The plan for the project as a whole is to reclaim and irrigate approximately 640,000 ha. by the year 2000, but the execution of the project has fallen behind schedule. The Euphrates Basin soils in Syria are in large part gypsiferous, crusty, prone to erosion, and suitable only for careful applications of irrigation water. The canals leading to the pioneer project not only collapsed when water was channelled through them, but also lost 5 m3/sec of water into the ground. It has been estimated that 50 per cent of the irrigated land in Syria's Euphrates valley is affected by salinization, causing crop losses of up to 300 million US$ a year (The Middle East, 1984, 29). In 1984 it was reported that "cracks" had appeared in the Balikh canal because the gypsiferous soil on which it rests had been dissolved by leaks from the canal (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991,152). Salinity in the middle and lower Euphrates in the early eighties took 22,000 ha. of privately pumped, originally undrained areas out of cultivation, cut production in half in 35,000 ha. more, and threatened a 3,000 ha. annual further loss. In addition ground water pumped for a irrigated cotton up river (in West Meskene) was exhausted (Hinnebusch,
1989, 236). A report from 1980 noted that less than half of the 640,000 ha. was
reasonably good for irrigation purposes and suggested a goal of 240,000 ha., but by 1978 only 7,400 ha. had been prepared. To these figures should be added the lands of the upper Khabur basin, which were also to receive irrigation water and which, although originally estimated at 400,000 ha., only 137.000 irrigated (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991,
152). According to Hinnebusch (1989), the Balikh basin had been slated to be reclaimed
first, but all but 28 per cent of it may be too high in gypsum and a fifth of the 20,000 reclaimed ha. in the pilot project are reported to be too gypsiferous for use. By 1980, projections for East Meskene had scaled the potential irrigable surface back from 33,000 to 18,000 ha. West Meskene, where fertility is good, was then advanced in priority. The Rassafe area, three-fourths of the 40,000 ha. in Mayadin, and 45,000 of the 70,000 ha. in the lower Khabur area also look unpromising. Studies are being done of two promising basins north and south of Aleppo totalling 212,000 ha. which could compensate for the loss of potential areas further east (Hinnebusch, 1989, 240). According to Fisher, only about 60,000 ha. had been irrigated by 1984, and perhaps 300,000 ha. may be impossible to develop according to the original plans (Fisher, 1989, 780). According to Kolars & Mitchell (1991), the actual amount of land successfully brought into production by 1986 was about 64,000 ha, and the total lands irrigated by Euphrates waters reached about 241,000 ha. by 1990 (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991,154-165).
In Satellite photos of the Euphrates valley and the Lake Assad area taken for purposes of comparison in 1975 (immediately after the Lake was filled) and 1980, one cannot see any significant changes in the amount of cultivated land despite the fact that
one can see the more intensive version in 1980. This estimate matches tables C4.2-C4.3 which show that only after 1980 was it possible to distinguish the extension of irrigated areas in the country (see photos 7 and 8).
C4.5 Electric power
Until recently Syria was petroleum poor, but since the mid-1980s oil production has almost tripled and it has been able to expand crude oil production to an average o f 570,000 bpd in 1992 (MEI, 16 April, 1993). Electricity has been one of the key areas of Syria's under - investment during the past two decades and efforts are under way to exploit natural gas as a local source of energy for power stations and industry. The increase in the generation of electricity is regarded as the key to much of Syria's future industrial development. After the completion of the Euphrates dam at Tabqa and the installation of eight 100 megawatt turbines in 1977 this problem seemed to have been solved for many years to come. The hydro-electric power station at Lake Assad was expected to generate about 80 per cent of the country's electric power, but just six years later, the high expectations were badly frustrated. The energy produced by the Tabqa power station dropped from 2,500 million KWh per annum to less than 1,500 million KWh. Figure C4.1: Syria: 3 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 2000 1 5 0 0 1000 5 0 0 0E + 0
Source: MEED, 4 June 1993, 3
electricity installed and operating capacity (MW - 1993)
|H Installed
Y7\ Operatin;
In 1983, and during the following years, the turbines could work at only 30-40 per cent capacity due to a lack of rainfall, Turkey's increased use of the upper waters of the Euphrates and the absence of Russian maintenance. The result is that, in 1993, the operating capacity of the dam was barely 150 MW with a further 75 MW of operating hydroelectric capacity coming from the nearby Al-Baath dam (MEED, 4 June 1993, 2). As more villages received electricity, more Syrians bought air-conditioners and other electrical consumer goods, and more industrial establishments switched to modem energy consuming machinery creating a serious power shortage. The Euphrates dam was operating well below capacity, the thermal power supply was insufficient to bridge the gap, and the difference between supply and demand continued to grow even more, so that daily power cuts were extended to four hours from 1986 on wards (Meyer, 1987,
49).
As a result, Syria started to developed thermal power stations to reduce the importance of the Tabqa hydro - power station and, in 1985, hydro - power generation was reduced to 40 per cent of the total production (Maury, 1983, 322). In the year 2000, Syria's operating capacity will reach 5,000 MW (compared to 2,500 MW in 1993) and, as a result, hydroelectric power will be less than 18 per cent of the total production
(MEED, 4 June 1993, 3). It is expected that hydro - power as a form of energy supply