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Historical Knowledge is cognitio ex datis:

Rational knowledge is cognitio ex principiis.

However a mode of knowledge may be originally giw i. It is still, in relation to th e individual who possesses it.

Simply historical, if he know s only so m uch of it as has been given To him from outside...w hether through immediate experience or Narration, or...through instruction.

(Kant. 1787/1929: 655-656)

This passage from the section o n the 'Architectonic' in the Critique o f Pure Reason underpins K ant's attem pt to theorise knowledge in general through the introduction of two pairs of binary oppositions, namely by postulating an antithesis between historical and rational, objective and subjective modes of knowledge. Despite the debatable n atu re of the distinction, ¿.nd the particularly problem atic assum ption that both "rational principles" and "Historical facts” are unaffected by historical change and interpretation, this passage expresses a quite im portant insight, which becom es clearer once the reader follows further Kant’s argum ent.

Thus, in the philosopher's opinion, anyone who h as "leum t” a “system of philosophy” has no more that a "com plete historical knowledge" of this system since one h as only formed one's "m ind on another’s, and the imitative faculty is not itself productive”. This sort of knowledge is therefore according to Kant defective in that it has "not arisen out of reason", and although objectively considered it is indeed the product of reason, it is also simply historical from a subjective point of view (Kant, 1787/1929: 656).

It should not have escaped the attention of the readc. th at although the concepts of tradition and effective historical consciousness have been explicitly

exam ined in the previous chapter there was alm ost no exp)-cit reference to the m ost celebrated of G adam er's form ulations, viz. to his corn opt of the fusion o f horizons. This is not only due to the fact that G adam er I'.m self stresses that the purpose of his giving an account of the “form ation ano fusion of horizons w as to show how historically effective consciousness opi-rates” (T&M: 341) shifting thereby the em phasis from the idea of the horizon to the discussion of the problem concerning the alleged mediation between truth and history taking place within this consciousness1

The m ain reason for “delaying” the them atic engagem ent v t h this conceptual form ulation is that as it is the case with all the celebrated concepts that become "ossified" or “merely historical" in the sense K ant uses Ihe term above, an untim ely discussion of the "fusion of horizons” might have hindered our exploration into G adam er's thought.

Indeed, it could be argued that concepts like “tradition” and fusion of horizons” quite often operate as catchw ords in the veiy sam e way that G adam er described the functioning of the fam ous dictum “to the things them selves” in the case of H usserl's phenomenology. Nevertheless, having shown th at the concept of tradition should be treated as correlative to th at of the fbiitude, or in other w ords of the historical conditioning of hum an beings and not as political- ideological bias, the way is paved for a closer exam ination of the event of the fusion of horizons. In effect, it is G adam er's understanding of tradition and of 199

199 Thus the claim of hermeneutics seems according to Gadamer "capable of being met only in the infinity of knowledge, in the thoughtful fusion of the whole tradition with the present. \\<- see it based on the ideal of perfect enlightenment, on the complete limitlessness of our historical horizon...on the omnipresence of the historically knowing spirit", which finds “its justification in Hegel, even it the historians, filled with enthusiasm for experience, preferred to quote Schleirmacher and Wilhelm von H r.nbolt” (T&M: 341-342).

the effective historical consciousness that arguably shapes the very conceptualisation of this “fusion”.

It is im portant to note once more that G adam er sees tradition as m uch m ore than a “perm anent precondition" conditioning hu m an understanding. To the contrary, hum an beings are rath er seen as continually rc -producing and re­ determ ining tradition inasm uch as they them selves participate in its "evolution” (T&M: 293). G adam er wishes to further illum inate this peculiar state of being of tradition by showing how the herm eneutic phenom enon it self is based on the "prejudice” or fore-conception of “completeness", which is a fine exam ple of the m ode of prejudices that G adam er understands as "productive”.

Thus, in an encounter with a “traditionary text” understanding is always guided by the expectation of com pleteness, not only formally, i.e. regarding the expectation of the expression of a complete meaning, b u t also in term s of the truth-claim s contained therein. Like any fore-conception, the prejudice of “com pleteness” is understood as being grounded on the inti ¡preter’s own “prior relation to the subject m atter” and it is in this respect th a t G adam er is able to defend the position that preconceptions and prejudices are not subject to the w him of the individual consciousness b ut are rather the direct effect of belonging to a tradition.

W hat is more, the “elem ent of tradition" in any historical-herm eneutical activity is said to be “fulfilled" in the com m onality "of fundam ental, enabling prejudices” th a t m ake possible the “connection with tradition" through the process of being-addressed by the "traditionary text” (T&M: 295).

It has been already rem arked th a t G adam er sees histoiical distance as a positive and productive condition of the understanding an d references were

m ade to his treatm ent of aesthetic experience. Literary and historical experiences are also brought to the fore in the thinker’s attem pt to further clarify th e beneficial workings of “historical distance".

On the one hand, G adam er underplays the idea that the “Temporal distance” between the author and the reader of a literary text 'is responsible for m isunderstandings and m isinterpretations, mainly on the grounds that the m eaning of a text usually “goes beyond" the intentions and the understanding of its au th o r (T&M: 296).

In a sim ilar m anner, the oft-repeated insight of conventional wisdom according to which the passage of tim e alone is w hat m akes objective historical judgm ent possible, is given a fresh and interesting interpretation. It would not be inaccurate to claim that G adam er regards the very conception of "historical distance" as paradoxical, in the sam e m anner that the conception of a herm eneutics of facticity is said to parallel som ething like the concept of a “wooden iron".

In other words, since facticity signifies the "unshakable resistance that the factual p u ts up against all grasping and understanding" the conception of a “herm eneutics of facticily" is rightly seen as pointing to the paradoxical m anner in w hich the hum an Dasein is fundam entally determ ined and which cannot be adequately grasped with the aid of the notions of consciousness or self- consciousness (Gadamer, 1994: 55).

To develop the analogy further, if facticity and herm eneutics jointly considered point to a certain im penetrability of the Self and to the unattainability of complete self-knowledge, then one could suggest that “historical distance” signifies a sim ilar mode of "resistance" characteristic of the

historical realm . This resistance is perhaps best exemplified in the “fact" that a “relative closure” of a historical event is often required before this event becom es accessible as a whole. It is nevertheless questionable if this characteristic of historical events exhausts their signdcance and their relationship with the historically effective consciousness. G adam er actually understands the paradox presented by the historic;il event as the epistemological counterpart of the old moral question of w hether anyone could be called happy before one's death.

Indeed, as the thinker readily acknowledges, although certain sources of error are excluded and some herm eneutic requirem ents are “au* ^matically fulfilled" when a “historical context has come to be of only historic al interest", this is hardly the “end of the herm eneutical problem" (T&M: 298). The thought of som ething th at has become “only historical" signifies the tendency of the historical to show itself as "dead" or “ossified”, as irrelevam to the concerns of the “present". At the sam e time, in pointing to the inevitable “historicity" of the “present” it accentuates the incom plete character of all historical understanding. It is true that one could quite easily put all the em phasis on the notion of incompleteness an d attem pt to philosophically justify or even celebrate it.

G adam er seem s to occasionally move tow ards this direction, when for example he insists that “real” historical thinking “m ust take account of its own historicity", or when he points towards the always unfinished work of interpretation (T&M: 298-299).

This tendency is even sharpened in the way th at the c oncept of effective historical consciousness is fashioned, since we are told that reflection on the

essence of hum anity’s historical being “can never be com p ctely achieved" and th at correlatively “to be historically m eans that knowledge o f oneself can never be complete" (T&M: 302).

G adam er is nevertheless far from being content with simply celebrating incom pleteness without reintroducing the elem ent of universality, as his modification of the concept of the "horizon ’ m akes plain. This becom es clearer in the attem pt to secure the very notion of the horizon from being identified with whim sical and unjustified subjective interpretations, and mere caprice by establishing its dependence to the w ider contexts of tradition

It is therefore im portant at th is point to follow G adam er’s reinterpretation of the concept of the horizon more closely. His first step is to trace in the very concept of horizon the indication of the range of vision articulated from “a particular vantage point", a state-of-affairs characterized by w hat could be term ed the determ inacy of finitude over thought. In the field of historical understanding, the idea of an horizon is often used to indi-ate the attem pt to bypass the criteria and prejudices of the "present" so as to enable the im m ersion into the "past", w herefrom the traditionary text or the historical event addresses the historical consciousness. In the first instance this prevalent understanding of horizons in term s of a transposition into the "alien” is in G adam er’s eyes -up to an extent- legitimate, though by no m eans adequate (T&M: 302-303).

Leaving aside the objections against the psychological aspect200 of the conception of this transposition th a t was considered in the previous chapter, it 21,1 This does not mean though that Gadamer fails to take into account the ubjective aspect of this phenomenon. To the contrary, the centrality attributed to the dialogical process in Gadamer’s thought suggests that the communicative experience of the individual human being -alongside the inter-subjective

has to be said that the m ain problem G adam er finds with this model is the postulation of “closed horizons”. In effect, the conception •. f a closed horizon th at supposedly “encloses" a culture is according to G adam er a mere abstraction (T&M: 303-304).

It should be rem inded that a problem of sim ilar order w as identified in chapter two with regard to Castoriadis' conception of “core significations” characterizing specific socio-historical form ations. It can be said that G adam er capitalizes on the fleeting qualities of tim e in order to show the indeterm inacy of the very notion of the horizon. In other words, if following Heidegger one places tem porality at the centre of hum an existence then the m ain consequence following the postulation of D asein’s radical historicity is the inability to perm anently fix a standpoint wherefrom history -both in the personal and the universal sense of the term - is experienced and hence to conceive of a truly “closed" horizon.

Consequently, both the singular hum an being and the historical horizons hum ans are im m ersed in are said to be in a state of constant movem ent. In the sam e m anner th at “past”, "present", and "future" are not separated dim ensions but ecstasies of time, the transposition of historical consciousness into "alien" experience of dialogue that Gadamer attempts to wrest from its being sublated in the conceptual framework of speculative dialectics- occupies a prominent part in Gadamer’s construction of the very notion of the “fusion of horizons”. This becomes apparent in Gadamer's (1989b: 41) description of the relation between

text, interpreter and reader. For indeed, the interpreter tends to “disappeai in the very process of mediating between the text and the reader, but in Gadamer's eyes this is net a disappearance in any negative sense, but it rather signifies the overcoming of “what is alienating in the 'ext”. It therefore signals

an "entering into communication”, which happens in “a way that the tension between the horizon of the text and the horizon of the reader is dissolved”. Gadamer stresses that he has called this process “a fusion

of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung)", in other words the process where the “separated horizons, like the

different standpoints, merge with each other”. In this context it should be also pointed out that Gadamer (1985/19K9b: 110) sees his own philosophy in terms of a “hermeneutic turn teward conversation" as a move beyond the "dialectic of German idealism...to Platonic dialectic”, as a "recollection" that is not entirely dependent on the individual but also “to ‘the spirit that would like to unite us’-we who are a

historical horizons does not merely imply “passing into alien worlds unconnected in any way with our own”. For Gadam er, th is 1 -ansposition rather reveals the fundam ental dim ension of the historical hori/.>n, nam ely that it consists a single horizon, which in its movement embraces- the past and the present, w hilst keeping itself open to the future (T&M: 304).

It is th u s altogether questionable w hether it is proper to sneak of a “fusion of horizons" characterizing the historically effective consciousness and not of a “fusion of the ecstasies of tim e” within a single historical \orizon. How else could one interpret the em phatic statem ent that “understanding is alw ays the fusion o f these horizons supposedly existing by them selves” (T&M: 306)?

Indeed G adam er acknowledges that the term “fusion of horizons” is preferable than that of the "formation of one horizon” mainly because the form er discloses more explicitly the herm eneutic situation. To be more precise, the concept of the "fusion of horizons" h as the advantage of explicitly recognizing th at understanding "becomes a scholarly task only under special circum stances" and that there is an acknowledged tension between the text -or the historical event- and the present

Bringing this tension to the fore and projecting a horizon th at is “different form the horizon of the present” is in G adam er’s view the m ain task of the herm eneutic approach. W hat is more, the regulated enactm ent of the fusion of the horizons of the “p ast” and the “present", the sim ultaneous process of projecting and superseding is the postulated task of th e historically effected consciousness, while being closely bound with the central problem of herm eneutics, that being the problem of application (T&M: 3< >6-307).

Certainly the problem of application is in Gadam er'- philosophy tightly bound with the attribution of prim acy to language, and with the fashioning of a philosophical position that is the outcom e of a bold attem pt to m ediate the notoriously incom patible accounts of Hegel and Kierkegaart ■. On the one hand language is brought to the centre of philosophical refleciion as a result of G adam er's aim to reclaim the exem plarity of theological and legal herm eneutics along w ith that of philological herm eneutics in regard of the need to recognize “application as an integral elem ent of all understanding” (T&M: 308).

Similarly, and with reference to a specific instance )f application, viz. aesthetic non-differentiation. G adam er attem pts to combine Hegel's concept of a “religion of art" with Kierkegaard's notion of “contem poraneity", in order to establish the herm eneutic dim ension of the "m ediation oetween past and present” (T&M: 573).

More specifically, art is used by the philosopher to show that m eaning cannot be exhausted by conceptual understanding as idealist philosophy fam ously claim ed. Thus, contem poraneity - the strict religious referent that is the hallm ark of Kierkegaard's philosophy being carefully remiwed- is interpreted not a s tem poral “om nipresence", b ut as “total m ediation’ or “im m ediate co­ incidence". At the same tim e, and in full knowledge of the ' fact" that even the use of the term m ediation m ight seem as an insult to the essentially anti- speculative Kierkegaardian reflection, G adam er also m akes use of Hegel's insight concerning the p a st character of all art in an attem pt to grasp the paradoxical nature the w ork of art, which achieves “aesthetic sim ultaneity" exactly by being “absorbed by historical, rem em orative consciousness".

This realization enables G adam er to devise the concept of aesthetic non- differentiation to “distinguish the real experience of ar, which does not experience art” qua art. from the so-called “aesthetic consciousness" and from