For the Bulgarian state established after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, the Bal- kan Wars represented an opportunity to rec- tify the settlement of the Congress of Berlin. Bulgarian nationalists had been overjoyed by the Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878, which established a large Bul- garian state in southeastern Europe. The Austro-Hungarians and the British objected
to this big Bulgaria because they feared it would result in Russian domination of the entire region.
The Congress of Berlin trisected San Stefano Bulgaria. A Principality of Bulgaria under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan ruled the region between the Danube River and the Balkan Mountains with its capital at Sofia. The autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia, south of the Balkan Mountains, had a Christian governor in Plovdiv. Macedonia returned to full Ottoman rule. After the Congress of Berlin, every Bulgarian government strove to over- turn the Berlin settlement and reestablish San Stefano Bulgaria. The Young Turk seiz- ure of power in 1908 in Constantinople raised concerns in Sofia that reforms might strengthen the Ottoman Empire and prevent the realization of a San Stefano Bulgaria. Then the Italo-Turkish War in 1911 offered the opportunity to realize Bulgarian nation- alist objectives while the Ottomans were distracted and weakened by the war with Italy. The government of Ivan E. Geshov (1849–1924) decided that the time was right to realize Bulgarian nationalist objec- tives in the Balkans.
With Russian approval and assistance the Bulgarians began talks with Serbia in the autumn of 1911. After some difficult nega- tions they reached an agreement which they signed on March 13, 1912. The open section of this treaty provided for mutual military assistance. The secret part divided Macedo- nia into two parts, one indisputably Bulgar- ian, the other, the so-called “contested zone,” left to the arbitration of the Russian czar. This marked the first time since the Congress of Berlin that the Bulgarian government had conceded the possibility that it would not obtain all of Macedonia. Nevertheless, most Bulgarian political and military officials expected to gain all
Macedonia in any future Balkan settlement. Having accomplished the alliance with Serbia, the Sofia government turned to Athens. On May 30, 1912, a Bulgarian- Greek alliance was signed. This did not con- tain any territorial provisions, primarily because the Bulgarians were confident that their army would occupy any disputed areas in southern Macedonia and western Thrace before the Greeks could arrive. At the end of August 1912, the Bulgarians came to an agreement with the Montenegrins.
In conjunction with its Greek and Serbian allies, Bulgaria declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 17, 1912. The initial phase of this First Balkan War exceeded all Bulgarian expectations. The Geshov government initially had intended to seek Russian intervention to end the war after a short time of fighting. The successes of Bulgarian arms at Lozengrad and Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, however, caused the titular commander in chief of the army, Czar Ferdinand (1861–1948), and his deputy commander in chief, General Mihail Savov (1857–1928), as well as many in the government to conclude that total victory over the Ottomans was possible. The Bul- garians pursued the retreating Ottomans to the Chataldzha lines. Czar Ferdinand hoped to make a triumphal entry into Constantino- ple. The defeat at Chataldzha, however, made the Bulgarian army command realize that their forces were exhausted and overex- tended. With some sense of relief, they con- cluded an armistice with the Ottomans on December 3, 1912. Peace negotiations between the Balkan allies and the Ottomans began in London on December 16.
The London Peace talks did not last long. The Bulgarians insisted on obtaining Adrianople, which they had besieged since October. They also hoped to establish a presence on the Sea of Marmara. After the
Young Turks seized power in Constantino- ple on January 23, 1913, they denounced the armistice. The war recommenced on February 3.
With the help of the Serbian Second Army, the Bulgarians captured Adrianople on March 26, 1913. This represented the final Bulgarian triumph of the Balkan Wars. At this point the Bulgarians anticipated a national state even larger than that estab- lished at San Stefano. Even as Bulgarian troops entered Adrianople, however, Bulga- ria’s relationship with the Balkan allies was eroding. During the initial phase of the war, Serbian troops had occupied most of Mac- edonia while the bulk of the Bulgarian army fought in Thrace. When the Austro- Hungarian government indicated that it would not tolerate a Serbian presence on the Adriatic Sea in northern Albania, the Serbs sought compensation in Macedonia. Meanwhile, the lack of a clear territorial agreement with Greece led to clashes between Bulgarian and Greek troops in southeastern Macedonia around Nigrita. Possession of Salonika became a focus of Bulgarian and Greek hostility. Also, the Romanians raised the issue of compen- sation for Bulgarian Balkan War gains. The Romanians demanded southern Dobrudja (Dobrudzha), including the Danubean port of Silistra.
The Sofia government made little effort to deal with these issues, preferring instead to rely on the support of Russia. This proved to be a mistake. In April 1913, the St. Peters- burg Ambassadors conference awarded Sili- stra to Romania. This alienated both the Bulgarians, because of the loss of a Bulgar- ian city, and the Romanians, because they wanted all of southern Dobrudja. Hostilities between Bulgarian and Greek troops esca- lated in southern Macedonia. The Serbs began to establish permanent administrative
and cultural institutions throughout Macedonia. In despair, Geshov resigned. The ardently pro-Russian Stoyan Danev (1858–1949) replaced him. Finally the Russians somewhat reluctantly agreed to take up their arbitration responsibilities.
Up until this time, most Bulgarians had supported the war effort. A notable excep- tion was the leader of the Bulgarian Agrar- ian Union, Aleksandu˘r Stamboliski (1879– 1923). By the spring of 1913, however, many of the peasant soldiers in the Bulgar- ian army were becoming impatient. Unrest emerged in the ranks. The army command sought to use the soldiers or to disperse them before the unrest spread throughout the army.
Before Bulgarian prime minister Stoyan Danev could begin his journey to St. Peters- burg for the arbitration process, Bulgarian troops acting on the orders of Czar Ferdi- nand and Deputy Commander in Chief Savov attacked Greek and Serbian positions in eastern Macedonia on the night of June 29–30, 1913. The Greeks and Serbs immediately launched counterattacks. In this situation, Danev resigned on July 13. The Russians then lost interest in pursuing the arbitration process. In the absence of any Russian help, the pro-Austrian Vasil Radoslavov then assumed the responsibility of prime minister. The Bulgarians found themselves in a precarious situation. Greek forces soon wiped out the Bulgarian contin- gent isolated in Salonika. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian Second Army, wedged between the Greeks and the Serbs in the southeastern corner of Macedonia, suffered a major defeat as it retreated northward. To the north, the Serbs inflicted a defeat on the Bulgarian Third Army at Bregalinitisa.
By mid-July, however, as the Bulgarians assumed positions along their prewar fron- tier, they were able to halt the Greek and
Serbian advance. At Kilimantsi, the Bulgar- ians achieved a major defensive victory over the Serbs. This was ultimately to no avail. The Ottoman army, set on retaking Adrianople, crossed the frontier on July 12 and quickly reoccupied that city. Then on July 14, the Romanian army, determined to obtain southern Dobrudja, crossed the Dan- ube in three places and advanced into central Bulgaria. With all of their forces engaged in fighting the Greeks and Serbs, the Bulgar- ians could not oppose these two invasions. The Ottoman advance into Bulgarian territory was particularly upsetting to the Bulgarians, because it revived memories of the 500 years of Ottoman domination of Bulgaria. With enemies all around, and with no help forthcoming from Russia or any other great power, the Sofia government asked for an armistice. Even as the Sofia government agreed to talks, the Bulgarian army succeeded in trapping the oncoming Greek army in Kresna gorge. This was too late to affect the outcome of the war.
Peace talks ensued in two separate ven- ues. In Bucharest, the Bulgarians met with Greek, Romanian, and Serbian represen- tatives. They conceded the loss of most of Macedonia and southern Dobrudja in the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on August 19, 1913. In Constantinople, the Bulgarians met with the sultan’s government. There the Bulgarians accepted the loss of most of eastern Thrace, eliminating the gains of 1912. They signed the Treaty of Constanti- nople on September 30, 1912.
The Balkan Wars were a catastrophe for Bulgaria. In the two wars, the Bulgarians lost 32,000 dead, 110,000 wounded, and 34,000 dead of disease. In addition, large numbers of Bulgarian civilians died of chol- era and typhus epidemics. Over 100,000 ref- ugees flooded into Bulgaria from Greek- and Serbian-occupied parts of Macedonia.
Bulgaria had no friends among its neighbors and lost Russian patronage. The country did make some territorial gains. Western Thrace and the Rhodope region became a part of the country, adding about 10,000 square miles, including the Aegean port of Dedeagach, and 130,000 people to the country. The Balkan Wars, begun in triumph, ended in disaster for Bulgaria. In an effort to over- come the Balkan War defeat and obtain Macedonia, Bulgaria intervened in World Wars I and II on the German side. Neither effort succeeded.
Richard C. Hall
See also: Adrianople, Siege of, 1912–1913; Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Balkan War, Second, 1913; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Causes; Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, Conse- quences; Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913; Cha- taldzha, Battle of, 1912; Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913; Dimitriev, Radko (1859– 1918); Ferdinand I, Czar of Bulgaria (1861– 1948); Kalimantsi, Battle of, 1913; London, Treaty of, 1913; Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Battle of, 1912; Savov, Mihail (1857–1928)
Further Reading
Crampton, R. J. Bulgaria, 1878–1918. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983.
Hall, Richard C. Bulgaria’s Road to the First World War. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1996.
Helmreich, E. C. The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938.