TOTAL MONTO US$ MONTO US$

Internationally and locally, there was little consensus on the objectives and effectiveness of the cultural boycott. It was called for and supported by various local and international organisations and personalities, including those in the music industry, while others chose not to recognise it. Within South Africa there was a degree of confusion and disagreement over the boycott, despite the fact that it was called for by the ANC itself. For example, several black South African artists publicly stated their fears that isolation from foreign artists would further impoverish the lives of blacks in South Africa (Beaubien, 1982:16). Supporters of the boycott were accused of practicing censorship, of endangering academic freedom, cutting off the black population from contact with the West, driving the white population into a corner and thereby strengthening the “laager mentality”97_,

which would have a counter-productive effect. The UN Register was criticised by

97 _{Named after the way in which Afrikaner pioneers (Voortrekkers) set up camps using their wagons, here the term denotes}

some as a blacklist similar to Senator McCarthy’s anti-communist crusade in the USA decades earlier (Braam & Geerlings, 1989:175).

As international demand for South African music and culture grew during the 1980s, people began to question why contact between locally-based artists and the rest of the world was being restricted – not by authorities but by the anti- apartheid movement itself. This led to much confusion, particularly for the progressive South African artists who felt excluded from these contacts. Activists began to question whether the boycott had been applied too strictly and was threatening to have negative consequences for the struggle itself. The boycott, intended to deny exposure to artists sympathetic or indifferent towards the government, was arguably making the “alternative culture” embodied by many progressive popular musicians invisible to the rest of the world (Braam & Geerlings, 1989:177). Barring black American artists, for example, from touring South Africa prevented them from being exposed to the daily reality of apartheid and thus potentially becoming more actively involved in the struggle, while preventing certain South African artists from touring abroad denied them exposure to non-racial societies that might inform their work.

Those overseas artists attempting to visit South Africa would first seek the approval of local organisations. Two rival groups emerged, however, both attempting to represent the interests of local musicians, but with different views of the cultural boycott. On the one hand, AZAPO often resorted to violence against offending artists and those involved, taking it upon themselves to disrupt tours in the name of the cultural boycott. For example, when the O’Jays visited in 1981, the tour collapsed due to AZAPO’s calls to boycott. The South African promoter Victor Mazibuko lost money and had his home stoned and petrol bombed. The band’s manager had his passport and air ticket impounded and was forced to remain behind pending legal action. Another organisation, also affiliated to the Black Conciousness movement, was the Music, Drama, Arts and Literature Institute (MDALI). It would also call on American artists to cancel tours, but was less likely to resort to violence. There were substantial differences between the two organisations over their implementation of the boycott, with MDALI more willing to compromise and reach some accord with foreign artists, for example by

ensuring the use of black promoters, guaranteed rates for local black artists and donations to black charities (Beaubien, 1982:5,14-16; Fleshman, 1982:5).

With questions mounting over the effectiveness of the boycott, in May 1987 ANC president Oliver Tambo announced in London that the ANC had modified its 30- year commitment to a blanket boycott of all cultural and academic links to South Africa. The boycott would continue, but the ANC would become selective in its choice of targets. Tambo pointed out that inside South Africa there had emerged a democratic “people’s culture” with alternative structures brought about by the struggle that needed to be supported rather than boycotted. Several days after Tambo’s speech, the UDF publicised its viewpoint in a resolution that formulated general criteria for selection. From then on, tours both to and from South African would only be exempt from the boycott if they were supported by the democratic movement in South Africa, approved by overseas solidarity groups and contributed to the advancement of the struggle and the building of a democratic South Africa (Braam & Geerlings, 1989:178). This apparent pragmatism reflects a growing recognition of the potential power or importance of musicians, both local and foreign, to the struggle – and arguably of the relative ineffectiveness of the cultural boycott as it was originally conceived.

As with the perceived role of musicians in the struggle, as was discussed in chapter four, the gradual striving for consensus regarding the cultural boycott evolved over the course of years through discussions, festivals, publications and speeches (Braam & Geerlings, 1989:178). It was informed not only by political actors and cultural workers inside the country but also by the growing international demand for South African music and culture – generated by South African musicians’ success overseas, the international music community, both artists and audiences, as well as the various organisations outlined above that made up the international anti-apartheid movement, in which music often played a central role. Although consensus was never reached over the cultural boycott, there was general agreement over the power and importance of cultural workers in the struggle, both in South Africa and abroad. It was therefore not only South African musicians at home and abroad who joined and came to lead the struggle against apartheid; popular and protest musicians from all over the world also played a

vital role. They did so not only through the contributions to anti-apartheid organisations outlined above, but also more generally through their music, which is outlined in the following section.

5.3 THE INTERNATIONAL MUSIC COMMUNITY’S ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE