Tipos de acervos de la sociedad o colectividad y/o comunidad de gananciales

m ak e i t r ig ht : Ending the Crisis in Girls’ E ducation

The direct and indirect costs of schooling have the largest influence on initial decisions to enroll in school. As highlighted above, the direct costs of schooling include school fees, materials, transportation, uniforms and school meals; these all increase when public expenditure is limited by the wider economic policy environment. Examples of indirect costs include forgone wages from labor, loss of domestic assistance for the family, safety of travel to school, and access to appropriate school sanitation. The unpaid care economy is closely related to the indirect costs of schooling and therefore is affected by similar policies. Increases in education and development expenditure provide the most direct path to decreasing these opportunity and direct costs. These costs are compensated for by increased public expenditures, with the top performing countries for girls’ education mitigating the direct and indirect costs of girls' education through adoption of the following policies:

■

Tanzania increased development expenditure by 8% and education expenditure by 16% in the first year of its budget cycle.

■

Bangladesh increased development expenditure by 28.8% and education by 86.6%, with the goal of achieving 5% of GDP.

■

Ecuador increased overall expenditure by 3.1% in the first year of its budget cycle, increased capital expenditure by 13.6% and increased teacher wages by 4%.

In addition to development expenditure, policies that improve health care, improve the availability of water, increase access and efficiency of energy and provide a larger social safety net all reduce this burden and increase the likelihood of girls attending school.

Wider economic policy can also create disincentives to educating girls. Current and future job opportunities for women speak to the state of the unpaid care economy and the rewards of education. When current opportunities are minimal or employment in sectors dominated by women is reduced, options to generate value outside of the unpaid care economy contract and pressure to participate in it elevate. Once again, girls are often chosen as the resource for this domestic assistance. If the long-term reward is not enough to outweigh the current benefit of assisting at home or getting a job, girls will be less likely to initiate and advance their education. The public sector wage bill and constraints on deficit spending are the policies having greatest impact on opportunity costs of this nature. Women who participate in the formal economy tend to be clustered in public positions. Wage bills that freeze or reduce wages of public employees and policies reducing deficit spending resulting in fewer resources for the public sector, decrease current and future job opportunities for women disproportionately.

■

It is telling that all top and medium performers are increasing wages and/or have ascending wage bills.

■

Among the weak and failing performers, only Haiti increased wages (by 8.1% first year, although the wage bill is capped at 5% of GDP); the rest are cutting wages or have descending wage bills.

Credit availability for women provides them with an additional resource that strengthens the family and increases the likelihood of girls attending school. Women obtaining financial resources are more likely to invest them in family well-being, including sending their children to school.

Policies that impact the credit availability of women include microfinance initiatives, the loosening of lending practice and the acceptance of multiple forms of collateral. Land rights and succession laws can also have a strong impact on credit availability as women obtain proof of land ownership which is often needed for collateral. Top performers uniformly have policies easing credit availability:

■

Tanzania established a Land Act in 2003 which allows use of land as collateral.

■

Bangladesh implemented a program of collateral-free loans.

■

Ecuador passed a national law capping financial intermediation spreads and eliminating loan fees. Finally the level of economic instability can impact the opportunity costs of education indirectly through the unpaid care economy. Economic instability makes a country more susceptible to economic shocks — during times of economic turmoil, responsibility is shifted from the state to the unpaid care economy. As cuts to public spending occur, the unpaid care economy is overburdened and girls are used as a resource to meet the needs of the community.

Having an exchange rate that is either freely floating or strongly pegged without a monetary intervention policy eliminates a country’s ability to smooth sudden detrimental changes in the international economy. In addition,

overreliance on an export sector makes a country more vulnerable to price shocks. This risk can be compounded when the export is a natural resource that has an intrinsically diminishing value. For example, reliance on cotton is

concerning. Eventually, the spread of cotton production will reach land that is not ideal for its cultivation. As reliance on the industry forces production to stretch into this land, the return per unit diminishes.

This broad problem can help to explain the poor standing of some of the weaker performers in girls’ education, each of which is characterized by one or more aspects of strong economic instability:

■

Afghanistan is failing to deliver education to its girls, afflicted by both conflict and strong negative social attitudes towards females.

■

Chad is over-dependent on its oil sector, which accounts for 83% of exports. While this generated a 1260% increase in revenues since 2004, the increase in education is solely 4.7%. Clearly the oil wealth flowed elsewhere.

■

Haiti has long suffered from what policy makers refer to as ‘democratic deficit‘ (absence of good governance), which results in fiscal and institutional responsibility being shifted to the general population.

m ak e it r ig ht : Ending

In document El régimen patrimonial de separación de bienes y la naturaleza jurídica del matrimonio, Arequipa 2017 (página 53-57)