The theoretical and empirical analyses presented here lead to three important conclusions. First, Democrat and Republican appointees prefer different sentences for different crimes. Even in the constraining framework of the Sentencing Guidelines, the judge’s preferences matter. Sizeable partisan effects were evident throughout and were fairly consistent: Democrat appointees favored lighter sentences than Republican appointees for drug trafficking, theft, and violent offenses. Democrat appointees also calculated higher offense levels than Republican appointees for white collar and environmental crimes, but we could not detect any resulting differences in prison time for
54 As a final note, there are times when mandatory minimum sentences may trump the minimum Guidelines
sentence, although in drug cases judges can often override the minimum sentences. We performed an analysis in which we measured changes in sentences from binding mandatory minimums instead of Guidelines minimums, and reach similar conclusions to those presented here. This result is not too surprising. As pointed out by Bowman and Heise (2002), mandatory minimums are not often binding, and when they are they generally do not change the minimum sentence greatly. Also, under U.S.S.G. §5C1.2, judges may make findings of fact to void mandatory minimums in drug cases. Of course, mandatory minimums do not prevent upward adjustments from enhancing the sentence.
these crimes (likely because of a smaller impact of offense level changes in these areas and smaller sample sizes). In addition, we found evidence of secular trends in white collar sentencing that may confound the estimate of partisan effects.
Second, judges mask their sentencing discretion through the calculation of the final offense level. While prison sentence regressions conditioned on the final offense level failed to reveal a significant partisan effect in sentencing, large and statistically significant partisan effects were evident when we condition on base offense level -- the condition under which the manipulation of offense level adjustments could be measured. The use of the departure instrument to shorten or lengthen prison terms was more dependent upon political context than the use of adjustments. Specifically, how judges expressed sentencing preferences depended on the political alignment between the district and circuit courts. In Democrat circuits, Democrat-appointed district court judges gave larger downward departures than when under Republican circuits. In fact, when we considered changes in prison sentences relative to the final calculated offense level, partisan effects were only measurable in districts that were aligned.
A final, important normative point should be made. While our work finds substantial differences between Democrat and Republican-appointed district court judges, our work also suggests that the sentencing reforms -- the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines and appellate review of district court sentencing decisions -- have served an important role in constraining judges’ sentencing practices. Prior to the sentencing reforms, district court judges had great discretion over sentencing and, without appellate review, no one to rein in that discretion. Essentially, district court judges acted as if the circuit court was ideologically aligned as no discipline was likely to come. Our finding
that alignment between district and appellate courts affects the sentencing judge's behavior regarding departures suggests that sentencing reforms may have reduced the overall discretion of district court judges, at least when those judges were overseen by a circuit with different political-ideological preferences. Moreover, the Guidelines, by setting out a recommended sentencing range, and then listing the acceptable factual circumstances for which an adjustment could be made, helped to limit the district court's options. It created a new fact (adjustment) versus law (departure) classification which pushed a large set of case circumstances (factors outside the heartland of the Guidelines) into stricter review conditions. There can be little doubt, then, that a return to a system of absolute discretion for district court judges within broad statutory boundaries and no appellate review would increase sentencing disparities.
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