6-8. This matrix considers targets within the HN population, government, and infrastructure. It allows leaders to identify target vulnerability, determine corresponding risk, and then prioritize security assets. The matrix is based on seven criteria represented by the acronym CARVER-P (criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effects, recognizability, and psychological impact). This matrix derives from the Army risk-assessment process. Figure 6-1 shows an example format of the Carver-P matrix for the vulnerability criteria. Figure 6-2 shows an example of the same matrix completed for a power plant.
Figure 6-1. Example format for Vulnerability Prioritization Matrix.
Figure 6-2. Example completed CARVER-P Vulnerability Prioritization Matrix.
6-9. Complete the CARVER-P Vulnerability Prioritization Matrix using these five steps: Step 1—Identification
6-10. Identify and continually reevaluate the key structures, capabilities, organizations, and individuals in the AO that the insurgents may target. Record each target's name and location on a separate Carver-P Risk/Vulnerability Prioritization Matrix. Figure 6-2 showed an example matrix completed for a power plant.
Step 2—Evaluation
6-11. Evaluate this potential target using the Criteria Evaluation Tool shown in Figure 6-3. This tool provides a simple means to determine risk either using the four generic risk statements of each criteria, or by developing or modifying similar statements.
Step 3—Analysis
6-12. In the Criteria Evaluation Tool (Figure 6-3), for each criteria, choose an appropriate risk statement, which corresponds to a risk level. Then, explain why and how you assessed the risk level, assign a numerical value for each of the criteria and, if needed, identify the control and mitigation for each assessment. Transfer this information to the matrix and sum the values. This sum represents the assessed desirability of the potential target from the insurgent’s perspective. The higher the number the more likely the insurgent will attack the target.
Step 4—Facilities Category
6-13. Using this sum, identify the facilities category (Figure 6-4). Both the identification and the prioritization of vital assets and key points should be the responsibility of the Host Nation. However, US commanders should participate in the planning process for assets within their area of operations. To assist in this process, it is useful to have a simple method of categorizing the facilities to be considered. Figure 6-4 shows a suggested method for categorizing facilities.
Step 5—Prioritization
6-14. Compare this target to others to determine priority.
CRITICALITY CRITERIA. Criticality refers to asset value. This is the primary consideration in targeting. A
target is critical when its destruction or damage has a significant impact on military, political, or economic aspects of a community.
High effect on output, production, service, or mission ... High Risk
Moderate effect on output, production, service, or mission ... Moderate Risk
Negligible effect on output, production, service, or mission ... Low Risk
No significant effect on output, production, service, or mission ... No Risk
Why and how Value Controls and Mitigation
ACCESSIBILITY CRITERIA. An asset is accessible when an insurgent can reach
the target with sufficient personnel and equipment to accomplish its mission.
Highly accessible: standoff weapons can be employed ... High Risk
Moderate accessibility: heavy barriers or protection can be employed ... Moderate Risk
Little accessibility: some barriers or protection employed ... Low Risk
Inaccessible or accessible only with extreme difficulty ... No Risk
Why and how Value Controls and Mitigation
RECUPERABILITY CRITERIA. An asset's recuperability is measured in time. That is,
how long will it take to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of or damage to the target?
High effect on replacement, repair, or substitution ... High Risk
Moderate effect on replacement, repair, or substitution ... Moderate Risk
Some effect on replacement, repair, or substitution ... Low Risk
No effect on replacement, repair, or substitution ... No Risk
Why and how Value Controls and Mitigation
VULNERABILITY CRITERIA. An asset is vulnerable if the insurgent has the means
and expertise to attack the target.
Vulnerable to small-arms fire, light antiarmor fire, or charges of 5 to 10 pounds ... High Risk
Vulnerable to medium antiarmor fire, bulk charges of 10 to 30 pounds, or very careful
placement of smaller charges ... Moderate Risk Vulnerable to heavy antiarmor fire, bulk charges of 30 to 50 pounds, or requires special
weapons ... Low Risk Invulnerable to all but the most extreme targeting measures ... No Risk
Why and how Value Controls and Mitigation
EFFECTS CRITERIA. The effect of an asset attack is a measure of possible military,
political, economic, psychological, and sociological impacts at the target and beyond.
Overwhelmingly positive effects for insurgent; no significant
negative effects ... High Risk Moderately positive effects for insurgent; few significant negative effects ... Moderate Risk
No significant effects; neutral ... Low Risk
Overwhelmingly negative effects for insurgent; no significant positive effects ... No Risk
Why and how Value Controls and Mitigation
RECOGNIZABILITY CRITERIA. An asset's recognizability is the degree to which an insurgent or
intelligence-collection and reconnaissance assets can recognize it under varying conditions.
The target is clearly recognizable under all conditions and from a distance. Requires little
or no training for recognition ... High Risk The target is easily recognizable at small arms range. Requires a small amount of
training for recognition ... Moderate Risk The target is hard to recognize at night or in bad weather, or might be confused with other
targets or target components. Requires some training for recognition ... Low Risk The target cannot be recognized under any conditions, except by experts ... No Risk
Why and how Value Controls and Mitigation
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT CRITERIA. An asset's psychological impact is the degree
to which it affects the local population and that population's perception of the government.
Overwhelmingly negative effects on population's perception of government ... High Risk
Moderately negative effects on population's perception of government ... Moderate Risk
Little negative effects on population's perception of government ... Low Risk
Overwhelmingly negative effects on population's perception of government ... No Risk
Why and how Value Controls and Mitigation
Figure 6-3. Criteria evaluation tool (continued).
PROTECTION
6-15. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure, deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). The elements of protection are the same in concept between conventional operations and COIN. However, one important aspect is that, counterinsurgents are responsible for protecting local citizens. By ensuring that the local population is secure, counterinsurgents increase their effectiveness in all other tasks and gain allies who will provide information and cooperation. This increases the security of tactical units.