Tipo de investigación

This study broadly follows the ICA framework (Feiock 2013) to explore the Australian federal government’s accountability expectations due to the collective action required by multiple LGAs and their service providers in different jurisdictions to provide national waste data (Bel, Fageda & Mur 2014).

The ICA framework is underpinned by a number of research traditions and theoretical approaches that may explain the behaviour of parties to the outsourcing relationships which result in collective action networks (Feiock 2013). TCE, as one of these theoretical foundations, is often used in research approaches designed to explain the behaviour of public organisations. TCE is specifically relevant to the outsourcing of waste management services due to the high asset specificity and measurement problems related to waste management services, which increase supplier hold-up risk and transaction costs (Williamson 1981, 1987, 1993, 1999).

LGAs and their service providers’ responses to policy interventions are not just informed by market pricing principles (Farneti & Guthrie 2009; Ghoshal & Moran 1996). The principles underlining TCE are only used in this study to assist in developing an understanding of how the outsourcing of difficult-to-measure waste management services which require highly specified assets lead to collaborative outsourcing practices, which can impact negatively on

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the federal government’s accountability expectations, rather than providing the main theoretical framework for the thesis.

The ICA framework also incorporates agency theory, which is often used in studies of accounting and accountability (Brennan & Solomon 2008). Agency theory is specifically relevant to this study because potential accountability problems may arise in those instances where service providers to LGAs act in their own commercial best interests and do not disclose sufficient information to establish adequate accountability relationships. Senior and middle managers of LGAs may similarly be conflicted in providing waste data that may impact on their job security, status or social standing (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; Jensen & Meckling 1976; LeRoux & Pandey 2011). Agency theory is used in this study to develop an understanding of how incongruent goals of principals and agents may impact on government’s accountability expectations, rather than serving as the main theoretical approach.

The ICA framework is considered the most suitable approach for this research as it provides a comprehensive means of (i) determining the scale and nature of the potential accountability problem of poor waste data flow between federal, state and local government; (ii) determining the response preferences to the accountability expectations of the federal government for improved waste data collection systems by LGAs and their service providers which impacts across jurisdictions and organisations; and (iii) determining what best-practice outsourcing mechanisms are available to LGAs to respond to the accountability expectations of the federal government when engaging in waste management outsourcing practices (Feiock 2013).

3.3.1 Scale and nature of the accountability relationship

Lindberg (2013) argues that an accountability relationship can only exist if there are clear and measurable criteria or standards of what is considered acceptable or accountable behaviour and the principal has a factual and enforceable right to information or a demand for explanation of actions and behaviours.

This study follows Lindberg’s (2013) approach by exploring whether the federal government’s accountability expectation of more and improved waste data is factual and enforceable by offering a critique of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan and the Tasmanian Waste Strategy in Chapter 5. It also considers Ball, Broadbent & Moore’s (2002)

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arguments that a central-local government accountable relationship must be based on a clear understanding of what constitutes acceptable or accountable standards of management through application of appropriate performance measures.

There is a further accountability expectation from the Australian federal government that the improvements in waste management systems which include data collection must take place through collaboration across jurisdictions, between governments at all levels and across organisational boundaries, such as between LGAs and their service providers (EPHC 2010a, p. 9). The critique of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan and the Tasmanian Waste Strategy in Chapter 5 also considers whether appropriate performance measures are adequately communicated to LGAs and their service providers on how to improve on waste data collection and collection systems. Whether performance measures are adopted by LGAs is also explored by performing a textual analysis of LGA corporate plans to determine whether they may assist in delivering on the federal government’s accountability expectations. The findings in Chapter 5 are supplemented with interviews in respect of those areas of accountability concerns that warrant further investigation in Chapter 7.

3.3.2 Response preferences by LGAs to the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan Ball, Broadbent & Moore (2002) note that local government managers have a spectrum of possible responses to centrally imposed policy interventions, that is, a narrow reactive approach to demonstrate improvement at the one end or adopting a longer-term systems approach by following a business excellence model at the other end.

Policy interventions, such as directives to engage in collaborative outsourcing initiatives, can illicit different response preferences from different LGAs. For example, smaller LGAs may prefer to assign the collection of waste data to service providers through relational contracting, while metropolitan LGAs may prefer to collect the data by engaging in arm’s- length contracting (Bertelli & Smith 2010; Desrieux, Chong & Saussier 2013). The theory of incomplete contracts discussed in Chapter 2 is used to develop an understanding of the natural response preferences to contracting in Chapter 6.

To explore the different response preferences to the accountability expectations which impact across organisational boundaries, this study follows Burritt’s (2012) suggested research approach which posits that an improved understanding of the impact of pre-determined public

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policy can be developed by exploring how information is managed across accountability boundaries (Burritt 2012).

The reasons why LGAs outsource waste management services in the normal course of business is explored in Chapter 6 through a textual analysis of LGA corporate plans to develop an understanding of the possible effects existing outsourcing relationships might have for the accountability expectations of the federal government.

The findings in Chapter 6 are supplemented with interviews in respect of those areas of accountability concerns that warrant further investigation in Chapter 7.

3.3.3 Mechanisms available to LGAs to respond to the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan

The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan directs the establishment of best-practise waste management networks for remote communities (EPHC 2010a, p. 19). The study accordingly explores best-practise mechanisms available to LGAs to guide the governance of outsourcing initiatives by considering the governance dimensions inherent in the best-practise outsourcing frameworks available in the management literature.

The governance dimensions from the Vagadia (2012) framework discussed in Chapter 2 are identified as best-practise mechanisms by which principals can hold agents accountable in contractual environments, the mechanisms being (i) alignment of goals and objectives within organisations, between parties to the outsourcing arrangements and with stakeholder values; (ii) communication; (iii) contract management; and (iv) managing and monitoring of relationships (Vagadia 2012).

The application by LGAs of these governance dimensions in their waste management outsourcing practices and possible constraints to application are considered by performing a textual analysis of corporate plans in Chapter 6, supplemented by interviews regarding areas of accountability concerns in Chapter 7.