TIPOS DE DATOS Definición:

For many theorists, the act of apology plays a defining role within restorative justice practice.1 _{In a broader sense, it has also proved to be a vital ingredient in a number of}

commissions investigating human rights abuses and internal conflicts. The apology act, combined with values such as acknowledgement, truth telling and commemoration, has been said to have represented a key component in the investigation and management of Indigenous human rights abuses in various jurisdictions around the world, including Canada, Australia and South Africa.2 _{Within the criminal justice arena, Tavuchis argues}

that an apology on the part of an offender can be viewed as a social gesture of symbolic importance, one that serves to constitute ‘a tacit acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the violated rule or social norm; an admission of full fault and responsibility; and an expression of regret for having caused the harm in question’.3 _{It has been further argued}

that an apology can serve to reinforce one of the main components of a restorative justice system, that of ‘amends’.4 _{Similarly, Doak has noted the potential of the apology}

act within restorative justice models. The apology can represent one of a number of potential ‘keys’ which can ultimately unlock the therapeutic potential of restorative justice practice,5 _{while for Braithwaite, the restorative apology, along with true remorse,}

can be viewed as ‘the most powerful form of censure as [it] is offered by the person with

1 _{Christopher Bennett, The Apology Ritual (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Hennessey}

Hayes, ‘Apologies and Accounts in Youth Justice Conferencing: Reinterpreting Research Outcomes’ (2006) 9 Contemporary Justice Review 369; Carrie J. Petrucci, ‘Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting: Evidence for Including Apology as an Additional Component in the Legal System’ (2002) 20 Behavioural Sciences

and the Law 337.

2 _{Chris Cuneen, ‘Reparations and Restorative Justice: Responding to the Gross Violation of Human Rights’}

in Heather Strang and John Braithwaite (eds.), Restorative Justice and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 86-88.

3_{Nicholas Tavuchis, ‘Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation. (Stanford: Stanford University}

Press, 1991) - cited in Jonathan Doak, ‘Honing the Stone: Refining Restorative Justice as a Vehicle for Emotional Redress’ (2011), 14 Contemporary Justice Review 439, 445.

4 _{Daniel Van Ness, ‘The Shape of Things to Come: A Framework for Thinking about a Restorative Justice}

System’ in Elmar G.M. Weitekamp and Hans-Jürgen Kerner (eds.), Restorative Justice: Theoretical

Foundations (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2002) 4. Here Van Ness argues that a genuine apology is an

‘acknowledgement of wrongdoing and places the offender in the powerless position of waiting to find out whether the victim will accept that apology’.

5 _{Jonathan Doak, ‘Honing the Stone: Refining Restorative Justice as a Vehicle for Emotional Redress’}

(2011), 14 Contemporary Justice Review, 439, see especially 444-447 for a discussion on the benefits and problems of apology acts within restorative models. Doak has listed the other ‘keys’ within a restorative programme as ‘personal narratives, forgiveness and procedural justice’.

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the strongest reasons for refusing to vindicate the victim by censuring the injustice’.6

Indeed, it has been further argued that a successfully accomplished apology can contain ‘almost miraculous qualities’ in that it manages to ‘undo what has [already] been done’.7

That is to say, although the crime has already taken place a successful apology can help to repair the harm in such a way that a victim is almost brought back to the position he was in before the offence took place.

Theoretically, therefore, support for the positive potential of the apology act is clear. It can also serve to represent a number of important aims as part of a restorative based justice outcome. Tavuchis has suggested three functions of a successful apology. A successful apology act will confirm

‘what is believed to be true, suggests the need for compensation, and clarifies who is to blame… In the legal setting, if an apology is offered merely as a legal requirement (for instrumental means), and not as a meaningful interaction (for moral purposes), it will have no worth or value, because it will not contain these three important elements’.8

The apology, then, can represent another means of making up for the harm caused other than through the more conventional route of material compensation.9 _{Such an act can}

extend further by ‘disarming threats to relationships’.10 _{As will be further discussed}

6 _{John Braithwaite, ‘Setting Standards for Restorative Justice’, (2002) 42 British Journal of Criminology,}

563, 571.

7 _{Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation. (Stanford: Stanford University}

Press, 1991) 5-6 - cited in Anthony. E. Bottoms, ‘Some Sociological Reflections on Restorative Justice’, in Andrew von Hirsch, Julian V. Roberts, Anthony E. Bottoms, Kent Roach and Mara Schiff (eds.), Restorative

Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 94-95.

8 _{Carrie J. Petrucci (2002) ‘Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting: Evidence for Including Apology as an}

Additional Component in the Legal System’ 20 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 337, 342. See also Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

9 _{Annalise Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice (Canada, UBC Press, 2004) 21.} 10 _{Linda Radzik, Making Amends. Atonement in Morality, Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,}

2009) 95. See also Christopher Bennett, The Apology Ritual (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 112.

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throughout this chapter, this ‘relational’ theme was evident within a number of panel observations. Panel members were frequently seen to highlight the wide ranging extent of the harm caused by including family members and friends, as well as direct victims themselves, within reparation apology practice. In a similar vein to the ‘moral’ purpose of apologies as offered by Tavuchis, Duff argues that the apology within the criminal justice setting should represent the central component to the principle of ‘moral reparation’.11 _{Such ‘moral reparation’ can increase an offender’s understanding that he}

has harmed another and needs to repent, that he has disowned the criminal behaviour, has committed to avoid doing wrong in the future and desires forgiveness and reconciliation with the person who has been wronged.12 _{Outlining the various}

definitions of the restorative apology, and its purpose within restorative justice processes generally, can help to engender a fuller consideration of the specific role of the apology act and its restorative value within Irish reparation panel practice.

The following section outlines the theoretical ground rules for successfully realising an ‘ideal apology’ act within restorative practice and how this ‘ideal’ blueprint can be seen to clash in a number of fundamental ways with the practical hurdles faced by reparation panellists when managing apologies within contract agreements. Because of these fundamental differences, a number of questions need to be addressed as to whether an apology within the Irish reparation model can be recognised as fundamentally restorative, or whether it merely represents a ‘box ticking’, instrumental legal requirement within the reparation contract as a whole.

11 _{Anthony Duff, ‘Punishment, Retribution and Communication’ in Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth}

and Julian Roberts (eds.), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 129.

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3.3 Reparation Practice and the ‘Ideal’ Apology: Theoretical Nirvana versus Practical