The lines between negotiated agreement and cooperation are blurred in the literature on water interaction. Sadoff and Grey are not the only ones who use the language of water conflict and cooperation theory when discussing negotiation strategies for resolving water- related disputes. Islam and Susskind, for example, also advocate in their Water Diplomacy Framework (WDF)268 for the development of non-zero-sum approaches to negotiations, but they see water governance (or water management networks, in their terminology) as a
266 Sadoff, C, & Grey, D 2005, ‘Cooperation on International Rivers’, Water International, DOI: 10.1080/02508060508691886, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 420
267Qaddumi, H 2008, ‘Practical approaches to transboundary water benefit sharing’, Working Paper 292, Overseas Development Institute, London, p. 8
268 For Islam and Susskind, Water Diplomacy is related to but distinct from the generic concept of hydro-diplomacy. Water Diplomacy is the theory and practice of adaptive water management being developed at Tufts, MIT, and Harvard universities. Water Diplomacy is rooted in the ideas if complexity theory and negotiation. The Water Diplomacy Framework posits that complex water problems might be more effectively managed by thinking about water as a flexible resource and invoking three key assumptions about water networks: 1) water networks are open and
continuously changing as a function of the interaction among natural, societal, and political factors; 2) water network characterization and management must account for uncertainty, nonlinearity, and feedback; and 3) management and evolution of water networks ought to be adaptive and negotiated using a non-zero-sum approach.
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complex adaptive system.269 As such, Islam and Susskind understand that by definition there are no straightforward, predictable and replicable solutions to complex problems. They identify three types of water management problems – simple, complicated, and complex – and argue that only ‘[s]imple problems are amenable to optimisation because they involve easily identifiable and neatly-bounded elements of water management that respond in predictable ways and pose challenges about which there is almost complete agreement with regards to means and ends.’270
In other words, if high-conflict, low-cooperation transboundary water interaction was a simple problem, then the optimisation of benefits could be a satisfactory solution. But water interactions are complex, and thus cannot be ‘solved’ directly. Instead, Islam and Susskind argue that practical solutions to water conflicts ‘are most likely to be found through a negotiated and joint problem-solving approach that blends science, policy, and politics to understand…and manage…complex water problems.’271 For Islam and Susskind, water conflicts are most constructively understood as differences in values and how to translate those values into policies and actions within the political domain.272 As such, the role of the third party is to assist in the translation of those values into equitable actions. Specifically, the Water Diplomacy framework calls for third parties to act as professional mediators or neutral facilitators in water conflict negotiations, and Islam and Susskind describe in great detail the tasks that this entails.273 These tasks are very similar to those outlined by Jones throughout his book Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice.274 Indeed, there are many similarities and complementarities between the emerging concept of hydro-diplomacy and that of Track II dialogue. As Jones points out, ‘Track Two often plays its greatest role…in assisting the process of developing new ideas and incorporating them into negotiations, rather than in necessarily providing specific outcomes to officials
269 Islam, S, & Susskind, LE 2013, Water Diplomacy; a Negotiated Approach to Managing Complex
Water Networks, RFF Press, New York.
270 Islam, S, & Susskind, LE 2013, Water Diplomacy; a Negotiated Approach to Managing Complex
Water Networks, RFF Press, New York, p. 90
271 Islam, S, & Susskind, LE 2013, Water Diplomacy; a Negotiated Approach to Managing Complex
Water Networks, RFF Press, New York, pp. 17-18
272 Islam, S, & Susskind, LE 2013, Water Diplomacy; a Negotiated Approach to Managing Complex
Water Networks, RFF Press, New York, p. 89
273 Islam, S, & Susskind, LE 2013, Water Diplomacy; a Negotiated Approach to Managing Complex
Water Networks, RFF Press, New York, pp. 144-149
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[emphasis in original].’275 It is also about building trust between conflicted parties and helping
‘the two sides learn more about each other and develop more accurate understandings of the complexities each side must deal with. In this sense, Track Two is useful in breaking down previously monolithic interpretations each side may have held of the other, and allowing for learning and differentiation about the deeper realities and constraints that the other faces.’276
This is also largely true of hydro-diplomacy.
Track II dialogue is a particularly appropriate method for addressing regional security issues, such as transboundary water interaction, in which there might not necessarily be a specific conflict to be resolved but where an atmosphere of distrust and lack of cooperation nonetheless persists.277 Transboundary water interactions are also an appropriate context for facilitated dialogue because, as Wolf points out, ‘[w]ater is, by its nature, an interdisciplinary resource – the attendant disputes can only be resolved through active dialog among disciplines.’278 The importance of dialogue between different groups of stakeholders as a means of building cooperation is beginning to catch on in both the scholarly literature on water conflicts, and the so-called grey literature of government and private sector output.
In 2014, the Berlin-based consulting firm Adelphi released a report written by Benjamin Pohl et al. called The Rise of Hydro Diplomacy. Pohl et al. claim that the most important role for third party interventions is in strengthening water governance institutions.279 They argue that to decrease conflict and increase cooperation, foreign policy makers must:
‘exert political leadership in fostering intra-basin cooperation and integration; connect and reinforce appropriate institutional structures
275 Jones, P 2015, Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 147
276 Jones, P 2015, Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 147
277 Jones, P 2015, Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 26
278 Wolf, AT 1998, ‘Conflict and cooperation along international waterways’, Water Policy, vol. 1 no. 2, p. 10
279 Pohl, B, Carius, A, Conca, K, Dabelko, G, Kramer, A, Michel, D, Schmeier, S, Swain, A, Wolf, A 2014, The rise of hydro-diplomacy: Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters, adelphi research gemeinnützige GmbH, Berlin, p. 35
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for coordinated and cross-sectoral, comprehensive engagement; and strengthen the diplomatic track of transboundary cooperation on water by investing more in training and capacity-building, expanding efforts to build confidence in shared basins, and improving water-related crisis response and conflict resolution mechanisms.’280
Not only is Pohl et al.’s report unique in focussing on the role of third parties in transboundary water cooperation, in doing so it also brings the concept of hydro- hegemony out of the realm of theory and into that of practice. Pohl et al. acknowledge that ‘[b]asin politics are often compounded by power asymmetries, begging the question of how to deal with riparian hegemons’281 and argue that international actors must engage with basin hegemons.282This is in line with Zeitoun and Jägerskog’s argument from 2009 that one way to address power asymmetry is to ‘create conditions to encourage basin bullies to transform into basin leaders.’283
In addition to these contributions to the literature on water conflict and cooperation, Pohl et al.’s report is interesting in that it emphasises the need for political will and trust between riparians for cooperation to flourish. The authors argue that ‘[u]ltimately, strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters hinges on creating and reinforcing international institutions that can channel political will into coherent action.’284 Pohl et al. also claim that trust is critical but that ‘[t]rust can only be built through longterm transparency in terms of data-sharing and intentions regarding future infrastructure,
280 Pohl, B, Carius, A, Conca, K, Dabelko, G, Kramer, A, Michel, D, Schmeier, S, Swain, A, Wolf, A 2014, The rise of hydro-diplomacy: Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters, adelphi research gemeinnützige GmbH, Berlin, p. i
281 Pohl, B, Carius, A, Conca, K, Dabelko, G, Kramer, A, Michel, D, Schmeier, S, Swain, A, Wolf, A 2014, The rise of hydro-diplomacy: Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters, adelphi research gemeinnützige GmbH, Berlin, p. 17
282 Pohl, B, Carius, A, Conca, K, Dabelko, G, Kramer, A, Michel, D, Schmeier, S, Swain, A, Wolf, A 2014, The rise of hydro-diplomacy: Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters, adelphi research gemeinnützige GmbH, Berlin, pp. 25-27
283 Zeitoun, M, & Jägerskog, A 2009, ‘Confronting Power: Strategies to Support Less Powerful States’ in A Jägerskog, & M Zeitoun (eds), Getting Transboundary Water Right: Theory and Practice for Effective Cooperation, Report no. 25, Stockholm International Water Institute, Stockholm, p. 12 284 Pohl, B, Carius, A, Conca, K, Dabelko, G, Kramer, A, Michel, D, Schmeier, S, Swain, A, Wolf, A 2014, The rise of hydro-diplomacy: Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters, adelphi research gemeinnützige GmbH, Berlin, p. 42
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which in turn requires long-term engagement.’285 Thus the element of time is brought into the understanding of how transboundary cooperation can develop.