Tipos de evaluación

Procedures should be established to include a medical response for contaminated and/or overexposed individuals. It should be the responsibility of the authority in overall charge of the major public event security to decide to what extent they should prepare one or several medical facilities to receive wounded or contaminated/overexposed individuals. Further guidance is provided in Ref. [14].

A nuclear security event will attract the immediate attention of the news media. Local and possibly international media representatives are likely to be at the scene or even be broadcasting live coverage of the response mobilization.

Arrangements should be made for promptly providing consistent and understandable information to the public and media when the situation requires.

The use of pre-prepared information can be valuable in such circumstances. An official spokesperson should disseminate information from a media centre.

Regular media briefings should be prepared in plain language with descriptions of the situation and answers to anticipated questions from the public and the media. The assistance of the media is invaluable for disseminating information and providing important instructions to the public about radiation safety [15].

6.2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR RESPONSE MEASURES

The concept of operations for response measures should be based on the response plan and the coordination of activities by all responsible organizations and agencies.

Once a secondary/tertiary inspection team and/or remote expert support team has confirmed that an alarm is non-innocent and that the situation constitutes a nuclear security event without the possibility of dispersal of radioactive material, the following measures should be taken by radiation safety experts:

(a) Assess the radiological risk, provide advice on radiation safety measures and establish the radiation safety perimeter;

(b) Recommend isolation and/or evacuation up to the radiation safety perimeter, to be determined, at the scene, by the responders [16];

(c) Assist the venue safety and security officers until appropriate additional support arrives;

(d) Activate notification and response procedures;

(e) Assist in the operational response and the crime scene management, in particular, assistance to the CBRNE team and the forensic evidence management team [17];

(f) Provide advice to the venue or any other strategic location security chief (Incident Commander) on the potential escalation of the situation, taking into account the circumstantial factors;

(g) Advise and assist all response organizations on countermeasures;

(h) Recover, secure and arrange for the safe transportation and storage of the nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as preserving potential forensic evidence [17].

In the case that the situation constitutes a nuclear security event with a real possibility of the dispersal of radioactive material and the event escalates, appropriate response procedures, in addition to the aforementioned, should be applied by the designated disciplinary response group, such as:

(a) Site control:

•Recommend isolation and/or evacuation up to radiation safety perimeter, to be determined, at the scene, by the responders [16];

•Recommend perimeter security and traffic control.

(b) Compound hazards assessment/scene assessment.

(c) Apply danger reduction procedures.

(d) Evaluate the radiological status and consequences through monitoring activities:

•Dose rate;

•Airborne activity;

•Spread of contamination;

•Site characterization;

•Assessment of exposure through various pathways;

•Level of protection needed.

(e) Rescue and triage operations — save life, evacuate people, assemble in a safe area.

(f) Public announcements and perceptions (preferably to be prepared in advance).

(g) Forensic evidence management.

(h) Recovery operations:

•Population monitoring, decontamination and registration of personal details;

•Medical management and biodosimetry;

•Environmental remediation;

•Radiological cleanup;

•Embargo of zones/areas.

(i) Restore operations — long term impacts.

6.3. NUCLEAR SECURITY RESPONSE PLAN

An important step towards a comprehensive response capability during a major public event is the development of an event specific response plan (‘the Plan’) for response to nuclear security events by the responsible organizations.

All identified organizations responsible for conducting preparedness and response activities should actually participate in the planning process. The Plan should be part of the plan for responding to CBRNE threats. The Plan should include provisions for cooperation among all organizations involved and should serve functional areas, such as: (a) coordination on all supporting elements, (b) counterterrorism measures (prevention and response), (c) consequence management, (d) casualty management, (e) media and (f) joint training and exercises. The Plan should take into account the existing national radiological emergency plan [18] and its associated procedures as well as complementing the national nuclear security response plan.

All organizations involved in response should establish internal plans describing their particular roles, responsibilities, equipment, teams and the various standard operating procedures to be followed in a nuclear security event, as well as multidisciplinary group agreements and protocols to determine intergroup cooperation foreseen by the Plan.

The Plan should also describe provisions for simultaneous events and different scenarios with nuclear security implications that the response organization is required to respond to during the major public event. This should be based on the threat assessment, risk analysis and deployed technical resources.

To fulfil its obligations under the Plan, the response organizations should ensure that they have sufficient human resources and adequate technical infrastructures.

In this context, the response organization should ensure the availability of the following assets, including:

(a) Expert support and response teams, CBRNE teams, remote expert support system (reach back) and a designated laboratory. Expert support teams could consist of radiation measurement and protection experts whereas the CBRNE team is led by a law enforcement officer and has expertise to search and respond to different CBRNE threats.

(b) Measuring and detection instruments which may include: those for rapid search, monitoring and identification (gamma/neutron detection instruments); gamma/neutron dose rate meters/dosimeters for dose rate assessment (survey meters, telescopic probes), contamination monitors for alpha, beta and gamma radiations and portable spectrometers for radionuclide identification.

(c) Protective equipment of different types, in order to protect while responding to a range of events of any severity (e.g. overalls, gloves, masks, shoes, shielded recovery containers, respiratory devices).

(d) Dedicated and reliable communication systems, in order to allow personnel to communicate independently of the general communication network, if needed.

(e) Transport vehicle(s) that can safely carry nuclear and other radioactive material (with shielding of different types, such as containers made of lead, sheets of lead, lead bricks and lead pellets).

In addition, the Plan should foresee the means to assess the environmental consequences of any release of radioactive material, including those resulting from explosions. Arrangements for obtaining the necessary tools to predict the potential consequences should be in place as well as access to expert support and software for the dispersal scenario.