Torii Ryûzô y los «japoneses propios».

Given how critical domestic support is to transitional justice, it is easy to see how the success of pro-justice and pro-reparations efforts would be heavily influenced by regime type. It is much simpler for activists to demand and acquire justice in a democracy, which respects the rule of law and which allows citizens to vote governments out of office if they do not respond to citizens’ demands, than in an autocracy, which does not hold free and fair elections and which can restrict citizens’ ability to organize, protest, and/or report on such events (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

However, in terms of theory construction, I do not expect democracy to cause

reparations. Rather, my research indicates that the driving force behind reparations –both promises and payments– is pro-reparations pressure from domestic activists, particularly pressure from victims themselves. Given the primacy of regime type in the literature on transitional justice, though, it is worth unpacking the link between the fields of transitional justice and democratization a little further, so as to gain a clearer picture of how domestic activism, which is tied to democracy, influences transitional justice in general and reparations in particular. The importance of democracy to transitional justice is reflected in the very name of

was designed to apply in transitional contexts, even though, as mentioned above, it can be applied to pre- and post-transitional contexts, as well.

It should be no surprise, then, that reparations research can likely benefit from examining the democratization literature to see how power dynamics function in transitional contexts. Previous work on democratization as it relates to justice has found that when the old elite remains in power, justice tends to be more lenient (Huyse 1995; Pion-Berlin 1994; Zalaquett 1992, 1994). This, too, is unsurprising; justice –including, presumably, reparations– is hardly likely to be on a government’s to-do list when the government has a vested interest in

maintaining impunity. Pacted transitions, in which democratic reformers and former hardline autocrats negotiate a transition together, offer more hope for reparations than transitions without any elite turnover, although pursuing justice and democracy after a pacted transition can still be a difficult endeavor (Lynch 2012; Powers and Proctor 2015; Rigby 2001; Stepan 1986). After a pacted transition, new, pro-justice elites do hold some positions of power, but holdover elites will likely seek amnesty for their crimes or try to institutionalize other methods of obstructing justice (Laplante and Theidon 2006; Nalepa 2009; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003/4; Subotić 2009; Weah 2012). When it comes to democracy and justice, a clear break with the past offers the best prospects for developing a democracy that respects civil rights and the rule of law. And although reparations do not surface explicitly in the democratization literature, it seems reasonable to expect the dynamics of reparations to depend on many of the same factors that influence democratization.

Regime type is also important because of how it influences the form and vibrancy of civil society. Civil society is a key player in the transitional justice process, and the literature on democratization has shown that although protests are possible in authoritarian regimes—and that

they can and do influence governmental behavior—autocracies do stifle civil society, whereas democracies offer the participatory environment and civil liberties protections necessary for fostering active, robust civil societies (Putnam 1993; Reuter and Robertson 2015; Robertson 2009, 2010). A quick glance at social movements in communist Eastern Europe shows that it is sometimes possible for people to engage in collective action in abusive dictatorships, although the stars must align on a myriad of factors in order for collective action to occur, let alone change governmental policy.

These factors can and do align on occasion, however. In a move that was largely seen as an attempt to quiet domestic discontent and preserve Morocco’s international reputation, King Mohammed VI paid reparations to certain people who had suffered human rights abuses at the hands of the monarchy during his father’s tenure (Loudiy 2014). Autocrats may not have the same electoral incentives to respond to domestic pressure that democrats do, but they still need to maintain a modicum of public support in order to stay in power, and they have reputational and economic incentives to avoid attracting too much negative international attention (Loudiy 2014). Thus, although it is easier to generate pro-reparations pressure in a democracy, committed and lucky activists in autocracies can successfully push for reparations, as well.

Transitional justice and reparations are also like democratization in that sometimes they seem to be bottom-up movements, whereas at other times they seem to be purely elite affairs. When examining the qualitative transitional justice literature, however, and the reparations

literature in particular, a clearer pattern emerges. Almost without exception,9 _{the main drivers}

9 _{The rare exceptions occur in post-Holocaust cases. Jewish victims were highly mobilized and}

acquired reparations fairly quickly after the war in Western countries, and they often acquired reparations in Eastern Bloc countries after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Years afterwards, in order to avoid being seen as playing favorites, some governments promised and paid reparations to

behind transitional justice efforts are the victims themselves. The influence that victims’ organizations can have on transitional justice decisions has been brought to light more often in recent years, as the discipline has started emphasizing that victims are not passive observers, they are active protagonists in their own lives (Méndez 2016). Although this research does not focus directly on using social movement theory to explain transitional justice outcomes or utilize victim group organization as a causal mechanism, the details provided in these case studies show that when victims are organized and passionate about transitional justice, their efforts propel such policies forward, but when they do not advocate for themselves, the government will be much more likely to sideline justice initiatives (Kurze 2012; Méndez 2016; Moffett 2016; Sajjad 2016). Again, even though scholars have yet to focus explicitly on the causal link between victim organizations and reparations, a close reading of qualitative research on countries as diverse as the United States, Uganda, Haiti, and El Salvador provides repeated examples of how vocal, active involvement from victims’ organizations is critical to achieving reparations payments (Bowens 2011; Buford and van der Merwe 2004; Segovia 2006; Otwili and Schulz 2012).

These findings help hone my theory. Rather than looking to the catch-all descriptor “domestic activists” or to civil society in general for an explanation as to why some governments promise and pay reparations when others do not, I argue that victims themselves are the key ingredient in motivating governments to first promise, and then pay, reparations. As mentioned above, victims’ groups have been shown to have a demonstrable impact on transitional justice policy—the literature repeatedly emphasizes that the success of transitional justice mechanisms

Germany paid reparations to Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1997 not because Jehovah’s Witnesses got organized, but because the German government did not want to be seen as having privileged one category of victims over another. Even in these cases, however, reparations are the result of victim pressure; the difference here is that the mobilized victims happen to be from a different

relies primarily on domestic organizations, including organizations led by victims themselves (Anonymous 2011; ICTJ 2010; Oette 2009; Olson 1965; Putorti 2011; Rigby 2001; van der Auweraert 2013). The impetus for reparations promises and reparations payments has not yet been analyzed through the lens of victims’ movements, but there is sufficient evidence from careful qualitative work to indicate that this is a line of inquiry worth pursuing.