Franjo TuĎman (Croatia‟s first President and so-called „father of the nation‟) and his party, the Croatian Democtatic Union (HDZ), envisioned an independent Croatian state as a
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member of the European Community of peoples: „Being a member of the EU means going back to our roots‟, PM Jadranka Kosor (HDZ) said at a speech in October 2009 echoing TuĎman‟s own words. Following the founding election of April-May 1990, the incoming nationalist elites embraced the Western project of centralised and homogenous nation-state building and the standard of modernity in which the project of nationhood is embedded (Zakošek, 1997, 2002). In Croatia, the relationship with „Europe‟ has historically been construed in strongly ideational terms. In fact, „Europe‟ represented a way to escape the primitive „Balkans‟, meaning Serbia. William Bartlett (2003: 64) ably summarises the point:
„Croatia‟s historical legacy lies in its experience as a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Serbia‟s legacy lies in subjugation and liberation from the Ottomans. In this long historical perspective, Croatia‟s unification with Serbia, first in the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and subsequently in the kingdom of Yugoslavia and then after the Second World War in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was seen as an aberration, at best an unhappy alliance, and at worst as a subjugation, never fully accepted by the population. The decision-making elite had always been divided over the choice of union with Serbia, and from time to time the prospect of a more independent position for Croatia had gained support among its members, for example during the Croatian Spring events of 1971‟.
Under the nationalists, Croatia had a unique historical opportunity to „return‟ to the civilised European family of which the country was once a member. It did not matter, however, that Croatia was in many respects a second-class province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for hundreds of years (cf. Goldstein, 1999). Croatians appropriated the economic accomplishments and culture of Mittel Europa as their own, without
„consideration of how they participated – as equal actors or otherwise‟ (Bakić-Hayden, 1995: 924). As Bartlett (2003: 64; emphasis added) puts it, „Croatia has been keen to project and emphasize her identity as a central European country, sometimes as a Mediterranean country, but definitely not a part of the „Balkans‟. In other words, Croats needed a separate identity in order to survive as a distinct nation and thus justly pursue their liberation struggle against the Serbs. Lindstrom and Razsa (1999: 8, 3) provide an excellent summary:
„Leading up to and following the outbreak of war in July 1991, Croatia needed to construct an identity that would be maximally differentiated from its Yugoslav identity and other constituent nationalities that made up
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the former Yugoslavia, most significantly Serbia. But because Serbia was so intimately connected to Croatia – over ten percent of Croatia‟s population is ethnically Serb, the Serbian and Croatian languages are linguistically very similar, and Croats and Serbs are both considered “ethnically” Slav – and because the Serbs posed a genuine military threat to Croatia‟s independence and in some cases its very existence, this process of differentiation was all the more acute. Balkanist discourse was the perfect mechanism for this differentiation‟.
Thus,
„By defining themselves as more progressive, prosperous, hard-working, tolerant, democratic or, in a word, European, in contrast to their primitive, lazy, intolerant, i.e. Balkan, neighbors to the southeast, Croatia could justify its quest for independence as a necessary emancipation from its “Balkan burden” and its return to its rightful place in Europe‟.
Thus, in order to manifest Croatia‟s serious prospects for „re-joining Europe‟, TuĎman created the Office for adjustment to European Integration (OEI) in 1990, while Croatia was still a Yugoslav republic. Diplomatic relations between Croatia and the EC were established on 15 January 1992, following the former‟s recognition by the latter. As noted above, for many years prior to independence, Croatia had benefited from preferential trade arrangements under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1980 between the EEC and the former Yugoslavia. Eventually, the dissolution of the former federal state meant the natural termination of contractual relations between the two parties by a decision of the EC Council of Ministers of November 25, 1991. The EU continued, however, to apply the commercial aspects of the Agreement with Croatia (Bartlett, 2003: 104).
Following independence, the EU decided to commence bilateral relations with both Croatia and Slovenia. But due to Croatia‟s „bloody‟ engagement in the wars of „Yugoslav succession‟, these were made conditional on Croatian observance of a „code of democratic conduct‟ and respect of minority rights (European Commission, 2000: 4).
In 1993, Central European countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, later joined by Slovenia and Romania – offered Croatia membership in the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), but were rebuffed. At that time TuĎman believed that Croatia could enter the EU directly, not in partnership with former communist countries (Goldstein, 1999: 261). But, as Croatia became deeply embroiled in the Bosnian war
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between 1992 and 1995, EU-Croatian relations started to cool as evidenced by the Union‟s sanctions on Croatia. In March 1995, the EU decided to extend its main assistance programme for the post-communist states of Eastern Europe - PHARE - to Croatia and to open negotiations in a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and a Transport Agreement.
Croatia was temporarily included in the PHARE programme between 12 June and 4 August 1995. But, both the assistance and the negotiations were suspended on 7 August 1995 due to the infamous military operation „Oluja‟ (Storm) in former UN sectors in the Krajina region9, which „casted a shadow on Croatia‟s democratic record and respect for the rule of law‟ (European Commission, 2000: 5). Although Croatia was outside the PHARE programme, it nevertheless benefited from substantial European aid in various other ways.
Suffice it to say that, apart from the autonomous trade preferences, the EU provided humanitarian assistance to war-torn Croatia which amounted to some €350 million between 1991 and 1997, while a further €1,166 million were provided on a bilateral basis by individual EU member states (Bartlett, 2003: 73).
4.3.1. Responding to Bosnian Crisis: The EU Royaumont and Regional Approach initiatives, 1995-1998
Without a doubt, the Bosnian conflict had a disastrous effect on the credibility of the EU.
The Union was criticised by many as being powerless to halt a war taking place virtually in
„the heart of Europe‟ (cf. Yannis, 2002). Many observers agree that this episode was a shock for the EU which now recognised that it had to increase its involvement in the Balkans (Türkes and Gökgöz, 2006: 674; Yannis, 2002). At the same time, the Bosnian
9 In March and August 1995 respectively, Croatia‟s army launched a series of offensives against the Croatian Serb militias that were still holding close to a third of the national territory (Pusić, 1998: 113).
Through the infamous Operations Blijesak (Flash) and Oluja (Storm), the Croatian army quickly regained Western Slavonia and the Krajina, while Eastern Slavonia would be peacefully reincorporated in July 1997 (Goldstein, 1999: 252-54). Significantly, Croatia‟s forceful recapture of the Krajina region resulted in the exodus of almost the entire Serbian population inhabiting the area (Cohen, 1997: 104). In all, some 180,000 Krajina Serbs –descendants of families that had first settled in Croatia over four centuries earlier - evacuated the area, leaving few behind (Bartlett, 2003: 70). Moreover, several hundred Serb civilians were killed and Serb property was looted and burnt (Goldstein, 1999: 254). For months, Croatian authorities did little or nothing to stop these outrages (Pusić, 1998:113). Croatia was again seriously criticised by the international community. These developments notwithstanding, it seemed that TuĎman had finally resolved the „Serbian question‟ that for centuries had troubled Croatia as the forcible expulsion of Serbs from the „Krajina‟ had made the country now „more ethnically homogeneous by reducing the ethnic-Serb share of Croatia‟s population from 12 per cent to less than 5 per cent‟ (ibid:
113).
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crisis offered proof that conflicts in the „neighborhood‟ could have a spill-over effect, showing a risk of instability being imported into the EU (Papadimitriou, 2001; Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008). In trying to contain conflict as part of sustaining stability, the EU developed a series of regional initiatives.
The Royaumont Process launched in the immediate aftermath of the Dayton Peace Accord (in December 1995) was the first EU initiative aimed at stabilising the region (Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008: 380). It represented an example of a civilian „preventive diplomacy‟ that focused on promoting regional projects to establish „good neighbourly relations‟ (Türkes and Gökgöz, 2006: 675). This process was soon superseded by the parallel Regional Approach initiative agreed upon by the EU General Affairs Council on 26-27 February 1996 aimed at strengthening „stability, good-neighbourliness and economic recovery in southeast Europe‟ (Papadimitriou, 2001: 74). As Fakiolas and Tzifakis (2008: 380) rightly conclude, within the Regional Approach framework the „stabilisation‟ and „regionalism‟
components appeared to constitute not simply the motors behind but also „the requisite conditions for the development of EU-Western Balkans relationship‟. In other words, not only did the EU show its first reluctant signs of a desire to create a post-Dayton security environment in its southeast European borderland. It also manifested the so-called
„Western Balkans‟ (all former Yugoslav republics but Slovenia plus Albania) as a „separate but unified regional grouping sharing an array of severe peace-consolidation and state-building capacity vulnerabilities‟ (ibid: 380).
Significantly, the 1997 EU General Affairs Council fitted the Regional Approach with political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations with the five „Western Balkan‟ countries including Croatia. In fact, the Council complemented the
„Copenhagen Criteria‟ (i.e., respect for democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law; protection of minorities; market economy reforms) introduced by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 with an additional condition: „regional cooperation‟
(Türkes and Gökgöz, 2006: 675). In brief, the Western Balkan countries were required to build common structures (for example, a free trade area) and sustain a multilateral political dialogue. Perhaps more controversially, cooperation with the ICTY, founded in The Hague in 1995, was established as a key condition by the Dayton grouping (Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia-Montenegro) for closer relations with both the EU and NATO (Bartlett, 2003: 78).
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In fact, the ICTY claimed jurisdiction over the Croatian military, particularly in relation to the police operations „Flash‟ and „Storm‟ in Krajina (Jovic, 2006: 2). Thus, in view of the 1993 „Copenhagen Criteria‟, which have been the „linchpin of the [EU] enlargement governance mode‟ (Dimitrova, 2004b: 9) since their introduction, the 1997 conditionality amounted to a „draconian‟ set of demands on the part of the EU (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003; see also Phinnemore, 2006).
For TuĎman and his clique, the Regional Approach scheme along with the concepts of the
„Western Balkans‟ and „regional cooperation‟ were unacceptable because they were seen and then interpreted at the domestic level as concealing a hidden agenda: the destruction of Croatia‟s independent statehood and subsequently the reconstitution of a new Yugoslavia (ibid: 89). In reaction to what he interpreted as a threat to Croatia‟s national identity and sovereignty, he initiated an amendment to the Croatian constitution in 1997, which included a new article (141), stating:
„It is prohibited to initiate any process of association of the Republic of Croatia with other states, if such an association would or could lead to restoration of Yugoslav state community or any new Balkan state union in any form‟ (cited in Jovic, 2006: 89).
By the mid-nineties TuĎman had turned openly hostile towards the EU, criticising its failure to halt Serbia‟s aggression on Croatia and for allegedly never really supporting Croatian independence (Jovic, 2009: 21-22). Furthermore, TuĎman considered himself as the creator of independent Croatia, and felt secure enough to reject what he saw were the unfair conditions that the EU defined through the 1997 Regional Approach (Jovic, 2006:
85). During the years when other CEE countries were negotiating conditions for accession to the EU, TuĎman accused Europe of purposely pushing Croatia „back to the Balkans‟
from which it had just escaped (Fisher, 2006). Moreover, the existence of the ICTY, which indicted several members of TuĎman‟s military elite, was interpreted by TuĎmanists as constituting a direct challenge to Croatian sovereignty.
To be more precise, for the illiberal and nationalistic regime of Franjo TuĎman, extraditing Croatian generals who helped restore the country‟s territorial integrity to The Hague as well as helping to re-integrate the expelled Serbs as envisaged by the Dayton and Erdut agreements translated into prohibitive compliance costs given that core elements and
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constitutive myths of the country‟s contemporary national identity – such as the
„Homeland War‟ - were at stake (Doleneć, 2008). Thus, opting for isolation was the only way to avoid accommodating Croatian standards of government to European ones (Goldstein, 1999: 262). According to TuĎmanists, Croatia would be able to survive on its own in the future.
This was to signal a retrenchment in the Croatian-EU relations. The HDZ under the right wing faction of Ivić Pašalić was largely an authoritarian and oppressive regime.
Consequently, access to EU PHARE assistance and the opening of negotiations on contractual relations remained suspended because of the EU‟s continued dissatisfaction with Croatia over the elements of 1997 conditionality such as refugee return, respect for democracy and the rule of law, as well as full cooperation with the ICTY (European Commission, 2000: 5). Between 1996 and 1999, the EU provided Croatia with limited assistance oriented solely towards the return of refugees and displaced persons. In fact, Croatia was placed under undeclared (silent) sanctions (Papadimitriou, 2001: 75-76).
Overall, the post-1996 period was marked by „negative conditionality‟ in the form of limited contractual relations and exclusion from an Association Agreement (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003: 7).
But, TuĎman‟s Croatia had a mixed and ambivalent attitude towards the EU. On the one hand, the notion of the „Western Balkans‟ was unacceptable to the Croatian government, as it linked Croatia to its former Yugoslav neighbours and Albania, instead of the CEECs, which had begun accession talks with the EU (and NATO) (Jovic, 2006: 89). On the other hand, as Bartlett (2003: 74) rightly contends, the regime was „keen to enjoy preferential trade relations with its largest export market‟, the EU. This was all the more true since in 1998/9 Croatian economy contracted seriously instead of growing (Bartlett, 2003: 109-18;
see next chapter). But because of Croatia‟s lousy compliance performance with regard to 1997 conditionality, the EU was unwilling to negotiate an Association Agreement with TuĎman‟s HDZ regime. Moreover, Croatia had also not gained admittance to the CEFTA, which in turn meant that it was also excluded from the duty-free zone covering its immediate neighbours: Hungary and Romania (ibid: 104). Combined with the fact that the Association Agreements signed with the other CEECs and the CEFTA regime gave these states preferential access to EU markets, Croatian goods became relatively uncompetitive
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in EU markets. Thus Croatian exporters had „an uphill struggle in gaining access not to just to EU markets, but also to the natural export markets to the east‟ (ibid). For all these reasons (ideational and material), the HDZ government established new structures for managing the country‟s (then still elusive) European integration affairs.
On 2 April 1998, a special independent body was established – the Government Office for European Integration (GOEI), led by a Deputy Prime Minister who was at the same time named Minister of European Integration. In September 1999, the Ministry produced an Action Plan for European Integration (Croatian Government, 1999). While the document acknowledged the conditionality imposed by the EU in 1997, it went on, however, to criticise the Union for placing Croatia alongside the other Balkan states which were grouped together within the Regional Approach framework by commenting that: „The Republic of Croatia interprets the term „Western Balkans‟ as an exclusively technical term.
Croatia does not accept that it carries any potential connotations which would place the Republic of Croatia within the Balkan framework‟ (ibid: 44).
4.3.2. Responding to the Kosovo crisis: The Stabilisation and Association process, 1999
The 1999 Kosovo crisis came to the fore as clear proof that the cycles of conflict in the region of Western Balkans were not yet over. It also showed that the EU‟s security, as well as credibility as a foreign policy actor and a security provider were once again at stake (cf.
Friis and Murphy, 2000). It is hardly surprising then, that the EU extended the Regional Approach into a much more wide-ranging platform - the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). Instead of a mere trade and cooperation agreement, the SAP offered Croatia and the other Western Balkan states the prospect of a more substantial Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) which provided, for the first time, albeit tenuously, the prospect of eventual accession to the EU (Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008: 383). Indeed, since its inception in May 1999, the EU projected the SAP as the „centerpiece of its policy in the Balkans‟ (European Council, 2000) or, put differently, its central „policy framework for the Western Balkan countries, all the way to their eventual accession‟. Analysts agree that the EU extended the prospect of future membership to these countries as a tool to avoid further instability and wars in the Balkans (Friis and Murphy 2000, Pippan, 2004). For Fakiolas and Tzifakis (2008: 385) the „regional stabilization - EU integration nexus‟ is the crux of
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this strategy, which additionally orders and fulfils „the condition that the prospect of EU accession depends on the pace of both of regional cooperation and the assimilation of European standards‟ (see also Batt, 2004, Batt and Obradovic-Wolchnik, 2009).
In reality, however, the EU membership promise was a „hasty and reluctant award‟
(Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008: 386), as manifested by the efforts of several countries led by France to dilute references to this prospect (Friis and Murphy, 2000). Considering that back then the EU was preoccupied with its „big bang‟ expansion to the CEE and that the Western Balkan countries were in many respects „failed‟ or „rogue states‟, the SAP aimed therefore primarily at their „European transformation rather than at their accession into the Union‟ (Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008: 387). But, the European Commission had to ensure the distant prospect of membership remained a credible incentive, given that the attraction of future membership was seen as the main reason why the post-communist CEE countries actually agreed to undertake dramatic domestic reforms as required by the EU (cf. Grabbe, 2001). As a result, the idea of manipulating the EU enlargement process was viewed by many in Brussels and other European capitals (particularly Berlin) as the only efficient way to discipline the SAP countries.
In many respects, the SAAs were thus not an innovative policy, but a replication of the European Commission‟s Association Agreements with the eight CEECs, although with additional and specific elements of conditionality such as „stabilisation, regional cooperation, democratisation, cooperation with the ICTY and the development of civil society and institution-building‟ (Papadimitriou, 2001: 77). The proposed SAAs also included economic and financial assistance and cooperation, political dialogue, harmonisation with the acquis communautaire, as well as the development of a free trade agreement between Croatia and the EU (Bartlett, 2003: 75). In addition to the SAA, the OBNOVA and PHARE programmes were complemented by the Community Assistance for Association, Democratisation, and Stabilisation (CARDS) scheme – a new assistance mechanism for the region. Moreover, unlike the eastern enlargement framework of the EU and its „regatta‟ approach that grouped together individual candidate countries, the SAP scheme established that the rapprochement with the EU was to be „tailor-made‟, based on the specific situation in the given country (Pippan, 2004). In this context, Croatia‟s (much
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like the other countries‟) integration process was to be assessed against the country‟s „own merits‟ as well as capacity to deliver the required reforms (European Commission, 2006d).