Tipos de Investigación 1 Tipos

In Ropoleski v.

Rairigh,

_{the Michigan federal district court}

stated that the father “did not allege that he had been subjected to

adverse treatment because he is male, but that his former wife ha[d]

been granted preferential treatment, to his detriment.”

_{After not-}

ing that the father was making an equal protection challenge claim-

ing that a facially neutral policy had been administered unequally,

the court stated that the father must show not only that the defen-

232. But see State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287, 291 (Fam. Ct. 1973) (denying the mother’s request for custody based on the tender years doctrine because the evidence in this trial court demonstrated that it was in the children’s best interests for the father to receive custody, and following the “at least cursory invocation” of the tender years presumption would violate the father’s right to equal protection of the law). The New York statute at issue stated that “[i]n all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent, but the court shall determine solely what is for the best inter- est of the child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness.” Id. at 287. Re- search indicates that this is the only case that determined applying a mother-preference under a facially neutral custody statute violated the father’s right to equal protection. No appellate level cases appear to have found a violation of a father’s right to equal protection in response to a father’s claim that the application of the tender years doctrine under a fa- cially neutral custody statute violated that right.

233. See Cheri L. Wood, Comment, Childless Mothers?—The New Catch-22: You Can’t Have Your Kids and Work for Them Too, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 383, 392 (1995) (“Consider- ing it violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts no longer applied the maternal custody preference for children of tender years.”) Wood also notes that because “ninety percent of children went to the custody of their mothers[,]” the maternal custody preference “was cited as statistical evidence of discrimination” and “‘sex- ual stereotyping.’” Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

Interestingly, a recent, successful, equal protection challenge involved a Pennsylvania statute that required non-custodial parents to pay their children’s college tuition. See

Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995). The court struck down the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because married parents were not likewise required to pay their children’s college tuition. Seeid. at 269.

234. 886 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mich. 1995). The court noted that the parties were in federal court due to “an action for deprivation of various civil rights under color of state law.” Id. at 1359.

dants’ conduct had a discriminatory effect, but that discriminatory

purpose was also a motivating factor.

_{The court further noted that}

“‘[d]iscriminatory purpose’ implies that the decisionmaker selected a

course of action because of its detrimental effects on an identifiable

group. Error, mistake in judgment or arbitrary administration in ap-

plying a facially neutral policy does not violate equal protection.”

The court then addressed the challenge:

Plaintiff has alleged, baldly, that [two court administrators], both

men, discriminated against him purposefully, pursuant to custom

or policy, because he is a man. The complaint provides no factual

detail in support of the claim. Plaintiff has not identified the dis-

criminatory policy or custom with any specificity. His allegations

offer no explanation as to why defendants’ alleged lenient or pref-

erential treatment of his former wife should give rise to a reason-

able inference that intention to injure him in his relationship with

his daughter, because he is a man, is the primary motivating fac-

tor. Not only is the claim not supported by factual details, but,

even when viewed in the abstract, it is not supported by reasoned

sense.

Though gender based discrimination is suspect, plaintiff as a

male, is not a member of a group whose interests have tradition-

ally been under-represented in the political process. Based on the

facts alleged, the notion that plaintiff’s injury is the result of gen-

der based discrimination—rather than, for instance, an erroneous

or even arbitrary exercise of discretion—is implausible. Plaintiff’s

equal protection claim is subject to dismissal as one “whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless.” To countenance such a claim un-

der the alleged facts would be to invite disgruntled parents every-

where to embroil the federal courts in child custody and support

disputes, matters traditionally and appropriately entrusted to the

state courts . . . simply by alleging gender discrimination. This, the

Court refuses to do.

The court then dismissed the equal protection claim.

In Fariello v. Rodriguez,

_{the father, appearing pro se, claimed}

that numerous named defendants deprived him of equal protection

under the law.

_{The court stated that a review of the “voluminous}

complaint” provided no evidence that any government official inter-

preted any statute to single out the plaintiff.

_{The court added that}

236. See id.

237. Id. (citations omitted). 238. Id. (citations omitted). 239. See id.

240. 148 F.R.D. 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 241. See id. at 677.

no such action could foreseeably occur, either, and dismissed the ac-

tion with prejudice.

B. Challenges From Unwed Fathers