TRADUCCIÓN Y TRADUCTOLOGÍA: consideraciones generales

The last of the three academic theories is the idea that atheists have a higher than average intelligence (perhaps due to a better education) and that this leads them to give up their belief in the supernatural. This explanation is, for obvious reasons,

one that is more likely to be given by atheists themselves than by theists. In recent years, several empirical studies have focused on this issue and have produced some seemingly clear, yet also controversial, results.

For example, a recent study of white adolescents in America (Nyborg, 2009) found that atheists in this group had an average general IQ of 111, agnostics 109, members of liberal denominations 107, and members of conservative (or “dogmatic”) denominations 105. This study used representative data from the National

Longitudinal Study of Youth and was therefore based on a large sample size (n = 3,742). Another recent study (Lynn, Harvey & Nyborg, 2009) compared the data on national IQ from Lynn and Vanhanen (2006) with the levels of atheism in 137 countries from Zuckerman (2007) and found a .60 correlation between national IQ and disbelief in God. The authors suggested that as civilizations develop, they are more likely to rely on science as a means to explain and control nature, than

“unprovable religious dogmas” (p. 14).

In discussions of atheism and intelligence, a meta study by Paul Bell of Mensa is often cited. In this article, Bell (2002, quoted in Dawkins, 2006, p. 103) is said to have concluded, “Of 43 studies carried out since 1927 on the relationship between religious belief and one’s intelligence and/or educational level, all but four found an inverse connection. That is, the higher one’s intelligence or education level, the less one is likely to be religious or hold ‘beliefs’ of any kind.”

Another line of reasoning used to build the case for the relationship between atheism and intelligence is the prevalence of non-belief among scientists, who are generally accepted to be among the most intelligent and educated members of society.

In a study modelled on a survey done by James Leuba in 1914, Larson and Witham (1997) found that only 39.3% of American scientists believe in God, compared to over 90% of the general population (a percentage that had changed very little from the

41.8% reported back in 1914). In a follow-up study (Larson & Witham, 1998), the authors focused only on “greater” scientists—those who were members of the prestigious National Academy of Sciences. In the second study, they found that only 7.0% believed in God, with 72.2% describing themselves as atheists and 20.8%

describing themselves as agnostic. Similar studies have found that belief in God is also relatively rare among Nobel laureates (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997, p. 180).

Two other recent studies (Kanazawa, 2010) suggest that atheism, along with liberalism and male sexual exclusivity, are evolutionarily novel preferences and that this is why they are more likely to be found among those with higher intelligence. The first study, based on the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, found that young adults who identified as “not at all religious” had an average IQ of 103,

whereas those who identified as “very religious” had an average IQ of 97. The second study, based on the General Social Surveys, found a significant correlation between IQ and atheism in adults as well.

Although not all apostates are atheists, studies on apostasy are nevertheless also important to consider with regard to the issue of atheism and intelligence.

Several apostasy-related studies have shown a connection between the rejection of one’s childhood religion and an intellectual orientation (Caplovitz & Sherrow, 1977;

Hunsberger & Brown, 1984). Hadaway and Roof (1988) also report a positive correlation between apostasy and higher education.

Although the connection between atheism and intelligence appears to be quite clear, there are some who think the issue is more complex. For instance,

Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997) point out that the correlation might have more to do with class differences and access to education than with religious belief (p. 183). It is already known that wealthier people are less likely to hold strong religious views than poorer poorer people (Zuckerman, 2011, p. 105) This hypothesis seems to be backed

up by a recent study done by Theos, a public theology think-tank in the U.K.

(Spencer, 2009). The study found that although life-long atheists do tend to be better educated and come from higher classes, converts to atheism (those who believed in God at some point but abandoned that belief at some point), when compared to converts to theism, tended to have less education and come from lower social grades.

Spencer believes that this is the result of atheism shifting from being a minority movement among the higher social classes to being a more mass phenomenon. He writes, “The data suggests that the effect of vocal atheism over the last decade has been to reach successfully into previously uncharted demographic territory... if this happening, we might expect to atheism to become increasingly ‘religious’ in its composition, if not its size” (para. 12-13).

Others have noted the shift as well. Lee and Bullivant (2010) cite that an analysis of the 2008 British Social Attitudes Survey found that among white British males aged 25-34, religious people were more likely to have a degree (40%) than non-religious people (25%). They also reported results from the World Values Survey which found that there are slightly less non-believers among those with university degrees (14.8%) than among those whose highest attainment was secondary level (17.2%). In the U.S., at least one study (Lee, 2002) also found that higher education strengthens faith more often than it weakens it. The study, based on 5,426 college students surveyed during their freshman year and then again four years later, found that 37.9% reported that their faith had increased during their college years whereas only 13.7% reported that it had decreased.

It has long been noted that women tend to be more religious than men and that men are more likely to become apostates (Hadaway & Roof, 1988). But this is

changing as well, almost certainly due to greater gender equality in education and

women’s increasing role in the workforce. In describing the faith journeys of two women (Zuckerman, 2011) writes:

both of these women lost their faith when they were feeling—perhaps for the first time—in control of their own destinies. The fact that Rita and Nancy both rejected religion at a period in their lives when they were working for the first time—making money and supporting themselves—suggests the possibility that there may be a connection at the broader, societal level to women’s participation in the workforce and secularization (p. 114).

Finally, there is some evidence that being exposed to a variety of different cultures and ideas, which can be seen as a type of informal education, plays an important role in why many people end up abandoning their religious beliefs.

Zuckerman (2011) explains that for many non-believers it is:

moving to a new country and being exposed to new ways of life that makes them question their beliefs. For others, it is experiencing or becoming acquainted with other religions. For still others, it is simply taking a class in which they learn about other religions, other cultures. But the underlying dynamic is always the same: experiencing, witnessing, or learning about other people who do things differently, believe different things, and/or hold different outlooks on life can stir up a process of critical self-reflection that can be potentially corrosive to one’s long-held religious convictions (p. 156).

The above summary demonstrates that the connection between atheism and intelligence is still somewhat unclear. Section 8.1.7 of this paper will outline how the present project further tested the possible connection and the results.

3.3 Conclusion

Chapter three reviewed seven existing theories on why certain individuals who grow up in religious environments end up becoming atheists: immorality, arrogance, anger, poor father-child relationships, lower religious emphasis during childhood, deliberation in the pursuit of truth, and higher intelligence. It was demonstrated that the research literature related to each theory is inconclusive and that further

investigation into each area is merited. The present project will thus incorporate measures related to each of these seven existing theories alongside measures related to the central thesis of the project.

Aside from the theory of higher intelligence, the existing theories all have one thing in common: they are all based on subjective, emotional, or social reasons rather than some sort of objective or innate quality in the person. However, there is reason to believe that innate qualities may play a role as well. After discussing many of the theories covered in this chapter, Zuckerman (2011) concluded, based on his

numerous interviews with atheist apostates:

One of the most common metaphors people employed in describing their apostasy was that it was akin to “coming out” as a homosexual. Such people said that they had tried their hardest to be religious—and they had even convinced themselves for a spell that they did have faith—but in the end, they just couldn’t deny their internal irreligiosity any longer, and they had to simply admit and embrace the atheism or agnosticism that seemed to be at the core of their being.

The next chapter will introduce one model of individual differences that may prove useful in determining which innate qualities may play a role in why some people become atheists and others do not.