IV led to yet another shift in power relations in the Dutch Republic. On the one hand, the lack of a strong Stadholder led to the partial restoration of anti-Orangist regent dominance in the Republic’s cities and provinces. On the other hand Anna of Hanover, who had assumed much of the responsibility of the Stadholderate after her husband’s death, attempted to hold on to as much power as possible until her son, the heir to the Stadholderate, was old enough to assume power. Anna received help from Bentinck and, above all, from the infamous Duke of Brunswick (1718 – 1788). These men relied heavily on a culture of patronage and brokerage (see below and chapter seven) to keep as much control over offices, and thus power, as possible (Gabriëls, 1989: 68-69). This continued in the period between 1759 (the death of Anna) and 1766 (the coming of age of Stadholder William V). Still, the period following the death of William IV was a temporary return to the way things were before 1747 (Gabriëls, 1989: 71-72). As Orangists were still holding on to as much power as they could, the regents again rose to power. The period after the death of Anna can even be considered another Stadholderless period (Schutte, 1978: 313), or as a contemporary observer noted: “then we
could see the resurrection of the old regents. Once again they handed out offices and commis- sions among themselves, just like before” (Te Lintum, 1910: 118).