Tipos de herramientas tecnológicas

THE PROBLEM

Atfirst sight, it appears a simple task to comprehend the religious history of Rome and the Roman Empire. Looking back at that period, we normally differentiate between Christianity, Judaism, and ‘the rest’. We are accustomed to distinguishing between different ‘reli-gions’, but find it difficult to characterize ‘the rest’ more precisely. We frequently talk of‘polytheism’ in this connection, although the term itself reflects the perceptions of people who see themselves as mono-theists. It isfirst found in the writings of the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria.¹But the individuals we describe as‘polytheists’ would in turn, and in common with Jews, distinguish themselves from Christian thinkers, whom they regarded as ‘atheists’. The task of distinguishing between different religions entails a further problem:

how to draw the boundaries? How would we classify an individual who prays to different deities, either in the course of his life or within the same week? Do Episcopalians, Mormons, and the Children of God, or Sunnis, Shiites, and Baha’is belong to different religions? To address these difficulties, religious scholarship has developed a ter-minology of‘cults’ and ‘belief communities’: the very choice of terms implying normative assertions of inclusion and exclusion. Scholars have held the view that it was Christianity (in the singular), with its emphasis on belief, and its desire to exclude ‘heretics’ that, in the course of time, created‘religion’ as something distinct from social life, and became accustomed to using the plural‘religions’ to refer to the multitude of‘illegitimate’ forms. Might the religious conflicts within the Roman Empire be explained in this way?

In this chapter I should like to show that the development of the conception of a plurality of religions signified a greater change within ancient concepts, a change to which Christian thinkers contributed only partially. In the following I shall concentrate on this change, and will therefore refrain from describing religious practices, ideas, and structures that existed prior to and alongside Jewish synagogues and Christian churches, and which are discussed in many hand-books.²In any event, in delineating such theoretical conceptions by means of an analysis of the developmental history of various (Latin) terms, I shall have regard for the actual variety of religious practices as a background to developments at an intellectual level.

TERMS AND C ONCEPTS—RELIGIO: CICERO The concept‘religion’ appears at first sight to have enjoyed historical continuity; but it is not identical to the conceptions comprised in the Latin word religio.³In order to investigate the terminological differ-ences, I shall in the following analyse the meaning, and, where it seems necessary, the history of the meanings of various expressions that fall within our conception of religion. My investigation will concentrate on Latin texts, because it is in those texts that are to be found the most important lines of thinking that largely defined political, legal, and religious activities in the Roman Empire.

Of all words that may signify something like ‘religion’, religio is clearly the one with the most momentous history. The word (and its derivative religiosus) is attested since Plautus, thus from the early second centurybce onwards,⁴and plainly implies something that we would describe as religious language. Its semantic spectrum extends from a direct reference to a deity to a rather more general kind of religious reflection. The term occurs frequently in Cicero, in the speeches as well as the philosophical texts. It appears with striking frequency in the speeches against Verres, administrator of the province of Sicily, collector of statues, and, in Cicero’s view, unscrupulous offender against the rights of property both human and divine. The term and its derived adjective are used more than 100 times in those texts. The much shorter speeches On His House and On the Response of the Haruspices contain between 50 and 60 instances; the term occurs with similar frequency in the philosophical treatises On the Nature of

the Gods and On the Laws, whose second book concentrates on what we would call religion. The selection of works of itself demonstrates the terminological link between religio and our concept of religion.

But distinctions are important. As Ernst Feil has shown in his multi-volume history of the term,⁵religio in Cicero certainly by no means corresponds to our own umbrella concept. But Feil’s analysis, which primarily uses On the Nature of the Gods, does not take into account the fact that Cicero’s use of the term in this dialogue, and therefore in the mouths of different speakers, is tactical; it forms part of the prosopoieia, the characterization of the protagonists. The triad pietas, sanctitas, religio, which appears to juxtapose piety and dealings with the gods, is therefore only part of the introductory section.⁶As is shown by the academician protagonist Cotta’s translation of the title of Epicurus’ treatise Peri osiotetos as De sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos,⁷ sanctitas as ‘knowledge of the worship of the gods’⁸ is an attempt to translate a Greek conception. While, in the introductory section, sanctitas is used in questions and very general statements,⁹ Cotta doubts the possibility of such ‘knowledge’ in the context of Epicurean thinking. When the Stoic Balbus speaks generally of the increase in deorum cultus religionumque sanctitates,¹⁰ and shortly thereafter defines religio as ‘the cult of the gods’,¹¹he appears to be indicating two distinct ideas. Cicero as author plainly identifies the former, vague statement as unclear, thus diminishing it. The connec-tion between pietas and religio appears relatively easy to explain. The first term describes a relationship to a superior being, human or divine. Religio is then the particular corollary in the case of the divine:

the cult. The existence of the gods is therefore a prerequisite for any piety or religious sentiment towards them.¹²

Despite its initial appearance in the context of the triad religio-pietas-sanctitas, religio nevertheless emerges as the central concept. It is, however, only in the introductory and concluding parts of the argument that it occurs frequently, and its use is unequally distrib-uted among the individual participants in the discussion. The Epi-curean Velleius never uses religio. Apart from the passage already cited, and a rejection of superstitio as the opposite of religio, the Stoic Lucius Balbus mentions the term only in a few instances where he speaks of regard for public omens.¹³It is the academician and pon-tifex Cotta who uses the expression religio most frequently, in both the singular and the plural form. Religiones, in the plural, is juxta-posed with caerimoniae (1.161), sacra, and caerimonia (3.5), in the

first instance being more precisely defined as ‘public’. It is the pontiffs’

function to protect such public manifestations of the concept. In a section where the singular form of the term dominates, the juxtapos-ition is amplified by means of a hierarchy of concepts: omnis populi Romani religio in sacra et in auspicia divisa sit, tertium adiunctum sit, si quid praedictionis causa ex portentis et monstris Sibyllae interpretes haruspicesve monuerunt (‘the entire cult of the Roman people is div-ided between sacrifices and the interpretation of bird flight, with a third category arising in certain instances when the custodians of the Sibyl-line Books or the readers of entrails provide a prophecy in reaction to unusual events or unnatural phenomena’).¹⁴ Religio is not a vague sentiment (for which Cotta criticizes his opponents), or a‘groundless fear’, like superstitio,¹⁵but something that arises from acceptance of the gods as part of the social order; it is a human predisposition, a habit thatfinds its expression in appropriate rituals (cultus deorum).¹⁶It is therefore contingent on the existence of gods,¹⁷and the uncontrolled proliferation of gods would pose a danger.¹⁸

I have one final, critical observation concerning Cotta and his academic standpoint. In the exchange preceding his wordy refutation of the Stoic position, he gives further precision to his definition cited above, asserting that it represents the view of the pontifex; he adds:

‘From you, the philosopher, therefore, I must hear a compelling argument for belief in the gods (rationem. . . religionis); to our fore-fathers on the other hand I must give credence, even if they fail to justify their arguments’.¹⁹ Religio represents a social reality of the highest importance for the stability of the community,²⁰but it is not an argument, and cannot be introduced as such into philosophical discourse.²¹Religio, rather, has to be tempered by ratio; and this is precisely the purpose of the entire work, as the author declares in the very introduction of the first book: quaestio . . . de natura deorum, quae et ad cognitionem animi pulcherrima est et ad moderandam religionem necessaria (‘Inquiry into the nature of the gods aids su-premely in our knowledge of our souls, and is indispensible to just measure in worship of the gods’).²² This is the philosophical pro-gramme, repeated by Cicero in his appended treatise On Divination.²³ In a hierarchy in descending order of general validity, he lists mos, religio, disciplina, ius augurium, collegii auctoritas (‘tradition, reli-gion, instruction, augural law, and collegiate authority’).²⁴

The singular and plural forms used by Cicero do not correspond to our conception of religion and religions. In the singular, religion is a

necessary, logical consequence of any theism. Itfinds expression in different religions (in the plural), but such expression is accompanied by restriction. It is possible to argue about theism, as it represents a theoretical problem and standpoint, but not about religio. Religiones, on the other hand, can be assessed by social standards of legitimacy and sound human understanding: for example, as to whether a particular religio actually relates to a deity. In his earlier fictional exercise in legislation, his books On Laws, Cicero had dealt with this problem by restricting cults strictly to the public and familiar, with new or foreign cults being allowed legal entry into the local system only by public decision.²⁵It is worth noting that Cicero had already dealt with the problem of religious separatism in the second clause of his religious laws (separatim nemo habessit deos neve novos neve advenas—‘nobody should follow new or foreign cults on his own account’). His attempt to list the gods, conceived of either as heavenly beings or as earthly beings deified on the grounds of merit or praise-worthy virtues, points at every turn to the problems in terms of public acceptance and legitimacy that arise from such a precise definition.²⁶ In On the Nature of the Gods, Cotta reacts to this problem with a strict reference back to traditional practice, invoking Numa (3.43), and a reductio ad absurdum of all historical, mythological, or similar think-ing. To summarize his long argument, based on the countless gods already worshipped in practice: if all those are gods who are known to possess altars in Greece (3.46), would the lack of any known cult be an argument against other candidates (3.45)?

We will shortly pursue further the practical problems entailed by these‘solutions’ to the interpretation of religious plurality. For the moment, however, in order to enlarge our field of inquiry beyond Cicero, and before examining authors from the third century on-wards, we must remain with the history of the term religio and its various plural forms. Cicero’s use of the term remained representative of Roman thinking until the beginning of the second centuryce. Of course, different religions spoke to different deities; but such a one-to-one relationship was not the rule. Religione-to-ones might multiply; different religious conceptions and resulting differences in religious practice might be directed at one and the same god, and pursued by the same individuals at the same time, or by different individuals. Tacitus’

expression religione Herculis (‘the religion of Hercules’),²⁷suggesting a direct connection, is thus relatively unusual. When the same writer, in a section on behaviour in war, maintains that the religio Veneris of

the Aphrodisians and the religio Iovis et Triviae of the inhabitants of Stratonice had been retained (3.62), he is modifying the conception of religio, and pointing to a different level of pluralization. Just as the Romans had their public religio (in the singular), so others had theirs,²⁸and these could be compared to one another.²⁹In this connec-tion it is important to note that, in his speech relating to that compari-son, Cicero does not use the plural form: ‘Every community has its religion, Laelius, and we have ours’ (sua cuique civitati religio, Laeli, est, nostra nobis).³⁰In the speech on behalf of Flaccus this is an affirmation, a confirmation of radical differences, but it does not suggest a possible choice, or the possibility of meaningful coexistence. As in On the Nature of the Gods, religio here includes the idea of a generality; but it is a local generality, and justifies our talk of ‘Roman’ and ‘Athenian’ religion;

I will not address here the problems indicated by the recently coined expression ‘religions of Rome’.³¹ It is in any event safe to say that Cicero’s ‘we’ and ‘our’ do not reflect the complex composition of the Roman population; this was already the case in his time.³²

RELIGIO IN TEXTS OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH CENTURIES

Religio does not play a significant role in the majority of later texts.³³ This is as true of the Christian Apologists as it is of the fourth-century statutes. Minucius Felix of Cirta, who wrote in the 240s,³⁴ was an attentive reader of Cicero, and in his dialogue Octavius both partici-pants (the Sceptic and the Christian) use the term religio in the very last sentences of their speeches, pairing it, respectively, with super-stitio and pietas (13.5; 38.7). For the Christian it is a matter of vera religio,‘true religion’ (also in 1.5), not merely another religion. In the main text the term is always found in the context of ritual. This is also true of its more frequent use in the speech of the future Christian Octavius (6.2; 7.1; 9.1; 10.1), and of the two mentions of nostra religio in the Christian’s reply in the same dialogue (29.2; 38.1).

Use of the term in texts by Tertullian, writing earlier than Minu-cius, essentially conforms to the conventions already described above.³⁵ Religio is grounded in the knowledge of God or the gods, and leads to greatly differing forms of religious practice. Tertullian

maintains that freedom of religio consists in choice of deity (24.6;

optio divinitatis; 25); true religio is the cult of the one true God;³⁶a few sentences later he describes Roman religio as Romanae reli-giones.³⁷ Outside the usage vera religio, it was immaterial whether the term was in the singular or the plural.

Following Tertullian in the early fourth century, Lactantius goes further than him. The term religio may not be central to his argu-ments, but it is useful to him, and occurs frequently in some texts. We may usefully begin with the few mentions in his treatise On the Deaths of the Persecutors, written in about 313/316. Nero instigated thefirst persecutions when he observed that ‘many, condemning the ancients, have gone over from the cult of idols to a new religion’

(ubique cotidie magnam multitudinem deficere a cultu idolorum et ad religionem novam damnata vetusta transire—2.5). Here as elsewhere, religio means Christianity (11.3 and 7); in the same section, Lactan-tius describes Christians as‘enemies of the public cults’ (religionum publicarum—11.6). The term’s frequent use in his earlier books on divine institutions provides the key: religio is usually linked with cults and gods; it is the cult grounded in acceptance of the deity to which the specific cult is addressed. It is the declared aim of the second book of this work to demonstrate that religion addressed to false gods, people, or idols is‘futile’. At the basis of this view is the notion of a direct relationship, which is why the plural is used for the‘religions of the gods’ (2.17.6). Roman religion is usually designated proprias Romanorum religiones, in contrast to religiones communes (‘com-monly held religions’; 1.20.1). Here is the basis of Lactantius’ cele-brated redefinition of religion: ‘We are linked to God by a band of piety, and bound (religati) to him, and it is from this that religion took its meaning’ (4.28.3). Religio and superstitio are thus to be distin-guished only according to the deity to which they are addressed (4.28.11). Christians are bound to the one true God by his cult; others by demons to the cults of empty idols. Even in key passages, Lactan-tius refrains from labelling the latter category with the singular falsa religio. It is the intellectual need to identify the one true God, and see beyond the limits of human experience and knowledge (sapientia), that motivates Lactantius’ use of religio as an umbrella concept: for him, there is no true cult piety (religio) without philosophy, and no true philosophy that does not lead to true cult piety. This correlation is the theme of thefirst book of the Diuinae institutiones (1.1.25). It is in this sense that religio raises humanity above the animals.³⁸