Tiempo promedio en la ejecución de los algoritmos

Principal-agent theory locates states and international organizations in specific interactive relationships, and identifies their roles in these relationships as principals and agents respectively. It provides a framework where the functions and structures of both states and international organizations are assessed based on the essential interaction between

the two: delegation. Since the principal-agent relationship is about states delegating authority to the international organizations with advanced authority, expertise and techniques (in certain issue areas) so that the latter can better accomplish tasks on behalf of the former, the eventual consequences of delegation are undoubtedly the focus in research. Moreover, principal-agent theory is a theoretical framework that focuses on the actors in international relations, yet it does not overlook the structural and social elements both inside institutions and in the general international political system. These structural and social elements play an important role in determining the specific relationship between a state and an international organization, and whether or not the international organization can successfully accomplish the tasks delegated from the state. Principal-agent theory thus could be used as a practical analytical tool to examine the relationship between a state and an international organization. Based upon the basic features of principal-agent theory and its actors introduced in the previous sections, I am going to propose a four-stage approach to analyzing the relationships between states (as principals) and international organizations (as agents).

First of all, identify the features of the actors. These features include the actors’

objectives, interests and structures. On top of that, it is important to locate the actors in the corresponding positions first, that is states as principals and international

organizations as agents.36 To be a principal, the state needs to have clear intentions, goals,

and preferences in a certain issue area. Hence, after the state measures its capability of achieving these objectives on its own and realizes it is not able to do so, it can choose to

36 _{However, international organizations can act like principals in some cases, when states need to fulfill}

either create a new agent or delegate to an existing agent. The state can create an agent alone, yet in most cases it creates an agent together with other states with similar objectives in the specific issue area. The state’s objectives may change over time. The state’s objectives are the primary driving force of delegation, so when we use principal- agent theory to analyze state-international organization relations, we ought to ensure the state’s dynamic objectives are correctly applied.

The structures of the actors, especially those of the agent, determine the form of delegation. As discussed earlier in the chapter, a state is often a member of the ‘collective principal’ of the international organization it participates in. Different states have different weights in the collective principal. The state’s weight among all members of collective principal significantly determines its decision making power in the international organization. The state’s weight is determined by both formal and informal governance rules of the international organization, which will be discussed later.

Agents’ interests also matter in principal-agent theory, and need to be clarified in the research. Despite the influence of its strongest member state(s), the international organization acts as an independent institution with unique interests and rules for practices. Agents’ interests are decided by the objectives of each international organization that are developed from its unique founding principles. They are also greatly influenced by the staff’s working principles that are developed from their education background and working experience. Nevertheless, although international organizations’ interests are independent from those of their member states, they are under strong

influence of their strongest member(s)’ preferences, especially if the strongest member(s) are also the founding state(s) of the international organization. The international organization’s interests, and mostly the staff’s interests in some cases, greatly decide the agent’s capability to accomplish the tasks delegated from states.

Secondly, analyze the agent’s functions and the principal’s consequential delegation

decisions. It has been stated earlier in the chapter that an international organization’s functions are the most fundamental reasons that lead the state to delegate certain tasks to the organization. Hence in order to assess a state’s delegation decisions toward an international organization, we need to initially look into the organization’s specified functions. The main functions of international organizations that distinguish them from any state and sub-state level institutions were discussed earlier in the chapter. They include outstanding expertise, political skills, and resources to perform the tasks; agenda- setting power to induce an ‘equilibrium’ among states on controversial issues; capability to govern decision-making in situations where the contract is not explicit; capability to solve time-inconsistency problem; and capability to ‘lock-in’ the validity of the political winner’s advocated policies.

These functions are enabled and supported by international organizations’ superior authority, competence, and legitimacy. However, not all the international organizations have an equal strength as the mentioned functions. Hence, in order to assess the state’s decisions on delegation, we need to look into each of the functions the international organization has. Based on the strength of each function, the state makes the decision on

delegation accordingly. A state often expects an international organization to solve multiple tasks due to its multiple functions; and the relationship between a specific function of the international organization and delegation decision on a single task made by the state needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Thirdly, evaluate the conceivable factors of the state’s delegation actions. The

consequences of delegation largely depend on the state’s delegation actions, including the degree to which authority is granted and the extent to which staff autonomy is tolerated. A state’s delegation actions are crucial especially when the international organization has more than one principal. Before we assess the consequences of delegation, we should evaluate the conceivable factors of states’ delegation actions. One important influential factor of states’ delegation actions is the state’s preferences. The state’s preferences compared to those of the international organization determine whether the interactions between the two will be smooth and productive. In the case of a collective principal, a state’s relative preferences compared to those of other members can significantly influence the state’s delegation actions. For example, Martin explained the influence of actors’ preferences on agency autonomy in the context of evolution of IMF conditionality. She made four hypotheses to test how actors’ preferences shape states’ delegation actions in the IMF. She concluded that the closer a state’s preferences are to those of the Fund’s, the more likely the state will tolerate staff autonomy. (Martin 2006)

The other important factor of states’ delegation actions is the organization’s governance rules. Governance rules decide a state’s decision-making power in the international

organization. Governance rules vary among international organizations. Some international organizations have their policy decisions made mostly based on formal governance rules (for example, voting rules and election rules), some based on informal governance rules (for example, an informal forum outside the international organization’s formal governing mechanism), and some are mixed. The state’s aggregate decision- making power- derived from the mixture of formal and informal governance rules- determines the extent to which the international organization’s final policy practice converges with the state’s decision. The state’s influence among international organization staff, especially when the staff are granted a large degree of autonomy, also contributes to the state’s decision-making power in the organization. These two factors of state delegation actions – consistency of preferences and international organizations’ governance rules- greatly contribute to the assessment of delegation consequences.

Finally, assess the consequences of delegation. The purpose of delegation- that is letting the international organization accomplish the tasks that could not be done effectively by the state on its own- has already been emphasized as the fundamental driving force of the whole principal-agent interactions. Hence, it naturally leads the principal-agent approach to its final analytical stage, also an important goal of the approach- assessing whether or not the consequences of delegation have fulfilled the state’s objectives. If the international organization accomplishes the tasks as the state expected, we say the agent has generated satisfactory delegation consequences, which may lead to re-delegation. If the international organization failed the tasks or did not fulfil them as the state expected,

we say the agent has generated undesired delegation consequences, which may lead to de-delegation.

International organization staff’s actions that lead to undesired delegation consequences are defined as agency slack. Agency slack happens quite often, as it could be caused by multiple reasons, for instance, the staffing rules of the international organization do not reflect the state’s interests; the international organization’s governance rules reduce the state’s decision making power among all collective principals; the state’s preferences deviate from those of the international organization; the international organization’s resources are inadequate to solve the tasks delegated from the state; and so on.

However, agency slack could be avoided, or at least reduced to some extent. One key to avoid or reduce agency slack is to use effective principal control mechanisms, such as screening and appointment processes, control of the budget, clear rules, and sanctions through rewriting the delegation contract. (Alter 2006) Yet controlling mechanisms can be costly, plus the principal could be too reliant on the agent’s expertise, and thus the principal may decide to continue delegation while knowing agency slack is happening. Assessment of delegation consequences is a crucial step in principal-agent theory used as an analytical tool, because it explains the state’s decisions toward the international organization: to re-delegate or to de-delegate. Such delegation decisions reveal the essence of the relationship between a state and an international organization, and show the prospects of the actors’ roles in the related issue area.

When principal-agent theory is applied to analyze the relationship between states and international organizations, the actual approaches vary due to the specific features of actors and their interactions, yet they ought to mostly follow the four stages suggested above. I will use this approach to analyze the relationship between China (as principal) and the IMF (as agent) in the next three chapters. It provides an suitable framework where China’s objectives that led it to the IMF, together with the unique interactions between China and the IMF that are affected by their preferences, functions and structures will be discussed. Eventually, I intend to assess the extent to which the IMF performs as a diligent agent that assists China to achieve its objectives. Before that, in the next section, I will briefly explain why principal-agent theory is suitable for analyzing the relationship between China and the IMF, and how I will do it.