Toxicodermias por inhibidores de la transcriptasa inversa análogos de los nucleótidos . 48

Q125: May the MMDA confiscate a driver’s license for illegal parking by virtue of an MMDA Circular by the Metro Manila Council prescribing for such penalty?

A125: No. The MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area, and all its functions are administrative. It is not a local government unit vested with police power; as such, there is no grant of authority under its Charter to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. Sec. 5(f) of R.A. No. 7924 authorizes the MMDA to suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses, but only in the enforcement of existing traffic rules and regulations by the Legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated, i.e. the City of Manila. [MMDA v. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005]

Q126: What are the exceptions to barangay conciliation as pre-condition for filing a complaint in court or any government offices?

A126:

a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 1 year or a fine exceeding P5,000;

d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice [Section 408, LGC]

h) Where the accused is under detention;

i) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

j) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendent lite;

k) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations [Section 412, LGC]

l) Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents;

m) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

n) Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);

o) Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations;

p) Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court [Supreme Court Administrative Circular 14-93]

Q127: Differentiate the grounds for preventive suspension imposed on public officials under the Ombudsman Act and the Local Government Code.

A127: The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. To justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24, R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; b) the charges should warrant removal from the service; or c) the respondent’s continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him.

Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of 60 days of preventive suspension prescribed in the LGC on an elective official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, b) the evidence of culpability is strong, c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. [Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995]

Q128: What is the extent of a mayor’s operational supervision and control over the police force, fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in the mayor’s jurisdiction?

A128: “Operational supervision and control” shall mean the power to direct, superintend, and oversee the day-to-day functions of police investigation of crime, crime prevention activities, and traffic control in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission. It includes the power to direct the employment and deployment of units or elements of the PNP, through the station commander, to ensure public safety and effective maintenance of peace and order within the locality. [Section 62, R.A. No.

6975 (DILG Act)]

Q129: A dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, while on its regular route for garbage collection, collided with a passenger jeepney, killing the driver. The heirs of the deceased filed a complaint for damages against the dump truck driver and the municipality. Will it prosper?

A129: No. While municipal corporations are subject to suit even in the performance of governmental functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.

Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. In the case at bar, the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. [Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991]

Q130: What are the grounds for which Commonwealth Avenue may be temporarily closed by the local government unit concerned?

A130: Commonwealth Avenue, being a national road, may be temporarily closed during an actual emergency, fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order. It may also be closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned.

[Section 21, LGC]

Q131: Who are disqualified from running for any elective local position?

A131: The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

[R.A. No. 7160, Section 40]

Q132: Is the conduct of plebiscite required in a legislative apportionment?

A132: No. A plebiscite is not required in a legislative apportionment. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

Q133: Is the participation of the entire province necessary in a plebiscite regarding the conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city?

A133: Yes. Art X, Sec. 10 provides that No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus the qualified voters of the province, which will be directly affected by the conversion, must be included in the plebiscite [Umali v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203974 (2014)]

Q134: Differentiate a resolution from an ordinance.

A134: A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an ordinance is a law that is permanent in character.No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant circumstances.

[Spouses Yusay v. CA, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011]

Q135: What are the additional requirements imposed on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units?

A135:

1. Exercised through its chief executive acting pursuant to an ordinance

2. The exercise the power of eminent domain must be for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless

3. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted [Sec.

19, LGC]